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# ΕΝΥΠΟΣΤΑΤΟΣ

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## Content

<i>Preface</i> .....	1
<i>I. The Pre-neochalcedonian ἐνυπόστατος-tradition</i> .....	2
1. ἐνυπόστατος – a technical and doxological Christian term.....	3
2. The development of the technical usage during the Arian controversy.....	7
3. The establishment of the technical usage in late fourth- and early fifth-century authors...	14
<i>II. The Christological application of ἐνυπόστατος</i> .....	20
A. ἐνυπόστατος and the ‘insubsistence-formula’ from John the Grammarian to John of Damascus.....	21
1. John the Grammarian and the introduction of ἐνυπόστατος into the Christological debate.....	23
2. Leontius of Byzantium and the distinction of ἐνυπόστατον and ὑπόστασις.....	29
2a. Philosophical excursion: The distinction καθ’ αὐτό - ἐν ἄλλῳ, the problem of substantial qualities and inexistent natures.....	33
3. Ephrem of Amid.....	38
4. Pamphilus the Theologian.....	40
5. <i>De sectis</i> and the Christological disadvantages of the common usage.....	45
6. Leontius of Jerusalem.....	47
7. Maximus the Confessor.....	53
8. Anastasius Sinaites (and the Doctrina patrum).....	66
9. John of Damascus.....	75
B. Summary.....	89
<i>Abbreviations and Bibliography</i> .....	93

## Preface

The so-called doctrine of *enhypostasia* is probably the only thing an average theologian knows about the post-chalcedonian development of patristic theology. It was very prominent in the confessional orthodoxy of the seventeenth century, despised by most of the enlightenment theologians and rehabilitated in the twentieth century in the context of Karl Barth's reinterpretation of the trinitarian and Christological dogma. Whereas this solemn tradition was mainly inaugurated by the western reception of John of Damascus' Πηγὴ γνώσεως, modern patristic scholarship from F. Loofs wanted trace back this doctrine until the beginning of the sixth-century and derived its origin from Leontius of Byzantium's defence of the Chalcedonian dogma. With more and more of Loofs' postulates about Leontius being refuted, Brian E. Daley challenged also this doctrine as being alien both to the Christology of Leontius and to the entire patristic era in a widely discussed, but still unpublished paper. The term ἐνυπόστατος, Daley argued, does not signify a quasi-accidental inherence of Christ's human nature in the person of the divine Logos, but simply its reality. The prefix ἐν- is not to be misunderstood as meaning 'in', but – being the opposite of an α- privativum - has to be understood as 'having' or 'endowed with'. Of course, this gives rise to the question, whether several hundred years of doctrinal tradition have in fact been deceived by an insufficient acquaintance with Greek prefixes.

This examination wants to contribute to a solution of this problem on a mainly terminological level, by analysing the use and significance of the term in question in the Christian authors of the relevant period. However, as the technical Christological usage in the post-chalcedonian debates developed on the background of an older, trinitarian usage the Church probably inherited from Origen, we will briefly have to work out this background in a first chapter on its use during the trinitarian debates of the late third up to the early fifth century. For the post-chalcedonian period, we will examine the works of those authors we consider to have contributed to a more or less significant degree to the development of our term one by one. Of course, this presupposes criteria of selection which have to be justified. Our main criterion was, whether the author presents explicit reflections about the meaning of our term and whether he connects it with a Christological somewhat comparable to the alleged doctrine of *enhypostasia*. Hence, we included neither the letter of the monk Eustathius, because he just uses the term without any explicit reflections upon its meaning, nor Eulogius of Alexandria, because he just

repeats John the Grammarian, nor Anastasius of Antioch, because in his dogmatic sermons he does not use the term at all and in his antitritheist dialogue he only makes a short remark about it which is perfectly in line with what we had already read in John the Grammarian or *De sectis*. On the contrary, we did include Anastasius Sinaita – although his writings do by no means occupy a prominent place in the history of our term –, because of his extensive treatment of the ‘no nature without hypostasis’-objection which was the stimulus for the whole development of technical Christological usage of our term.

A problem we can treat only marginally is that of the alleged metaphysical innovations connected with the *enhypostasia*-doctrine. Nonetheless, the few remarks we are going to present about this will hopefully enable the reader to judge for himself about those postulates. Additional support for such a judgement could be provided by the short preface introducing the treatment of our individual post-chalcedonian authors. The clues concerning those authors’ relationship to contemporary philosophy are thus probably not as necessary as those concerning the interrelation of the Christian authors amongst each other which provide the necessary basis for any description of a development of a term, but nevertheless have their relevance in the context of our fragmentary remarks concerning possible metaphysical innovations.

## I. The Pre-neochalcedonian ἐνυπόστατος-tradition

The Greek prefix ἐν- is subject to a crucial ambiguity which was not only puzzling for interpreters of sixth-century Christology. Being derived from the local preposition meaning “in”, it can actually retain its literal, localising sense, e.g. in ἐγγάστριος (“in the womb”) or ἐνυγρος (“in the water”). Even Aristotle has to refute the possible misunderstanding of differentiae like (ζῳον) ἐνυδρον as distinguishing species of animals according to their location (Topics VI,6 144 b 31-145 a 1). However, in most of the cases it has lost its localizing sense and is simply opposed to an α- privativum, as in ἐντιμος / ἄτιμος. In those cases, one has to determine how ‘external’ the possessed entity is conceived to be with regard to the possessing one. In the context of a materialistic philosophy, ἐνυλος would in any case mean just ‘material’, i.e. it would describe a kind of identity between ὕλη and the ἐνυλον. In contrast, an idealistic philosophy would not conceive of the ἐνυλον as matter or material, but as in-mattered, i.e. currently in some kind of connection with matter without being identical with it.

Similar examples are the important Christian terms ἑνσαρκος and ἑνσώματος. Melito of Sardes was blamed for being a materialist because of writing a treatise Περὶ τοῦ ἑνσωμάτου θεοῦ, which was interpreted as ‘On the corporeal God’, but in fact meant ‘On the incorporated i.e. incarnate God’.<sup>1</sup> We will have to see which of those two possible meanings can be verified with regard to ἑνυπόστατος.

### 1. ἑνυπόστατος – a technical and doxological Christian term

It is very a astonishing fact that the term ἑνυπόστατος at least until the sixth century CE seems to appear only in Christian texts. The only possible pagan reference I could find stems from Secundus, a gnomologist of the second century, but in the light of a closer philological examination the phrase appears to originate in a later misreading of ἑνυπόστατος for ἀνυπόστατος.

According to the manuscripts B, Pc and V, the question about what a friend is is answered by ἑνυπόστατον κειμήλιον.<sup>2</sup> However, Perry’s decision to accept this reading is in my opinion very problematic, as he took the immediate context of the phrase from PNA, which represent the other branch in the tradition of BPcV.<sup>3</sup> In PNA the text reads: Τί φίλος; [...] ἀγκῶν τάλαιπορίας, κατάσκοπος βίου, ἄνθρωπος ἀκατάληπτος, ἀνυπόστατον κειμήλιον, ἀκατάληπτος εὐτυχία. BPcV replace ἄνθρωπος ἀκατάληπτος by δυσκατάληπτον εὐρημα and ἀκατάληπτος εὐτυχία by ἄπρονος ἐπιτυχία (B), ἐπίμονος εὐτυχία (Pc), or ἀπόμονος ἐπιτυχία (V) respectively. Hence, all three manuscripts show the tendency to suppress Secundus’ pessimism with regard to the possibility of finding or retaining friends which would be completely in line with a replacement of ἀνυπόστατον by ἑνυπόστατον. Moreover, the obvious misreading ἀνυπόστακτον κειμήλιον in R – the oldest manuscript<sup>4</sup> – is much better explicable by supposing ἀνυπόστατον in its original. Probably just like Perry, the scribe may have thought that it does not make much sense to call a friend a “non-existent treasure”. However, paralleling the two ἀκατάληπτος-phrases,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. A. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*, vol. 1, Freiburg: Herder 1979, p. 210f. Cf. also Maximus Confessor, *Ambiguum* 17 (MSG 91, 1225C). Although “material” is not mentioned as a possible meaning of ἑνυλος in H.G. Liddell / R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon. A New Edition revised and augmented throughout by H. S. Jones*, Oxford: Clarendon 1958, s.v. (col. 579a), the frequent opposition of the word to ἄυλος is much better explicable presupposing this ‘simpler’ meaning rather than the more complicated “involved or implicated in matter” (Cf. e.g. Eusebius, *Demonstratio evangelica* III,3,10; ed. I.A. Heikel, Leipzig: Hinrichs 1913 [GCS 23], p. 111 [quoting Porphyry] / Denys the Areopagite, *De ecclesiastica hierarchia* I,5; ed. G. Heil / A.M. Ritter, Berlin: De Gruyter 1991 [PTS 36], p. 67,21-23 / Hermeias, *In Platonis Phaedrum scholia*, ed. P. Cuvreur, Paris: Bouillon 1901 [repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1971], p. 65,5-7 and similarly Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus* I,6,45,1; ed. O. Stählin, Leipzig: Hinrichs 1905 [GCS 12], p. 117 / Cyril of Alexandria, *In Isaiam* [MSG 70, 680B] / Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, prop. 209; ed. E. R. Dodds, Oxford: Clarendon 1963, pp. 182f). However, in philosophical texts, the hylomorphic metaphysics most of them are based on makes a decision very difficult, since every ‘material’ object is constituted by a form ‘impressed’ in the formless prime matter. Anyway, in case of the πάντως ἑνυλα (Olympiodorus, *Prolegmena*; CAG XII/1, 9,36f), the objects of natural science, ‘being involved in matter’ finally amounts to being material.

<sup>2</sup> B.E. Perry, *Secundus the silent philosopher*, Ithaca, New York: American Philological Association 1964, p. 84 (Sent. 11). The next pagan reference stems from the early sixth century philosopher Asclepius, pupil of Ammonius Hermeiou (In Met.; CAG VI/2, 363,21).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Perry’s introduction in Secundus, pp. 14-23 (stemma on p. 22).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Ibid., pp. 10f.

ἀνυπόστατον κειμήλιον is in my opinion a very suitable expression for the unavailable preciousness of a friend.

The earliest Christian reference can be found in Irenaeus, fragment 19, where Jesus is claimed to be τοῦ ἐνυποστάτου Λόγου τύπος ἀψευδής,<sup>5</sup> a fact that made many scholars regard the fragment as spurious.<sup>6</sup> A few decades later, we find Origen speaking of Christ as ἐνυπόστατος λόγος at least two times<sup>7</sup>: In his *Expositio in Proverbia* he distinguishes two kinds of wisdom, the one given to the believers by the Spirit and the ἐνυπόστατος Υἱὸς καὶ Λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, who brought everything into being by his wisdom (MSG 17,185B). Origen wants to distinguish a non-substantial kind of wisdom, a Spirit-given attribute of the souls of the believers, from a substantial one, the second person of the Trinity and Son of God himself, who is the personified wisdom of the father itself. The second passage from the *Adnotationes in Deuteronomium* is rather of non-technical, doxological nature, enumerating the following titles for Christ: ὁ ἀληθὴς Ἐκκλησιαστής, τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἡ κεφαλὴ, καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ Πατὴρ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνωτάτω καὶ ἐνυπόστατος σοφία καὶ λόγος (MSG 17,28B). This distinction is roughly corresponding to that of Lampe, s.v. A 1 and A 2, but wants to maintain that the *Sitz im Leben* of the term was originally a theological, Christological one. There is no reference for an expansion of its use to a meaning of “real, concrete, actual” (Lampe’s A 2) and an application to non-christological or trinitarian issues before the late fourth

<sup>5</sup> Sancti Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis libri quinque adversus haereses, ed. W.W. Harvey, vol. 2, Cambridge: CUP 1857, p. 488.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. R.M. Grant, The Fragments of the Greek Apologists and Irenaeus, in: Biblical and Patristic Studies in Memory of R.P. Casey, Freiburg: Herder 1963, 213: “The difficult word in the fragment is ‘hypostatic’ (ἐνυποστάτου); this cannot come from Irenaeus.”

<sup>7</sup> The last fragment of the Scholia in Matthaeum is obviously not authentic. Cf. Origenes Matthäuserklärung III. Fragmente und Indices, ed. E. Benz / E. Klostermann, Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs 1941 (GCS 41), 235. Against the suggestion of Henrici quoted in the apparatus, I would not suppose a „Verfasser nach Art des Severus“. The antimodalist rejection of συναλοιφή of the three persons rather points to second half of the fourth century, somewhere between or after Cyril of Jerusalem and Epiphanius. The former connects a similar warning in Catecheses IV,8; ed. ed. W.C. Reischl / J. Rupp, vol. 1, Munich: Lentner 1848, p. 98 with the Sabellian υἱοπάτωρ, saying: Καὶ μήτε ἀπαλλοτριώσης τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱόν, μήτε συναλοιφὴν ἐργασάμενος υἱοπατορίαν πιστεύσης Ἀλλὰ πίστευε ὅτι ἑνὸς Θεοῦ μονογενὴς εἷς ἐστὶν υἱὸς, ὁ πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων Θεὸς Λόγος· Λόγος, οὗ προφορικὸς εἰς ἀέρα διαχεόμενος, οὔτε λόγοις ἀνυποστάτοις ἐξομιούμενος· ἀλλὰ Λόγος υἱὸς λογικῶν ποιητὴς, Λόγος ἀκούων τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ λαλῶν αὐτός. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων κατὰ καιρὸν, εἰ ὁ Θεὸς παράσχοι, πλατύτερον ἡμῖν ῥηθήσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιλανθανόμεθα τῆς προτάσεως, ὅτι κεφαλαιώδεις εἰσαγωγὰς πίστεως νῦν ποιούμεθα. (Cf. Cat XI,16.18; ed. Reischl / Rupp, vol. 1, pp. 310.312) In opposing the errors of Arius and Sabellius (οὔτε χωρίζομεν τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα ὥς τινες, οὔτε συναλοιφὴν ὥς Σαβέλλιος ἐργαζόμεθα. Cat XVI,4; ed. Reischl / Rupp, vol. 2, Munich: Lentner 1860, p. 208) Epiphanius might be dependent on him (e.g. Panarion 62,3,4; ed. K. Holl, vol. II, Leipzig: Hinrichs 1922 [GCS 31], p. 393 / 62,7,1; *ibid.*, p. 395 a.m.). Already Eusebius in his *De ecclesiastica theologia* III, 15,3 (Eusebius Werke, Vol. 4: Gegen Marcell. Über die kirchliche Theologie. Die Fragmente Marcellis, ed. E. Klostermann / G.C. Hansen, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1972 [GCS 14], p. 172) defends a subordinatianist conception of the ὑποταγὴ τοῦ υἱοῦ against a συναλοιφή τις καὶ σύγχυσις τῶν ὄλων.

century, when Basil, Macarius / Symeon and Didymus the Blind started arguing against the substantial reality of evil.<sup>8</sup>

The hypothesis I want to expound in the first part of this examination is that these two traditions of using the term can be traced throughout the whole trinitarian (and Christological) controversy until the beginning of the neo-chalcedonian period. Given those two traditions existed, the two questions arise, which of them is prior to the other and how do they interrelate with the genuinely Christological tradition, the examination of which will be the task of the second part, the core-section of my thesis?

The first question could provide an explanation for the Christian monopoly on the usage of ἐνυπόστατον. In its more doxological use the term is employed to emphasize the son's belonging to the father: this person, presented to us by the gospel, is nothing but God's personified word or wisdom itself. The immediate biblical origin of this use of the term is obvious: Jesus Christ is δύναμις καὶ σοφία ἐνυπόστατος (1Cor 1:24)<sup>9</sup>, ζωὴ ἐνυπόστατος (John 11:25; 14:6)<sup>10</sup>, ἀλήθεια ἐνυπόστατος (John 14:6)<sup>11</sup>, δικαιοσύνη ἐνυπόστατος (1Cor 1:30)<sup>12</sup> and finally – most important – λόγος ἐνυπόστατος (John 1). Whereas the meaning of ἐνυπόστατος in the first five titles clearly is “personified x” or “x itself”, it is not that easy to see why exactly the term Logos has to be specified this way. The probably most obvious explanation would be that the specification is supposed to distinguish Jesus Christ, the personified word of God, from other, non-personal words of God like e.g. the old-testament law (cf. John 1:17)<sup>13</sup> or the preaching of the church. Yet, most of the passages the title occurs in show no distinction from other words of God at all, neither explicitly nor implicitly. Where it does not occur in a doxological row of titles<sup>14</sup> or stress the independent personal

<sup>8</sup> Basil, Quod Deus non est auctor malorum; MSG 31, 341C / Makarios/Symeon, Homily 16,11-13.77f, in: Die 50 geistlichen Homilien des Makarios, ed. H. Dörries, E. Klostermann and M. Krüger, Berlin: De Gruyter 1964 (PTS 4) p. 158.160 / Didymus, frg. 26 l.2 in Ps 5,5-7, in: Psalmenkommentare aus der Katenenüberlieferung, ed. E. Mühlenberg, Berlin: De Gruyter 1975 (PTS 15), p. 132,1f.

<sup>9</sup> Apart from the Origen passage quoted above, cf. esp. Cyril of Alexandria's use of δύναμις ἐνυπόστατος (bel. n. 72).

<sup>10</sup> Ps-Athanasius, De st. Trinitate dialogus V (MSG 28, 1277A); John Chrysostomos, Homily 5 in John 1:3 (MSG 59, 57D).

<sup>11</sup> Asterius Sophista, Homily 21,21 in Ps 11,2b LXX (Asterii sophistae commentariorum in Psalmos quae supersunt, ed. M. Richard, Oslo: Brogger 1956 [Symbolae Osloenses, fasc. suppl. 16.], p. 169,3).

<sup>12</sup> Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis IV,7; ed. Reischl / Rupp, vol. 1, p. 96.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Irenaeus, fr. 19 (ab. n. 5)/ Cyril of Alexandria, Sancti patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi Alexandrini in D. Joannis evangelium, ed. P.E. Pusey, vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1872 (repr. Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1965), p. 569.

<sup>14</sup> The best example is probably Epiphanius, Ancoratus 19,1, ed. K. Holl, vol. 1, Leipzig: Hinrichs 1915 (GCS 25), p. 27: Αὐτὸς τοίνυν ὁ ἅγιος Λόγος ὁ ζῶν ὁ ἐνυπόστατος, ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ ἐπουράνιος, ὁ υἱὸς ὁ γνήσιος, ὁ αἰὶ <ὦν> σὺν πατρί, ὁ ἐκ πατρὸς προελθὼν, τὸ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, ὁ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως, «ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς» ἐν ἀληθείᾳ, ὁ σύνθερος τοῦ φύσαντος...



subsistence of the trinitarian persons according to the technical use, the context mostly deals with the substantial equality of father and son. The ἐνυπόστατος λόγος of the father is the one which truly proceeds from him, exists in him and is of equal glory and power, truly and undeniably God the Son, wisdom, power and word of the Father. The connotation of truth and authenticity inherent in “personified Logos” or “Logos himself” becomes the dominant aspect in the meaning of the term (John 14:9).<sup>15</sup>

The technical use somehow presupposes this doxological one in stressing the substantial and personal independence from the father the Logos has despite his close affiliation to him. In the first Origen-passage, it is not the second type of wisdom, but the Son and Logos who receives the attribute ἐνυπόστατος, which is thus indirectly transferred to the wisdom by identifying the latter with the Son. It was probably designed as a positive counterpart to ἀνυπόστατος, a term quite common to classical pagan literature. Just like ὑπόστασις / ὑφίσταμαι developed its basic meaning from “sediment, foundation” to “substantial reality” within the first centuries BC and CE<sup>16</sup>, ἀνυπόστατος means “irresistible” in Plato, “without sure foundation” in Polybius and “unsubstantial” in some Stoic and later philosophers.<sup>17</sup> Where pagan literature offers ὑπόστατος, ὑποστατικός, ὑφεστώς<sup>18</sup> or something else which is not derived from

<sup>15</sup> Cf. the vicinity of ἐνυπόστατος to ἀλήθεια-derivatives in Origen, Adnotationes in Deuteronomium (MSG 17, 28B) / Epiphanius, Ancoratus 10,5 (GCS 25, p. 18); 19,1 (ibid., p. 27); Panarion 76,29 (GCS 37, p. 378); 76,35 (ibid. 385). Cf. the following passages not referring to the Son: Epiphanius, Panarion 70,6 (ed. K. Holl, vol. 3, Leipzig: Hinrichs 1933 [GCS 37], p. 238: θεὸς ἀληθὴς καὶ ὢν ἀληθῶς ἐνυπόστατος βασιλεύς) / John Chrysostom, Homily 4,7 in principium Actorum (MSG 51, 107B: ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐνυπόστατος ἀνάστασις); id. (?), In catenas St. Petri 19 (ed. E. Batareikh, “Discours inédit sur les chaînes de S. Pierre attribué à S. Jean Chrysostome,” Χρυσοστομικά 3. Rome: Pustet 1908: ἐλπὶς ἐνυπόστατος καὶ ἀληθής).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. H. Dörrie: Υποστασις. Wort und Bedeutungsgeschichte, in: Platonica minora, Munich: W. Fink 1976, (13-69) esp. pp. 32ff.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Liddel-Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. (col. 168a).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Hippolytus, Refutatio omnium haeresium V,17,8, ed. M. Marcovich, Berlin: De Gruyter 1986 (PTS 25), p. 185 (Against the Peratai): οὐδεὶς οὖν, φησί, δύναται σωθῆναι οὐδ' ἀνελθεῖν <εἰ μὴ> διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν ὁ ὄφιος· ὥς γάρ, <φησί,> κατήνεγκεν ἄνωθεν τοὺς πατρικοὺς χαρακτηῖρας, οὕτως πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἀναφέρει τοὺς ἐξυπνισμένους καὶ γεγονότας <μνηστήρας> πατρικοὺς χαρακτηῖρας, ὑποστατοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἀνυποστάτου ἐντεῦθεν ἐκεῖ μεταφέρων. / Synesius Alchemista (4th century), Πρὸς Διοσκοῦρον εἰς βιβλίον Δημοκρίτου (ed. M. Berthelot and C.É. Ruelle, Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs, vol. 2. Paris: Steinheil, 1888 [repr. London: Holland Press, 1963], p. 62): Ἐνόησας, Διόσκορε· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ κηρὸς, οἶον δ' ἂν προσλαμβάνῃ χρῶμα δέχεται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ὑδράργυρος, φιλόσοφε, αὕτη λευκαίνει πάντα, καὶ πάντων τὰς ψυχὰς ἔλκει, καὶ ἐπεὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπισπᾶται. Διοργανιζομένη οὖν καὶ ἔχουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰς ὑγρότητας πάντως, καὶ σῆψιν ὑφισταμένη ἀμείβει πάντως τὰ χρώματα, καὶ ὑποστατικὴ γίνεται, ἀνυποστάτων αὐτῶν ὑπαρχόντων. μᾶλλον δὲ, ἀνυποστάτου αὐτῆς ὑπαρχούσης τότε καὶ κατόχιμος γίνεται ταῖς οἰκονομίαις ταῖς διὰ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν ὑλῶν αὐτῶν. In Cyrill's Thesaurus we find next to ἐνυπόστατος ὑποστατικός, and οὐσιωδής (MSG 75, 101B-D), in the Ps-Athanasian Sermo in annuntiationem deiparae the λόγος ὑποστατικός is contrasted to a mere λόγος προφορικός (MSG 28, 921C/D), and Ps-Athanasius and Didymus also use ὑπόστατος in relevant contexts (cf. Lampe, Patristic Greek Lexicon, s.v. [1461b]).

the same root as positive counterpart to the term at this final stage of its development, some Christian circles may well have designed the more exactly corresponding ἐνυπόστατος instead in order to express their overwhelming impression of the word, wisdom and power of God personified in Jesus Christ.

Yet, for the task of my thesis these considerations are only *parerga*. Much more interesting is the second question about the interrelation of the Pre-neochalcedonian, trinitarian tradition(s) of the term and the (post-)Neochalcedonian, Christological one(s).

To find an answer to this, we have to give brief account of how that trinitarian tradition(s) developed from the third to the early sixth century.

## 2. The development of the technical usage during the Arian controversy

The first time the term appears in a fairly prominent position was during the controversy around Paul of Samosata. Against the strict monarchianism of Paul, the *Letter of Hymenaeus* wants to maintain that the only begotten Son, God's wisdom, word and power, is truly god (without article!) not by foreknowledge, but οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει.<sup>19</sup> Jesus Christ must not be thought of as a simple human being in whom the divine wisdom decided to reside in some extraordinary way, but as a substantial divine reality in its own right, coeternal with the father, his partner in the work of creation, revelation and salvation from the very beginning. When Col 1:16 says that everything was created in the Son, you must not regard him as inferior instrument, otiose spectator or ἀνυπόστατος ἐπιστήμη, but as ζῶσα ἐνέργεια καὶ ἐνυπόστατος.<sup>20</sup> The biblical arguments for this view present a clearly subordinationist position: Predicates like 'angel', but probably also 'mediator' or 'anointed' cannot be attributed to the father himself, but only to the personified wisdom revealing him to us.<sup>21</sup> The anointing of Christ was not a temporal act of adoption, but one of Christ's eternal and essential traits:

<sup>19</sup> Eine fingierte Korrespondenz mit Paulus dem Samosatener, ed. E. Schwartz, in: SbBAW 1927 (42-46), p. 42 (324,21 Turrianus). Schwartz's rejection of the authenticity of this letter (ibid. pp. 49-55) was opposed by G. Bardy and H. de Riedmatten and did not receive acceptance among scholars (cf. CPG 1705).

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 43 (326,9f).

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 44 (326,21-23): τὸν μὲν γὰρ θεὸν τῶν ὅλων ἀσεβὲς ἄγγελον νομίσαι καλεῖσθαι, ὁ δὲ ἄγγελος τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς ἐστίν, αὐτὸς κύριος καὶ θεὸς ὢν. Although θεός must not take the article in predicative position, one can in my opinion nevertheless assume Origen's distinction between θεός and ὁ θεός as standing behind the text (cf. Origen, Commentary on John II,2,17, ed. C. Blanc, vol. 1, Paris: Cerf 1966 [SC 120], pp. 216f).

“If Christ existed before the eons as God’s power and God’s wisdom, he also did that as Christ, because he is – despite being perceived according to a very large number of terms – substantially one and the same entity”.<sup>22</sup>

Unmentioned throughout the early stages of the Arian controversy, the term finds its first proper theological promoter in Cyril of Jerusalem:

“The Father begot the Son, not like in a human being the intellect ‘begets’ a word. For the intellect in us is ἐνυπόστατος, but the speech is dispersed through the air and perishes. But we know that Christ was begotten not as a λόγος προφορικός, but as the Logos which is ἐνυπόστατος, alive, not pronounced by lips and dispersed, but comes from the Father eternally and inexpressably, and was begotten ἐν ὑποστάσει.” (Cat XI,10)<sup>23</sup>

This seems to be the first attempt to employ our term in order to secure the apologetic Logos-concept against a possible modalistic abuse. Already Irenaeus had to reproach the Valentinian Gnostics for considering the true Logos to be a mere λόγος προφορικός,<sup>24</sup> which reproach from then on became a commonplace in orthodox Christian literature.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, the early apologists, especially Theophilus of Antioch, quite keenly identified Christ with the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος of the father to maintain the spiritual nature of the son’s begetting and defend the latter against any

<sup>22</sup> Fingierte Korrespondenz, p. 46 (330,1-3): εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς καθὼ θεοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεοῦ σοφία πρὸ αἰώνων ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ καθὼ Χριστός, ἐν γὰρ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὧν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα πολλαῖς ἐπινοίαις ἐπινοεῖται.

<sup>23</sup> More explicit, but without employing the term ἐνυπόστατος in the addition to catechese XVI,3 (ed. Reischl / Rupp, vol. 2, pp. 248f): Ἄλλ' ὥσπερ θεοῦ λόγον ἀκούσαντες οὐκ ἀνυπόστατόν τι πρᾶγμα τὸν λόγον φήθημεν οὔτε ἐκ μαθήσεως ἐγγινόμενον οὔτε μετὰ τὸ προενεχθῆναι διαλυόμενον, οὔτε ἄλλο τι πάσχοντα τοιοῦτον οἶα περὶ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον θεωρεῖται πάθη, ἀλλ' οὐσιωδῶς ὑφειστώτα προαιρετικόν τε καὶ παντοδύναμον, οὕτως καὶ πνεῦμα μεμαθηκότες θεοῦ, τὸ συμπαρομαρτοῦν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ φανεροῦν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, οὐ πνοὴν ἄσθματος ἐννοοῦμεν, (ἡ γὰρ ἂν καθαιροῖτο πρὸς ταπεινότητα τὸ μεγαλεῖον τῆς θείας δυνάμεως, εἰ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἡμετέρου καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα ὑπονοοῖτο,) ἀλλὰ δύναμιν οὐσιώδη, αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐν ἰδιαζούσῃ ὑποστάσει θεωρουμένην, οὔτε χωρισθῆναι τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν ἡ λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ ᾧ παρομαρτεῖ δυνάμενην, οὔτε εἰς τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἀναχωρήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου καθ' ὑπόστασιν οὔσαν, προαιρετικὴν, αὐτοκίνητον, ἐνεργον, πάντοτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προαιρουμένην καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν πρόθεσιν σύνδρομον ἔχουσαν τῇ βουλήσει τὴν δύναμιν.

<sup>24</sup> Adversus haereses II, 13,8, ed. N. Brox, Freiburg e.a.: Herder 1993 (FC 8/2), p. 102. Cf. M. Mühl, Der λόγος ἐνδιάθετος und προφορικός von der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351, in: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 7 (1962), (7-56), pp. 47-49. On the philosophical background of the distinction cf. ibid. 8-24 (Stoa, Philo, Gnostics). The later third and fourth century is treated by Mühl very briefly and superficially (cf. ibid. 52-56: Origen, Hilary, Athanasius, Augustine, Sirmium).

<sup>25</sup> For references see G. W. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford: Clarendon 1961, 809b. Of special interest could be the following passage from Origen’s commentary in John (I,24): Καὶ ἔστιν ἄξιον ἐπιστῆσαι [...] τὸ τί ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος ὀνομαζόμενος, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπεὶ συνεχῶς χρῶνται τῷ: «Ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία μου λόγον ἀγαθόν», οἰόμενοι προφορὰν πατρικὴν οἰονεῖ ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειμένην εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπόστασιν αὐτῷ, εἰ ἀκριβῶς αὐτῶν πυνθανοίμεθα, οὐ διδόασιν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ σαφηνίζουσιν, οὐδέπω φάμεν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, ἀλλ' ὅπως ποτέ οὐσίαν. Λόγον γὰρ ἀπαγγελλόμενον υἱὸν εἶναι νοῆσαι καὶ τῷ τυχόντι ἐστὶν ἀμήχανον. Καὶ λόγον τοιοῦτον καθ' αὐτὸν ζῶντα καὶ ἥτοι οὐ κεχωρισμένον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ μὴ ὑφειστάναι οὐδὲ υἱὸν τυγχάνοντα ἢ καὶ κεχωρισμένον καὶ οὐσιωμένον ἀπαγγελλέτωσαν ἡμῖν θεὸν λόγον.

mythological misunderstanding.<sup>26</sup> Two centuries later, this will be stigmatized as preposterous modalistic heresy. In Eusebius' polemics against Marcellus of Ancyra we have the first instance of rejecting both sides of the stoic opposition as proper explanation for the essence of the Logos. The second book of his *De ecclesiastica theologia* deals with Marcellus' renewal of the Sabellian heresy. Its eleventh chapter blames Marcellus of calling the Logos sometimes προφορικός, sometimes ἐνδιάθετος λόγος of God while the fifteenth chapter provides the proof from Marcellus' own works. What Eusebius seems to be particularly upset about is the anthropomorphism of Marcellus' theology ascribing something like human thought and speech to the eternal and transcendent God.<sup>27</sup> If the term Logos in John 1 has to be understood κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς, not καταχρηστικῶς,<sup>28</sup> Marcellus' πλατύνεσθαι of the Godhead, the transgression of the Logos form being δυνάμει ἐν τῷ πατρὶ to being ἐνεργείᾳ πρὸς τὸν θεόν,<sup>29</sup> is nothing but the manifestation of something inside God, undistinguishable from the human utterance of thoughts breaking Marcellus' ἡσυχία τις before creation.<sup>30</sup>

Eusebius' own view of the Logos can be beautifully illustrated by a quotation from his commentary in Psalms (on 57,4c with reference to 43,3a and 107,20):

"The light, the truth and the Logos sent from the highest God are neither without substance (ἀνούσια) nor without hypostasis (ἀνυπόστατα). Just as the Logos is perceived as agent of healing and salvation, the same is named 'mercy' in our passage, because he is a servant of God's philanthropy. Accordingly, he is called 'truth', because he really subsists (ἀληθῶς ὑφεστῶς) and is actually substantiated (κατ' ἐνεργειαν οὐσιωμένος). Our speech which has its hypostasis in syllables, verbs and nouns and is pronounced by tongue and voice might not be called 'logos' properly and truly. For it has another logos which 'begets' it and which might be called 'logos' properly. That one is called the ἐνδιάθετος logos. Hence, just like the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος in us which could also be truly called logos, God's Logos is hypostatical (ὑπόστατος), substantially subsisting (κατ' οὐσίαν ὑφεστῶς), different from the one who sent him".<sup>31</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Ad Autolycum II,10,2. 22,3, ed. M. Marcovic, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 1995 (PTS 44), pp. 53.70. Cf. Mühl, Logos, pp. 25-32 (Theophilus and his reception by Tertullian).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. esp. De ecclesiastica theologia I, 17,7 (GCS 14, p. 78) / II, 11,1 (Ibid., p. 112); 14,20 (pp. 117f); 15,2-4 and J.T. Lienhard, Contra Marcellum. Marcellus of Ancyra and Fourth-Century Theology, Washington: The Catholic University of America Press 1999, 131-134.

<sup>28</sup> Marcellus, fr. 46 (GCS 14, p. 193). Cf. Ibid. I,1,2f (pp. 62f), where Eusebius argues that Sabellianism consists in calling the second person of the Trinity κυρίως word and only καταχρηστικῶς son.

<sup>29</sup> fr. 52 (Ibid., p. 194).

<sup>30</sup> fr. 103 (Ibid. p. 207).

<sup>31</sup> MSG 23, 509A. For Eusebius, this substantial independence does not exclude a reciprocal trinitarian inexistence: καὶ πάλιν οὕτως ἦν ὁ πατήρ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ. ὥς ὁ θεῖος ἀπόστολος καὶ περὶ πάντων διδάσκει τῶν τῆς ἐπουρανίου βασιλείας ἀξίων λέγων· «τότε ἔσται ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν», ὥς καὶ τὸ «ἐνοικήσω ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐμπεριπατήσω» λέλεκται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμεῖς «ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμεν». καὶ ταῦτα πάντα περὶ ἡμῶν λέλεκται, τῶν κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ὑφεστῶτων καὶ ζώντων καὶ μηδὲν ἔχόντων κοινὸν πρὸς τὴν πατρικὴν θεότητα. τί δὴ οὖν χρὴ θαυμάζειν, εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αἱ παραπλήσιοι φέρονται φωναί, οὐκ ἀναιροῦσαι μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν οὐδ' αὐτὸν εἶναι πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν διδάσκουσαι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς

To rule out the Marcellian deviation Eusebius uses many expressions equivalent to ἐνυπόστατος in its technical trinitarian sense: ἀληθῶς ὑφ'εστῶς, κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὐσιωμένος, ὑπόστατος (!) and κατ' οὐσίαν ὑφ'εστῶς.

The substantial independence of the Logos expressed by those or similar terms was in fact the crucial point in the homoeousians' early anti-marcellian (and -athanasian) opposition and in my opinion also the theological context for the emergence of the term ἐνυπόστατος. This can be shown by a comparison of the early homoeousian creeds from 341 to 345.

The Dedication council of Antioch (341) offers two corresponding formulas:

Theophronius of Tyana's creed (first creed) has θεὸν τέλειον ἐκ θεοῦ τελείου, καὶ ὄντα πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἐν ὑποστάσει.<sup>32</sup> The officially ratified creed (second creed) expounds Mt 28:19 the following way:

"...obviously of the Father who is truly father, of the Son who is truly son, and of the Holy Spirit who is truly holy spirit, as those names are not given without meaning or function (οὐχ ἀπλῶς οὐδὲ ἀργῶς), but as accurately signifying the proper hypostasis, rank and glory of those named by them. Thus, they are three with respect to their hypostasis, but one with respect to their harmony (ὡς εἶναι τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ δὲ συμφωνίᾳ ἓν)".<sup>33</sup>

One paragraph of the *Ekthesis Makrostichos* (345) runs:

"For we know that he is not just God's λόγος προφορικὸς or ἐνδιάθετος, but the living God-Logos existing by itself (καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑπάρχοντα), God's Son and Christ, who accompanies and stays with his Father before eons and assists him in the entire creation of both visible and invisible things not merely as included in divine foreknowledge (οὐ προγνωστικῶς)".<sup>34</sup>

Socrates' text of the creed is already amplified by the gloss: ἀλλ' ἐνυπόστατον Λόγον ὄντα τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ.<sup>35</sup> This glossator shows an accurate awareness of what the point of introducing this term into the trinitarian discussion was: It was a homoeousian way to secure the apologetic Logos-terminology against the Marcellian abuse. The Word, wisdom and power of God is not a λόγος οἷος ὁ ἐν καρδίᾳ or a σοφία οἷα ἐν ψυχῇ ἀνθρώπου,<sup>36</sup> but an eternal divine being ἐν ἰδίᾳ

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αὐτὸν ἰδιόζουσαν καὶ ἐξάρετον τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν τῆς μονογενοῦς καὶ θεικῆς κοινωνίας παριστῶσαι; (De eccl. theol. III,20; GCS 14, p. 181).

<sup>32</sup> J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, Singapore: Longman 1972, 267 (Athanasius, De synodis 24; ed. H.G. Opitz, Berlin: De Gruyter 1940, p. 250).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 269 (De syn 23,5f).

<sup>34</sup> Athanasius, De synodis 26,6; ed. Opitz, p. 253 (cf. Kelly, *Creeds*, p. 279f). Calling the Son λόγος προφορικὸς ἢ ἐνδιάθετος is again condemned in the eighth anathema of the second council of Sirmium (351) against Marcellus' pupil Photinus (cf. De synodis 27,3; ed. Opitz, p. 255).

<sup>35</sup> *Historia ecclesiastica* II,19,17; ed. G.C. Hansen, Berlin: Akademie 1995 (GCS NF 1), p. 115.

<sup>36</sup> Epiphanius, Panarion 65,3,4 (GCS 37, p. 5) = Paul of Samosata, fr.49 Loofs.

ὑποστάσει, acting αὐτοπροσώπως<sup>37</sup> from creation throughout the history of world, reigning alongside the father without end. Thus, for the homoeousians the Logos of Marcellus corresponds exactly to the ἀνυπόστατος ἐπιστήμη which the six bishops who subscribed to the *Letter of Hymenaeus* claimed Paul of Samosata's Logos to resemble. Not surprisingly, they accused him and his pupil Photinus<sup>38</sup> not only of Sabellianism, but also of Paulinianism and thus obviously made use – at least at the second council of Sirmium (351) – of anti-paulian documents like the *Letter of Hymenaeus*.<sup>39</sup> A similar conservative position, very close to the Cappadocian compromise can be found in Meletius of Antioch's famous homily, which caused his deposition by the Arians, but was not accepted by the Eustathians either. Meletius confesses:

“The Son is and is called Logos, but is not perceived as (mere) voice or word of the Father. For he subsists by himself (ὑφέστηκε γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸν) and acts, and everything is through and in him. Similarly, he is wisdom and is perceived neither as (mere) thought of the Father nor movement or activity of his intellect, but as offspring of the father, equal to him and his accurate image. For he is the one who was sealed by the Father, God himself, and he does not inhere in something else, nor does he subsist by himself (οὐχ ἑτέρῳ μὲν ἐνυπάρχει, οὐχ ὑφέστηκε δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὸν), but is the active offspring who has created all this and always conserves it”.<sup>40</sup>

The creation of God's wisdom (Prv 8:22) and the begetting of his Son (Ps 2:7) are complementary analogies: The Logos is not ἀνυπόστατός τε καὶ ἀνύπαρκτος like human wisdom, but ἐνυπόστατόν τε καὶ μόνιμον like a human son, a created natural entity; yet, he is neither heterogeneous to his source, like the product of a certain technical know-how, but a unique ‘reduplication’ of the Father, his only-begotten son, similar to him in every respect.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Ekthesis makrostichos (De synodis 26,6; ed. Opitz, p. 253): ὁ καὶ τοῖς πατριάρχαις αὐτοπροσώπως ὀφθεῖς.

<sup>38</sup> In the debate between him and Basil of Ancyra at Sirmium II (351), he said according to Epiphanius, Panarion 71,2 (GCS 37, p. 251): οὐπω δὲ ἦν <υἱός>, λόγος δὲ ἦν, καθάπερ ἐν ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος. Accordingly, Epiphanius criticizes him in 71,3-5 exactly the way Eusebius argued against Marcellus claiming that God's son and co-creator could neither be his λόγος ἐνδιάθετος nor προφορικός (cf. bel. on Epiphanius).

<sup>39</sup> Cf. H. de Riedmatten, Les actes de Paul de Samosate. Étude sur la christologie du IIIe au IVe siècle, Fribourg: Éditions St. Paul 1952, pp. 129-133. The consequence of this association of Marcellus, Photinus and Paul was a severely adulterated concept of Paul's monarchianism which is already in Epiphanius barely distinguishable from Marcellus' modalism; cf. ibid. 82-91 and R.M. Hübner, Die Hauptquelle des Epiphanius (Panarion, haer. 65) über Paulus von Samosata: Ps-Athanasius, Contra Sabellianos, in: ZKG 90 (1979), 55-74.

<sup>40</sup> Epiphanius, Panarion 73,30 (GCS 37, 305).

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 70,31 (p. 306f). The whole homily has still got a slightly subordinatianist touch, when it calls the son λόγος καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις τοῦ ὑπὲρ σοφίαν καὶ δύναμιν, ὑπὲρ ὃ φητέχασθαι δύναται γλῶττα, ὑπὲρ ὃ κινήσαι διάνοια (ibid. 73,30; p. 305).

Of course the Marcellan party did react. Given Marcellus himself is the author of the pseudo-athanasian *Expositio fidei*,<sup>42</sup> he even explicitly repudiates Eusebius' reproaches saying:

"We believe [...] in one only-begotten Logos, wisdom, Son, begotten from the Father eternally and without beginning, not in a λόγος προφορικός, not in a λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, not in an outflow from the perfect one, not in a piece cut off from the impassible nature or an emanation, but in the Son perfect in itself, living and acting, the true image of the Father, equal to him in honour and glory".<sup>43</sup>

Shortly before Marcellus' death in about 371, the Marcellian party writes an *Expositio fidei* to Athanasius seeking his support against Basil of Cesarea. They still do not speak of three hypostases, but at least of a subsisting Triad:

"For we are confessing an eternal Father of an existing (ὄν) and subsisting (ὑφεστώς) eternal Son and an eternally existing and subsisting Holy Spirit, as we do not call the Triad ἀνυπόστατον, but conceive of it as ἐν ὑποστάσει".<sup>44</sup>

Four years later, the marcellian party confesses its orthodox faith to some bishops exiled in Egypt and finally condemns its master's doctrine about God's expansion and contraction speaking openly of three subsisting realities in God:

"We have not thought anything deviating from the Nicene [...] faith, [...] and pronounce accursed [...] everyone who does not regard the holy Triad as three persons who are incomprehensible, ἐνυπόστατα, consubstantial, coeternal and perfect in themselves, just as we pronounce accursed those who call the Son an expansion, contraction or energy of the father, and those who do not confess the God-Logos, the Son of God to be from before the ages, coeternal with the Father and a son and god who is ἐνυπόστατος and perfect in himself".<sup>45</sup>

When Socrates tells us that already Eustathius of Antioch had called the son ἐνυπόστατος καὶ ἐνυπόρχων in a controversy with Eusebius of Cesarea<sup>46</sup>, he probably rephrases the debate in his own terms, as such a friendly stance towards the hypostatical plurality in the homoousian party cannot be detected before the turning point of 362, when Athanasius' *Tomus ad Antiochenos* provided the basis for a reconciliation of the Origenist three-hypostases theology and the Nicene ὁμοούσιος.

<sup>42</sup> The latest Marcellus monograph of Lienhard, 23.25-27 does not reject F. Scheidweiler's (Wer ist der Verfasser des sog. Sermo major de fide?, in: BZ 47 [1954], [333-357] 356f) suggestion, but does not rely on it either.

<sup>43</sup> *Expositio fidei* 1,2, in: Athanasiana I, ed. H. Nordberg, Helsinki / Helsingfors: Centraltryckeriet 1962 (Commentationes humanarum litterarum 30.2), p. 49. Although Sabellius is explicitly rejected in 2,2; *ibid.*, p. 51 (οὐτε γὰρ υἱοπάτορα φρονοῦμεν ὡς οἱ Σαβέλλιοι λέγοντες μονοούσιον καὶ οὐχ ὁμοούσιον καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀναιροῦντες τὸ εἶναι υἱόν) the allegory of source and river in 2,4 conveys a modalist impression by calling father and son δύο σχήματα καὶ δύο ὀνόματα. Moreover, the son's sessio ad dextram and reign without end is not mentioned a single time – a striking fact in texts with such a close relation to the creed.

<sup>44</sup> *Expositio* 2,4; in: M. Tetz, Markellianer und Athanasios von Alexandrien. Die markellianische *Expositio fidei* ad Athanasium des Diakons Eugenios von Ankyra, in: ZNW 64 (1973), (75-121) p. 79,29-32.

<sup>45</sup> Epiphanius, *Panarion* 72,11 (GCS 37, p. 265).

<sup>46</sup> *Historia ecclesiastica* I,23,8 (GCS NF 1, p. 70).

According to the confession of the Meletians, the expression ‘three hypostases’ is acceptable, “because we believe in the Holy Trinity which is not only a triad by name, but a really existing and subsisting one (ἀληθῶς οὖσαν καὶ ὑφεστῶσαν), a really existing and subsisting Father, a really substantially existing and subsisting (ἀληθῶς ἐνούσιον ὄντα καὶ ὑφεστῶτα) Son, and a subsisting and existing (ὑφεστῶς καὶ ὑπάρχον) Holy Spirit”. In accordance, the reply of the Eustathians admits that ‘one hypostasis’ is possible, if it is not intended as an “abolition of the Son and the Holy Spirit, as if the Son was unsubstantial (ἀνούσιος) or the Holy Spirit without hypostasis (ἀνυπόστατος)”.<sup>47</sup>

This turning point removed every obstacle for a mainstream reception of the homoeousian term ἐνυπόστατος in trinitarian theology, as it emerges esp. in Pseudo-Athanasius, Didymus the Blind and later on in Cyril of Alexandria, partly also in John Chrysostom.<sup>48</sup>

### 3. The establishment of the technical usage in late fourth- and early fifth-century authors

Examining the exegesis of Hbr 1:3 in the pseudo-athanasian dialogues *De trinitate*, one is reminded of the discussion between Eusebius and Marcellus, whether Son or Logos has to be understood properly and thus has to form the key-concept of Christology.<sup>49</sup> According to Ps-Athanasius, δύναμις, σοφία and λόγος have to be understood alongside with ἀπαύγασμα as titles emphasizing the consubstantiality of Father and Son, whereas the title Son manifests τὸ ἐνυπόστατον, i.e. that the Son is an οὐσία ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει.<sup>50</sup> Against the Anomoean’s objection that the χαρακτήρ τῆς

<sup>47</sup> MSG 26, 801B/C. The arrangement of the two confessions is most clearly presented by L. Abramowski, Trinitarische und christologische Hypostasenformeln, in: *Formula and Context. Studies in Early Christian Thought*, Hampshire: Variorum Reprints 1992, (38-49) pp. 42f n. 21 and 23.

<sup>48</sup> Basil the Great still expresses his anti-modalistic concern mostly in different terms, as e.g. in epist. 210,5: Οὐ γὰρ ἐξαρκεῖ διαφορὰς προσώπων ἀπαριθμήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ χρή ἕκαστον πρόσωπον ἐν ὑποστάσει ἀληθινῇ ὑπάρχον ὁμολογεῖν. Ἐπεὶ τὸν γε ἀνυπόστατον τῶν προσώπων ἀναπλασμὸν οὐδὲ Σαβέλλιος παρητήσατο, εἰπὼν τὸν αὐτὸν Θεόν, ἓνα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντα πρὸς τὰς ἑκάστοτε παραπιπτούσας χρεῖας μεταμορφούμενον, νῦν μὲν ὡς Πατέρα, νῦν δὲ ὡς Υἱόν, νῦν δὲ ὡς Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον διαλέγεσθαι. The three references for such a use of the term in Gregory of Nyssa (Cfr *Eunomium* III,6,17; ed. W. Jaeger, vol. II, Leiden: Brill 1960, pp. 191f / *Adv. Macedonianos de spiritu sancto*; ed. F. Mueller, vol. III/1, Leiden: Brill 1958, p. 102,27f / *Oratio catechetica* 8; ed. E. Mühlenberg, vol. III/4, Leiden: Brill 1996, p. 35,8-16) do not contribute much to this survey.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. ab. n. 28.

<sup>50</sup> MSG 28, 1124B-1125A.1160B-1161A; esp. 1161A: Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, Υἱὸν ἀκούοντες, τὸ ἐνυπόστατον νοοῦμεν καὶ δύναμιν ἀκούοντες, καὶ Λόγον, καὶ σοφίαν, τὸ ἀχώριστον καὶ συναίδιον ἐπαιδευόμεν. A.I.C. Heron’s discussion of the term in those dialogues (The two pseudo-athanasian dialogues against the anhomoeans, *JThS* 34 [1973], [101-122] 114-118) points in the right



ὑποστάσεως had its subsistence ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει of the Father and not on its own, the Orthodox stresses the substantial independence of the Son and thereby clearly establishes a meaning of ἐνυπόστατος diametrically opposed to any kind of insubsistence.

Didymus the Blind, who apparently uses the pseudo-athanasian dialogue as an important source,<sup>51</sup> seems in his use of the term more concerned about the substantial reality of the Spirit than that of the Son. When he speaks of the ἐνυπόστατον ἀπαύγασμα καὶ χαρακτήρ, he rather has in mind the undiminished equality of Father and Son: the Son is the personified and most adequate (ἐνυπόστατον καὶ ἀψευδέστατον) simile of the Father's being.<sup>52</sup> Yet, speaking about the Spirit he is very eager to stress exactly that substantial independence our previous authors wanted to maintain mainly (of course not exclusively) for the Son.<sup>53</sup>

Epiphanius of Salamis is really fond of our term: In his two main works, *Ancoratus* and *Panarion*, written between 374 and 377, ἐνυπόστατος occurs 74 times, of which only four references belong into a non-trinitarian context.<sup>54</sup> More than half of the trinitarian references are of antimodalistic intention. Yet, the modalistic misunderstanding of the Logos-concept is neither treated in the chapters against the Valentianian Gnostics, nor

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direction, but does not reject C. Bizer's suggestion that ἐνυπόστατον could mean something like ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας clearly enough.

<sup>51</sup> I follow Heron's view, op.cit. 118-122, who considers the De trinitate to be an authentic work of Didymus', but argues convincingly against A. Günthör that the pseudo-athanasian Dialogues do not belong to him. For the De trinitate the following editions are used: Didymus der Blinde: De trinitate, Buch 1, ed. J. Hönscheid, Meisenheim am Glan: Hain 1975 / De trinitate, Buch 2, Kapitel 1-7. ed. I. Seiler, Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1975. For II,8-27 and III, there is no alternative to MSG 39 available.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. De trinitate I,16,44, ed. Hönscheid, p. 98; 26,15f, ibid., p. 160; without reference to Hbr 1:3 also in II,2,35, ed. Seiler, p. 36 and III,19 (MSG 39, 892A). An antimodalistic exposition of the term Logos occurs in his Genesis-commentary, codex page 2A 1.2-7, ed. P. Nautin and L. Doutreleau, vol. 1, Paris: Cerf 1976 (SC 233), p. 34: πάντα γὰρ [διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐγένετο καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἐκτίσθη τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς [οὐρανοῖς τὰ ὁρατὰ] καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα· ἐν γὰρ τῷ υἱῷ τὰ πάντα συνέστηκε [καὶ εἰς αὐτόν, ὅς] ἐστ[ι] πρὸ πάντων· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅς οὐ[τε προφορικῶς] οὐτε ἐνδιάθετός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, Θεοῦ οὐσ[ιάδος ... τῷ] ὄντι, ο[ὐδ] ἐν ὑποστῆναι δύναται.

<sup>53</sup> De trinitate II,1,7-9, ed. Seiler, pp. 8-10; II,8,1 (MSG 39, 616A); III,37 (MSG 39, 972B). A very interesting passage for the use of enhypostatos in general occurs in Didymus' commentary on Zachary, ed. L. Doutreleau, vol. 2, Paris: Cerf 1962 (SC 84), p. 139: Ἐπὶ λθὲν τινι τῶν παλαιῶν εἰπεῖν τὸν δικαστὴν ἔμψυχον δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον, τελείως κατὰ δικαιοσύνην πεποιμένον, ἵν' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔργοις δικαίως τὸ δίκαιον διώκει, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ δικάζειν. Just as the Son is called personified word, wisdom, power, life etc., the judge can be called personified, personally realized or living justice.

<sup>54</sup> Ancoratus 77,5 (GCS 25, p. 97: ἐνυπόστατος/ον ψυχῇ/σώμα); Panarion 24,6 (GCS 25, p. 263: ἐνυπόστατον κακόν) and 25,4 (Ibid., p. 271: ἐνυποστατικαὶ ἀρχαί). By trinitarian context I mean the reference to one of the trinitarian persons, which could of course occur in treating whatsoever theological topic.

in that against Noetus, nor in that against Sabellius, but only in those against Paul of Samosata and Photinus of Sirmium.<sup>55</sup>

Paul and Photinus are of course linked by their adoptianism and their modalism. Both of them express – according to Epiphanius – their modalistic stance by the anthropomorphic misconception of the divine Logos for which Marcellus had been criticised by Eusebius:

“That person [Paul] is claiming that God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, and that his logos and spirit are always in God, just as a man’s proper λόγος is always in his heart. According to him, the Son of God is not ἐνυπόστατος, but (exists) in God himself, just like also Sabellius, Novatianus, Noetus and others claimed”.<sup>56</sup>

Combined with the misunderstood anthropological analogy, the modalistic use of John 10:38<sup>57</sup> becomes particularly dangerous, because it renders the Son a mere function, attribute or accident of the Father without proper subsistence. If the Son were in the Father just like human reason is in its possessors, he would be nothing but one of God’s transitory manifestations:

“If the Logos existed in the beginning, and the Logos was with God, his existence (τὸ εἶναι) is not just κατὰ τὴν προφορὰν, but κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν. [...] For if God has the Logos only in his heart, but not as a begotten one, how can the word ‘existed’ and the phrase ‘God was the Logos’ [John 1:1a.c] be maintained? The logos of a man is not a man who is together with this man. Neither does it live nor does it subsist (ὑπέστη), but it is just the movement of the living and subsisting heart (καρδίας δὲ ζώσης καὶ ὑφεστώσης) and not a hypostasis. For once it is uttered it suddenly ceases to exist”.<sup>58</sup>

Against Photinus’ affirmation during the debate with Basil of Ancyra that the Logos in the beginning οὐπω δὲ ἦν <υῖός>, λόγος δὲ ἦν, καθάπερ ἐν ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος<sup>59</sup>, Epiphanius also maintains that the Son cannot be just προφορά τις [...], ἀλλ’ ἐνυπόστατος θεὸς λόγος.<sup>60</sup> Why he uses ἐνυπόστατος only once in chapter 71 and rather characterizes the eternal Logos with a term like ἔμφυτος, which could suggest exactly the opinion he opposes,<sup>61</sup> is a question I cannot answer.

<sup>55</sup> In the chapter against Sabellius, an anthropological analogy is mentioned, but not expounded (Panarion 62,1; GCS 31, p. 389). The chapter against Marcellus mainly consists of documents not written by Epiphanius (Macellus’ letter to Pope Julius [72,2f], Acacius of Caesarea’s treatise against Marcellus [72,6-10], the confession of the Marcellians to the Egyptian bishops [72,10f]).

<sup>56</sup> Panarion 65,1 (GCS 37, p. 3). About the misleading introduction of Novatianus see Holl’s annotation to I.13 (p. 3f).

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Panarion 57,5 (against Noetus; GCS 31, p. 349); 62,2 (against Sabellius; ibid. p. 391).

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. 65,3 (GCS 37, pp. 5f).

<sup>59</sup> Cf. ab. nn. 27f.

<sup>60</sup> Panarion 71,5 (GCS 37, p. 254); cf. esp. 71,2 (Ibid. p. 251: ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, φησὶν, ἦν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἦν υῖός); 71,3f (Ibid. pp. 252f: neither προφορικὸς nor ἐνδιάθετος λόγος).

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. 71,3 (Ibid., p. 252) cf. Eusebius, *De ecclesiastica theologia* II,16 (GCS 14, p. 120): τί δὲ μὴ πιστεύων εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ προσποιεῖται πιστεύειν, σχηματιζόμενος διὰ τοῦ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐν τῷ θεῷ υἱὸν ἀποκαλεῖν, σαφῶς τοῦ παραδείγματος μακρῶ διεστάναι διδάσκοντος τὸν ἔμφυτον

John Chrysostom also explicitly maintains against every modalistic heresy that the Logos is not a mere ἐνέργεια of God, but an οὐσία ἐνυπόστατος.<sup>62</sup> In his homily on Hbr 1:3 he draws from the title χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως exactly the opposite conclusion to the one the Anhomoean draws in the pseudoathanasian dialogue: the impress of a hypostasis does not have its being in this hypostasis, but exists independently outside it, resembles it in every respect except κατὰ τὸ ἐνυπόστατον εἶναι,<sup>63</sup> it is a numerically different subsistence, which can nevertheless be perfectly equal to its prototype with respect to its essence or quality. Moreover, the terms ἀπαύγασμα and χαρακτήρ entail a perfect similarity of Father and Son which must also include the substantial reality of the Father: ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ Πατὴρ ἐνυπόστατος, καὶ πρὸς ὑπόστασιν οὐδενὸς δεόμενος· οὕτω καὶ ὁ Υἱός.<sup>64</sup> Yet, Chrysostom's most significant contribution seems to be a first link of the term ἐνυπόστατος with the philosophical substance-accident scheme. Quoting the heretics' objection that an ἀπαύγασμα is not ἐνυπόστατον [...], ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι,<sup>65</sup> he clearly has in mind the Aristotelian distinction between things that are in something else as their subject and other things that are subjects themselves.

Cyril of Alexandria is again really fond of our term: It occurs 51 times in his works, only once in non-trinitarian (or Christological) context.<sup>66</sup> He is probably the author one can find the richest variety of hypostasis- and ousia-language in, mainly in his two big treatises on the Trinity and his commentary on John. He likes to combine ἐνυπόστατος not only with terms like ἐνούσιος or οὐσιώδης, but especially with the more 'lively' ζῶν and sometimes also ἐνεργής.<sup>67</sup> His trinitarian theology seems all in all less defensive and less concerned about possible misunderstandings than that of his predecessors: He freely develops a positive understanding of the hypostasis of the

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ἐν ψυχῇ λόγον παρὰ τὸν ἕκ τινος γεννηθέντα καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑφ' ἑστώτα καὶ ζῶντα καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα υἱόν;

<sup>62</sup> Homily 6 in Phil 2:5-8 (MSG 62, 219B); cf. Homily 4 in John 1:1 (MSG 59, 47B: οὗτος δὲ ὁ Λόγος οὐσία τίς ἐστὶν ἐνυπόστατος, ἐξ αὐτοῦ προελθοῦσα ἀπαθῶς τοῦ Πατρὸς.).

<sup>63</sup> Homily 2 on Hbr 1:3 (MSG 63, 22B).

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. (63, 20B).

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> In Isaiam on 1:19f (MSG 70, 48C: Εἰ γὰρ φύσει τὸ κακὸν, καὶ ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστιν...).

<sup>67</sup> 19 times combined with ζῶν: Thesaurus de sancta consubstantiali trinitate (MSG 75, 80C.596B); In Joannem (ed. Pusey, vol. I, pp. 35.294.382; vol. II, pp. 47.310.697.714); De st. Trinitate dialogi (ed. ed. G.M. de Durand, vol. 3, Paris: Cerf 1978 [SC 246], pp. 92.96.102); Expositio in Psalmos (MSG 69, 785A.876A); Commentarii in Lucam (ex cat.) (MSG 72, 476A); Contra Iulianum imperatorem I,28 (ed. P. Burguière and P. Éviéux, vol. 1, Paris: Cerf 1985 [SC 322], p. 160); De incarnatione unigeniti (ACO I/1/5,4: ἐνυπόστατος, ἐνεργής, ζῶν); Epistula ad Maximianum (ACO I/1/3,72); Epistula ad monachos (ACO I/1/1,15) – three times with οὐσιώδης: Thesaurus (MSG 75, 580A); In Joannem (ed. Pusey I, 70; II, 714) – two times with ἐνούσιος: Thesaurus (MSG 75, 104A); Apologia XII capitulorum ctr orientales (ACO I/1/7,51).

Son as word, power and wisdom of God. In his *De recta fide ad Theodosium* he mentions the modalistic word-concept only during the refutation of an adoptianist Christology à la Paul of Samosata or Photinus:

“Some people deface the beauty of truth [...] and imagine the Only-begotten inexistent and not subsisting independently (ἰδικῶς οὐχ ὑφ’εστηκότα). Those miserable people are claiming that he is not endowed with an independent hypostasis (οὐκ εἶναι μὲν ἐν ὑποστάσει τῇ καθ’ ἑαυτόν), but that he is simply a word, the speech happening merely according to God’s utterance (κατὰ μόνην τὴν προφορὰν γενέσθαι παρὰ θεοῦ) and inhabiting a man. Having composed Jesus this way, they say that he is holier than the saints, but by no means God. [...] However, the likenesses are like their archetypes. [...] Thus, if neither the likeness is ἐνυπόστατος nor the image is perceived as endowed with independent existence (ἐν ὑπάρξει νοοῖτο τῇ καθ’ ἑαυτόν), they will have to admit as a necessary consequence that also the one to whom the image corresponds is ἀνυπόστατος, and the stain (ἀκαλλὲς) of the likeness will most certainly be carried over (ἀναδραμεῖται πού) to the archetype”.<sup>68</sup>

Yet, the analogy of the reasoning in the father afterwards revealed by uttering the word is keenly drawn upon elsewhere.<sup>69</sup> The analogies of word, reason and wisdom can explain the simultaneity of unity of essence and distinction of persons beautifully, because word and wisdom are ἐκ νοῦ καὶ ἐν νῶ προσεχῶς καὶ ἀδιαστάτως, and all three have as it were an εἰς ἄλληλα ἀντεμβολήν:

“For the intellect is in word and wisdom, and the word will appear in turn in the intellect, and nothing interrupts or separates one from the other”.<sup>70</sup>

In his *Thesaurus*, Cyril answers the heretic’s objection how a momentarily uttered word can be the eternal Son of God in the following way:

“The word coming from a man is resolved into nothing and is neither alive nor active, as also the man who ‘begot’ it comes from nothing and is subject to destruction. In contrast, the Logos of God is living; as it comes from some living thing, it was always existing and exists (always). For neither was God ever nor will he ever be without the Logos”.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>68</sup> ACO I/1/1,50f. Note the parallel terms and phrases for enhypostatos: ἰδικῶς ὑφ’εστηκώς, εἶναι ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει τῇ καθ’ ἑαυτόν, νοεῖσθαι ἐν ὑπάρξει τῇ καθ’ ἑαυτόν.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *Thesaurus* (MSG 75, 80C.297B.321D-324A); In Ioannem (ed. Pusey, vol. I, pp. 69f; vol. II, p. 310). In another passage of the commentary in John (Ibid. vol. I, p. 57) the Arians demanding a λόγος ἐνδιάθετος in the Father, which is responsible for the existence of the Son, are asked, whether they consider this logos to be ἀν- or ἐνυπόστατον. If it subsisted properly, there would be two sons. If it is not, nothing can disturb the continuity between Father and Son.

<sup>70</sup> In John 1:3 (ed. Pusey, vol. I, p. 70).

<sup>71</sup> *Thesaurus* 16 [on the eternity of the Son] (MSG 75, 300A). A similar argument of Eunomius that a ῥήματος ἀργὴ προφορὰ and an ἐπιστήμη ἀνυπόστατος cannot be the Son of God, is refuted the very same way later on (Ibid., 321C-324B). Cf. also his positive evaluation of the craftsman/know-how-analogy in his *Expositio* in Ps 33:9 (MSG 69, 876B): Τὸ δὲ ἐνετείλατο μὴ νομίσης ἀνθρωποπρεπῶς, ἐννοεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν βανασκευῶν τεχνῶν οἱ ἐπιστήμονες, ὅταν τι διατεκτῆναι βούλωνται τῶν ἐγνωσμένων αὐτοῖς, μονονουχὶ καὶ ἐντέλλονται τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ διὰ γε τοῦ ἐθέλγειν ἐργάσασθαι τι· καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ῥοπή, δύνανται ἔχει προστάγματος καὶ αὐτοκελεύστου φορᾶς. Ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπων, ἀνυπόστατος αὐτῇ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἢ τε σοφία καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν· ἐπὶ δὲ Θεοῦ οὐκέτι. Ὑφ’εστηκε γὰρ ὁ Λόγος δι’ οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐργάζεται, διὰ γε, φημὶ, τῆς ἐνοῦσης αὐτῷ δυνάμεως καὶ σοφίας.

Yet, even more important for him than word and wisdom seems to be the title ‘power of God’. The title δύνάμις (ζῶσα καὶ) ἐνυπόστατος<sup>72</sup> for the Son occurs six times, the title ἐνέργεια ἐνυπόστατος for the Spirit two times.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, Cyril presents several ontological reflections about the substantial or accidental status of a power or energy:

“Again, [the Son is called] power, because he continuously inheres in those who are apt to possess it. He can never be separated from them – as if he would be classed with accidents – without the destruction of the subject, [...] because each of them is naturally and necessarily in the other. When the Father is active, the Son is obviously also active, like his natural, substantial and ἐνυπόστατος power. Accordingly, when the Son is active, the Father is also active, like the source of the creating Logos, substantially inhering in its own offspring like the fire in the heat it emits”.<sup>74</sup>

Both the Son and the Spirit are adequately described as a natural power or energy, inseparable from the divine essence, but nevertheless distinguishable from it.<sup>75</sup> Thus, Cyril conceives a form of in-existence which must not be confused with that of an accident, because the in-existing Son and Spirit cannot be removed without corruption of their subject. He might be well aware of the paradox when he speaks about an ἐνυπόστατος σοφία ἐνυπάρχουσα τῷ θεῷ<sup>76</sup> using a term usually signifying the insubsistence of accidents in its subject in order to describe the son’s being in the father (John 10:38),<sup>77</sup> while his predecessors apparently did not allude to its philosophical use in employing the term ἐνυπάρχειν.

To conclude, the technical meaning of ἐνυπόστατος developed during the trinitarian debates of the fourth century is in a way diametrically opposed to its meaning as a

<sup>72</sup> In Ioannem (ed. Pusey, vol. I, p. 70; vol. II, pp. 697.700); De st. Trinitate dialogi (SC 246, pp. 92.96); Expositio in Ps 9:33 LXX [10:12a] (MSG 69, 785A: the Son as χεῖρ θεοῦ). Cf. De st. Trinitate dialogi (SC 246, p. 102): ζῶσα καὶ ἐνυπόστατος ἰσχύς and also the spurious Collectio dictorum in Vetus testamentum (MSG 77, 1261A: ἰσχύς δὲ καὶ δύνάμις ἐνυπόστατος).

<sup>73</sup> Thesaurus 34 (MSG 75, 580A.596B).

<sup>74</sup> In John 1:3 (ed. Pusey, vol. I, p. 70). On the philosophical discussion of the so-called ‘substantial qualities’ cf. bel. chapter II, nn. 73-75.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Thesaurus 34 (MSG 75, 596B/C): Πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἢ θεία Γραφή τὸ ἐκ Θεοῦ Πνεῦμα διηλεκτῶς ἀποκαλοῦσα φαίνεται, οὐχ ἓν τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων αὐτῷ δηλοῦσα, [...] ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦτο σημαίνουσα, [...]. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἅγιον, οὐκ ἔξωθεν ἔχει τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτο, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸ, τῆς θείας ὑπάρχον οὐσίας ἐνέργεια φυσικὴ τε καὶ ζῶσα καὶ ἐνυπόστατος, προστίθῃσιν αἰεὶ τῇ κτίσει τὸ τέλειον δι’ ἁγιασμοῦ καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μετοχής.

<sup>76</sup> Thesaurus 19 (MSG 75, 324A) cf. Gregory of Nazianzen, Oratio 31,32, ed. P. Gallay, Paris: Cerf 1978 (SC 250), pp. 338f: μὴ τὸν πατέρα μὲν οὐσιώσωμεν, τᾶλλα δὲ μὴ ὑποστήσωμεν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις θεοῦ ποιήσωμεν ἐνυπαρχούσας, οὐχ ὑφεστάσας.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Thesaurus 8 (MSG 75, 104A: Δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι τοῖς ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει πρὸς τὰ ἐνοῦσία τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατα ἢ ὁμοιότης ἢ κατὰ τοῦτο σώζεται, οὐ πρὸς τὰ ἑτερογενῆ, καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις ἔχοντα τὸ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ σοφία τυχὸν ἐν τῷ σοφῷ, καὶ ἡ βούλησις ἐν τῷ βουλευομένῳ.) and esp. De st. Trinitate dialogi, ed. G.M. de Durand, vol. I, Paris: Cerf 1976 (SC 231), pp. 270f: Οὐ γὰρ δὴ διαμεμνήση πεποννηκός ἡμῖν τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὡς ἐνὶ καλῶς ἀποδεδειχότος ὅτι τὰ ἐν τάξει τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἢ καὶ ἐνότων ἀπλῶς κατηριθμημένα, ἥκιστα μὲν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ἑτέροις δὲ μᾶλλον ἐνυπαρχόντα καταθρήσαι τις ἂν, καὶ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τι καθ’ ἑαυτὰ καὶ λέγεσθαι, φύσιν δὲ τὴν τοῦ λαχόντος ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχει.

Christological term: Whereas it was introduced into trinitarian theology to maintain the independent substantial existence (καθ' αὐτὸ ὑφιστάναι) of Son and Spirit,<sup>78</sup> its Christological intention was to deny exactly this existence on its own with regard to the human nature of Christ. Before Leontius of Byzantium, something ἐνυπόστατον is necessarily a ὑπόστασις, just like something ἐνούσιον is an οὐσία. Furthermore, all four terms are absolutely convertible before the distinction between ὑπόστασις and οὐσία receives general acceptance and application in the works of the neo-chalcedonians. The orthodox antimodalist polemic grew in a way accustomed to the fallacy of calling everything without independent existence an ἀνυπόστατον similar to a chimera or another kind of useless fantasy-product: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑφεστῶς ἐν ἴσῳ τῷ μηδενί, μᾶλλον δὲ παντελῶς οὐδέν<sup>79</sup> – a wrong conclusion the neo-chalcedonians would have to struggle hard with against the Nestorians and Monophysites.

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<sup>78</sup> Cf. John of Damascus in his chapter on the trinity (Expositio 8,184; Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, ed. B. Kotter, vol. 2, Berlin: De Gruyter 2:1973 [PTS 12]), p. 26): ἐνυπόστατον ἦτοι ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει ὑπάρχον.

<sup>79</sup> Cyril of Alexandria, De recta fide ad Theodosium (ACO I/1/1,51). Cf. bel. ch. II, nn. 32-34.

## II. The Christological application of ἐνυπόστατος

Having examined the rise of the term ἐνυπόστατος in Christian, especially Trinitarian theology, we will turn to the Neochalcedonian Christology and its use of the term in question. The debate around this term initiated by F. Loofs' important study *Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche* is not mainly concerned with the historical problem of determining the semantics of a special technical term in several authors of a certain period. The more recent discussion did not only take into account the theology of Karl Barth which was attacked by F. LeRon Shults for relying on Loofs' incorrect representation of Leontius' so-called doctrine of *Enhypostasia*,<sup>1</sup> but also determined the link between Barth and the possibly misrepresented Leontius: the confessional orthodoxy of the 17th century.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the latter created the Greek neologism ἐνυποστασία which was received in our modern theological terminology:

“ἀνυπόστατον is what does not subsist per se and according to a proper personality; ἐνυπόστατον is what subsists in another entity and has become participant of another hypostasis. If the human nature of Christ is therefore said to be ἀνυπόστατος, this means only the fact that it does not subsist for itself in a proper personality; but it is called ἐνυπόστατος, because it has become participant of an alien hypostasis and subsists in the Logos”.<sup>3</sup>

As Loofs puts it:

„Factisch ist das ἐνυπόστατον εἶναι bei Zusammensetzungen ein prädicatives Sein von sonst selbständigen φύσεις oder οὐσίαι. Sonst selbständige φύσεις nehmen eine Stellung ein ähnlich der ποιότητες οὐσιώδεις und ἐπουσιώδεις. [...] Sein [Leontius'] Begriff der φύσις oder οὐσία ist der der aristotelischen δεύτερα οὐσία, dem aristotelischen der πρώτη οὐσία entspricht der Begriff der ὑπόστασις. Gleichwie bei Aristoteles das Genus und die διαφοραί, welche die δεύτερα οὐσία constituieren, individualisiert werden durch das εἶναι ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, so wird bei unserem Verfasser die menschliche Natur in Christo individualisiert durch das εἶναι ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ λόγου, durch das ὑποστῆναι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ“.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A dubious Christological formula: From Leontius of Byzantium to Karl Barth, in: *Theological Studies* 57 (1996) pp. 431-446.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. U.M. Lang, „Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, Protestant Orthodoxy and Karl Barth“, in: *JThS* 49 (1998), (630-657) pp. 655f and M. Gockel, „A dubious Christological formula? Leontius of Byzantium and the *anhypostatos-enhypostatos* theory“, in: *JThS* 51 (2000), (514-532) pp. 526-531 (including also medieval scholasticism).

<sup>3</sup> J. A. Quenstedt, *Theologia didactico-polemica sive Systema theologicum* (1685), in: H. Schmid, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt*, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 7.ed. 1893, p. 217 n. 6a. For I. A. Dorner as a second important source for the Loofsian reading cf. J. Lebon, *La christologie du monophysisme syrien*, in: A. Grillmeier / H. Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart. Vol I: Der Glaube von Chalkedon*, Würzburg: Echter 1951, (425-580) pp. 516-519.

<sup>4</sup> Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche, in: *TU* 3 (1888), (1-317) p. 68.

As we have seen during our examination of the trinitarian context, this can hardly represent the common meaning this term had in the Christological discussion of the early sixth century. This is why B. Daley could use our term as a starting-point for his attack on the more systematic implications of Loofs' interpretation, namely to integrate Leontius into the Cyrillian tradition and to proclaim him as an extraordinarily innovative thinker, especially with regard to his concept of personality.<sup>5</sup> The latter point was especially elaborated by S. Otto<sup>6</sup> and afterwards also extended to other fields of metaphysics.<sup>7</sup> We will thus have to deal with the development of our term taking into account at least three levels: The usage of the term itself, the usage of phrases like ὑποσῆναι ἐν λόγῳ and their meaning in the context of the Christology of the different authors to be examined, and the possible connection between our term and those phrases. As there is a various number of expressions for insubistence occurring in our texts, we will subsume every phrase describing an asymmetric dependence of Christ's human nature in the divine Logos as in-existence of the former in the latter under the title 'insubistence formula' being fully aware of the fact that the wording of this formula may display considerable differences.

#### A. ἔνυπόστατος and the 'insubistence formula' from John the Grammarian to John of Damascus

The systematic problem motivating both the introduction of the insubistence formula and the transformation of ἔνυπόστατος into a technical term of Christology is already formulated by Cyril of Alexandria in his second letter to Succensus:

"If one and the same is conceived as complete god and complete man, consubstantial with the Father according to his godhead, but according to his manhood consubstantial with us, where is this completeness, if the human nature did not subsist (ὑφέστηκεν)?"<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Daley's surveys of the discussion in *The Christology of Leontius of Byzantium: Personalism or Dialectics?*, Oxford 1979 (ms), pp. 2-13 and *A Richer Union: Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of Human and Divine in Christ*, in: *Studia Patristica* 24, Leuven: Peeters 1993], (239-265) pp. 240-244.

<sup>6</sup> *Person und Subsistenz. Die philosophische Anthropologie des Leontius von Byzanz*, Munich: W. Fink 1968.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. e.g. H. Stickelberger, *Substanz und Akzidens bei Leontius von Byzanz. Die Veränderung eines philosophischen Denkmodells durch die Christologie*, in: *ThZ* 36 (1980), pp. 153-161.

<sup>8</sup> ACO I/1/6, 160,14-16.



Interestingly enough, the very first discussion of this question employing our term took place before the Neochalcedonian period, even before Cyril's letter was written. As it links up with the trinitarian debate of the term much more clearly than John the Grammarian's apology for Chalcedon, but contributes hardly anything to its Christological career, we will just mention it very briefly before entering the examination of the Neochalcedonian contexts. In the fictional correspondence of Dionysius of Alexandria and Paul of Samosata – ascribed by E. Schwartz to an Apollinarian author of the early fifth century who wanted to attack Theodore of Mopsuestia<sup>9</sup> – the adoptianist heretic Paul is attacked by the orthodox bishop because of his claiming the “form of a servant” the Logos assumed (Phil 2:7) to be ἐνυπόστατος, thus introducing two ἐνυπόστατα into Christ's person and destroying the unity of his hypostasis.<sup>10</sup> In case of a human being, things like form, logos or wisdom are ἀνυπόστατα, whereas they are ἐνυπόστατα in God.<sup>11</sup> Christ's transfiguration (μεταμόρφωσις) shows that his human μορφή can never have been ἐνυπόστατος, if one wants to avoid the absurdity of three μορφαὶ ἐνυπόστατοι, the divine one, the human one and the glorified one.<sup>12</sup> Thus, Christ's human form is by no means a δοῦλος ἐνυπόστατος inhabited by the Logos, but only a transitory state during the exinanition of the Logos.<sup>13</sup> What this Apollinarian author wants to provide is an application of the antimodalist polemics and its terminology to Christology: Just as it is wrong to conceive of form, word and wisdom of God as ἀνυπόστατον and not existing by itself as the second hypostasis of the trinity, one must not hypostasize God's human actions and make a δοῦλος ἐνυπόστατος of the deeds the Logos accomplished in human form in order to serve mankind. What he achieved is a pretty clear deviation into docetism. Let us see whether our Neochalcedonian authors are able

<sup>9</sup> Eine fingierte Korrespondenz mit Paulus dem Samosatener, in: SbBAW 1927, (1-58) pp. 55-58.

<sup>10</sup> This is the topic of protasis 7 (Schwartz, Fingierte Korrespondenz, pp. 26-33; cf. Schwartz's summary on pp. 51f), but it is already envisaged in Dionysius' letter (ibid. p. 5; 209,5-6 Turrianus) and also touched in prot. 2 (p. 11; 221,13-222,8). This discussion could be reflected in Cyril's apology of his first anathematism against Theodoretus (ACO I/1/6, 112,12-113,25), where Cyril asks whether the incarnation was a unification of two proper realities or just of ὁμοιότητες ἀνυπόστατοι or μορφαί, and whether Theodoretus wants to postulate a συνάφεια σχετική δουλοπρεπεῦς καὶ ἀνυποστάτου μορφῆς πρὸς ἀνυπόστατον καὶ θεῖαν μορφήν. A varia lectio already testified by Euboulos of Lystra in the seventh century (apud Doctrinam patrum de incarnatione verbi. Ein griechisches Florilegium aus der Wende des 7. und 8. Jahrhunderts, ed. E. Chrysos, Münster: Aschendorff 1981, p. 142,24f) reads πρὸς ἐνυπόστατον καὶ θεῖαν μορφήν the possible authenticity of which would make Cyril's acquaintance with our Apollinarian author almost certain.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 5 (209,3-9).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 27f (251,5-252,7).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 11 (222,5-8). 26 (249,10-14). 31 (259,11-15). 34 (264,13-265,2).

to bestow upon Christ's human nature a proper subsistence without dissolving the unity of his person.

### *1. John the Grammarian and the introduction of ἑνυπόστατος into the Christological debate*

John the Grammarian of Cesarea is commonly credited with having not only introduced our term into the Christological debate but also with having applied the Cappadocian trinitarian terminology to Chalcedonian Christology, mainly in an apology he wrote for the council of Chalcedon at about 514-518.<sup>14</sup> Some Greek fragments of this apology are preserved in Eulogius of Alexandria's *Συνηγορίαι* which is itself only extant in fragments contained in the *Doctrina patrum*.<sup>15</sup> But the most important source for the theology of our Grammarian and its systematic relevance is Severus of Antioch's polemical opus magnum *Contra impium grammaticum* which survives in syriac translation.

John seems to have used our term in three different contexts:

- (1) His use of the phrase ἑνυπόστατον πρόσωπον is an obvious resumption of the traditional trinitarian usage.<sup>16</sup> This emphasizes the typical Neochalcedonian identification of the second hypostasis of the Trinity with the unique hypostasis of the incarnate Christ proclaimed in Chalcedon.<sup>17</sup>
- (2) He uses it to describes the unity of the two natures in Christ itself, either in form of an adjective (ἕνωσις ἑνυπόστατος)<sup>18</sup> or an adverb (ἑνυποστάτως ἐνοῦσθαι).<sup>19</sup>
- (3) He employs it to signify the ontological status the two natures in Christ have being 'real', but nevertheless not self-subsisting, i.e. having countable hypostases of their own.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Cf. S. Helmer, *Der Neuchalkedonismus. Geschichte, Berechtigung und Bedeutung eines dogmengeschichtlichen Begriffs*, Bonn: Dissertation 1962, pp.160-162 (on person and works) and A. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*, Vol. II/2: *Die Kirche von Konstantinopel im 6. Jahrhundert*, Freiburg a.e.: Herder 1989, pp. 56-69 (on his terminological innovations). Some tendencies towards the application of Cappadocian terminology to Christology can already be found in Theodoretus of Cyrus (cf. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*, Vol. I, Freiburg: Herder 1979, pp. 694-698).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Iohannis Caesariensis presbyteri et grammatici opera quae supersunt*, ed. M. Richard, Turnhout: Brepols 1977 (CCG 1), pp. V-XXVIII. Richard (pp. XVII-XXV) has shown that Eulogius did not draw upon a Greek copy of Severus, but on the text of the Grammarian's apology itself.

<sup>16</sup> CCG 1, 11,166; 52,97 cf. Epiphanius, *Panarion* 72,12; GCS 37, p.266,4 / Gregory of Nyssa (?), *Testimonia adv. Judaeos*; MSG 46,196C.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus* II/2, p. 68.

<sup>18</sup> CCG 1, 10,118; 20,408.410; 52,108; 55,182; 57,256. Also in the *Capitula ctr Monophysitas*: *ibid.* 64,109.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* 8,69 (= 53,118); 20,417; 53,133. And the *Capitula*: 61,25; 63,66; 64,122.

In evaluating the Syriac fragments Richard presents in the Latin version of J. Lebon, we have equated “hypostaticus” and ἑνυπόστατος not only because of the Grammarian’s obvious predilection for our term (possible equivalents like ὑποστατικός are missing), but also because this is proven by Richard’s 13th Syriac excerpt which is also found in a longer Greek passage in Eulogius. In this case, what about Severus’ abundant use of the formula ‘hypostatic union’/ ‘hypostatically unified’? What if the Greek original of *Contra impium grammaticum* and the other works of Severus did not read ἔνωσις ὑποστατική / ἐνωῦσθαι ὑποστατικῶς or καθ’ ὑπόστασιν, as it is commonly supposed,<sup>21</sup> but employed our term instead? As we learn from the translation of Cyrillian quotations in Severus’ works, the translators were quite fond of rendering Cyril’s prepositional phrase καθ’ ὑπόστασιν using the adjective *qnwmthn*’ or the adverb *qnwm’jth*.<sup>22</sup> However, the more literal equivalent *bqnwm*’ also occurs from time to time,<sup>23</sup> which makes a variation already in Severus’ text most plausible. A priori, the most plausible alternative for ἔνωσις καθ’ ὑπόστασιν would have in fact been ἔνωσις ὑποστατική as it exactly parallels Cyril’s and Severus’ other formula ἔνωσις φυσική. Neither ἑνυπόστατος nor ὑποστατική ἔνωσις are attested in earlier texts, but both are often used interchangeably in later (Neo-)Chalcedonian authors.<sup>24</sup> Thus, we can only rely on a hint Severus gives in the context of his only quotation from the Grammarian containing our term. In II,17 he quotes John’s complaint about the Monophysites’ ignoring the Chalcedonian confession of the hypostatic union and guarantees his undiminished attention to every element of the self-contradictory formula of two general substances united καθ’ ὑπόστασιν (*bqnwm*’) or ἑνυποστάτως (*qnwm’jth*). The interesting thing about this is the final clause Severus attaches to the last term: “in order to use also this word of yours” (*mlt d’f bhd’ bmlth’ djlk nthchshch*).<sup>25</sup> If Severus calls ἑνυποστάτως the Grammarian’s word (*hd’ mlth’ djlk*: “this word which belongs to you”) and contrasts it to his own (and Cyril’s)

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 55,201.206

<sup>21</sup> Lebon, *Christologie*, pp. 469-472; Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus* II/2, p. 52.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. e.g. Philaethes, ed. R. Hespel, Louvain: Durbecq 1952 (CSCO 133), p. 135,18.23f, where the original (3rd Letter to Nestorius; ACO I/1/1, 40,25 / Apology against Theodoretus; ACO I/1/6, 115,12f) all three times reads καθ’ ὑπόστασιν.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. e.g. *Contra impium grammaticum* II,17, ed. J. Lebon, Louvain: Durbecq 1952 (CSCO 111), p. 151,15.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Lampe, *Patristic Greek Lexicon*, s.v. ὑποστατικός (p. 1461) B 2d.

<sup>25</sup> CSCO 111, p. 151,16f. The whole sentence reads in Lebon’s translation (CSCO 112 p. 118,7-11): “Namque dualitatem naturarum, quae unum Christum in duo secant, evehis ad substantias secundum communem significationem intellectas, dicisque illas unitas esse secundum hypostasim, seu, ut hac etiam voce tua utar, hypostaticae”.

καθ' ὑπόστασιν, this admittedly does not necessarily mean that Severus himself did not use it at all. What it does prove, is that already Severus noticed the abundant use of our term as a particularity of the Grammarian's style, which nevertheless does not entail any difference in meaning with regard to the synonymous phrases ἔνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν or ὑποστατική. The possibility of an earlier introduction of our term into the Christological discussions by the Monophysites can thus not be ruled out, but the Grammarian will by all means retain his credit of having made it popular.

This popularity is of course mainly due to the third context of usage mentioned above. There it is employed in order to refute one of the basic monophysite objections against the Chalcedonian distinction between οὐσία = φύσις and ὑπόστασις = πρόσωπον which already Timothy Ailuros had raised in his refutation of the synod: οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀπρόσωπος.<sup>26</sup>

This objection is the starting point and central topic of the longest Greek fragment preserved from John's Apology (IV,1-6 in CCG 1). The Grammarian reminds his opponents of the Cappadocian distinction between οὐσία, φύσις as universal substance and ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον as particular subsistence marked off from its fellow species-members by several distinguishing characteristics. As one can conclude from the fact that human beings are constituted by an immaterial soul and a material body, the presence of two heterogeneous substances does not entail two countable particular subsistences. As Christ's human nature is individualized by the Logos, the second person of the trinity in which it subsists (ἐν αὐτῷ ... ὑπέστη), it must not be counted as a second hypostasis apart from the Logos (IV,3). The counter-objection concerning Athanasius' statement of the synonymy of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις (Ad Afros 4) is answered by the Grammarian with a distinction between two ways of being ἐνυπόστατος: It could signify either the existence of the natures in general or their self-subsistence, i.e. their being independent, countable hypostases. The first sense is acceptable, the second would be Nestorian heresy (IV,6). The important thing is that this distinction is based on the fact that those two senses are also possible for ὑπόστασις, i.e. that the Grammarian still accepts the equation  $x \text{ ἐνυπόστατον} = \text{ὑπόστασις of } x$ . Accordingly, he speaks at first of two ἐνυπόστατοι οὐσίαι and focuses on Christ's human nature in a second step, probably because the divine nature

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Lebon, *Christologie*, pp. 461f. For further occurrences cf. the apparatus on Pamphilus, *Panhoplion* VII,1-4.9f, ed. J.H. Declerck, Turnhout: Brepols 1989 (CCG 19), p. 173 and that on Anastasius Sinaita, *Hodegos* VI,2,16f, ed. K.-H. Uthemann, Turnhout: Brepols 1981 (CCG 8), p. 100.

or the Logos has to be unquestionably called ὑπόστασις or ἐνυπόστατον in both senses.<sup>27</sup> This fact is misrepresented in K. H. Uthemann's claim of an enhypostasia-theory in John the Grammarian.<sup>28</sup> His simple distinction between 'having' and 'being a hypostasis' does by no means take into account the philosophical problems concerning this issue and moreover presupposes a distinction between ὑπόστασις and ἐνυπόστατον, which can possibly be found from Leontius of Byzantium onwards, but not yet in the Grammarian.

Nevertheless, the Grammarian's secondary focus on the human nature already points towards the later development which will connect our term and the insubistence-concept. Already for our Grammarian, the human nature insubstists in and is individualized by the Logos, which were the genuine ideas of the traditional and Loofsian theory, but he does not (yet) directly connect those with our term, but with the verbal phrase ὑφίστασθαι ἐν. Because the ἐνυπόστατος ἔνωσις unites two natures in the single hypostasis of the Logos, the human nature of Christ subsists, but only in the Logos which marks it off from its human species-members by the characteristic of being his very own flesh.<sup>29</sup>

If we look for possible sources of the Grammarian's distinction between a wider and narrower use of hypostasis and of his insubistence-concept, there are possible candidates both in pagan philosophy and in the Christian tradition. As to the first, we find a distinction between a wider and narrower use of οὐσία which is common to the Aristotelian commentators: It can either mean the opposite of accident, substance in the sense of self-subsisting subject, or existence in general (ἀπλῶς ὑπαρξίς) which comprises also the accidents.<sup>30</sup> We will find this parallel worked out more clearly in the later discussions of our term. Another possible inspiration could have been the twofold use of ἀνυπόστατος meaning both "unsubstantial, without independent existence" and "non-existent, unreal".<sup>31</sup> In pagan philosophy, the development of the former

<sup>27</sup> CCG 1 p. 55, 201.206.

<sup>28</sup> Definitionen und Paradigmen in der Rezeption des Dogmas von Chalkedon bis in die Zeit Kaiser Justinians, in: J. van Oort / J. Roldanus (eds), Chalkedon: Geschichte und Aktualität. Studien zur Rezeption der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon, Leuven: Peeters 1998] (54-122), pp. 90-94. Our considerations concerning Cyril and Severus should have shown, that it is incorrect to speak – as Uthemann does – of an "enhypostatic union", as ἔνωσις ἐνυπόστατος is nothing but one of many possible equivalents for ἔνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν.

<sup>29</sup> CCG 1, p. 55, 181-188.

<sup>30</sup> Ammonius, In Isagog.; CAG IV/3, 115, 5f; In Cat.; CAG IV/4, 20, 26-21, 2 / Philoponus, In Cat.; CAG XIII/1, 20, 9-14; In Phys.; CAG XVI, 137, 25-27; De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig: Teubner 1899 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms 1963), pp. 181, 23-182, 7.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Lampe, Patristic Greek Lexicon, s.v. (p. 164) B 3 and 4.

meaning out of the latter can easily be shown. Already for Aristotle, the accident is ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος,<sup>32</sup> and Sextus Empiricus explains that the so-called accidents do not have an existence distinct from that of substances and are therefore ἀνυπόστατα.<sup>33</sup> This factual equation of dependent existence and non-existence was received – as we have seen – also by the fathers in arguing for a self-subsisting hypostasis of the Logos: God the son cannot be something like human thought, word, wisdom, or will, because they are all ἀνυπόστατα, without independent existence, factually non-existent. A very interesting exception can be found in Ps-Basil, *Contra Eunomium* V. The divine substance, he says, is not ἀγέννητος in the sense of ἀνούσιος and ἀνυπόστατος, i.e. absolutely non-existent. One has to distinguish two kinds of ἀνυπόστατα, that which is also ἀνούσιον, absolute nothingness, and that which is ἐνούσιον, i.e. the ἐνυπάρχουσα οὐσία, the essence inexistent in its instances.<sup>34</sup> According to John, not only the divine substance ἐνυπάρχει in its three hypostases, but also manhood in every individual man and the human nature of Christ in the hypostasis of the Logos.<sup>35</sup> However, as John does not yet discuss the relationship of ἀν/ἐνυπόστατος and accidents, this passage is probably more important for later authors, especially the one of *De sectis*.

Yet, with regard to his insubsistence-concept, it could be of more relevance, as insubsistence formulas were already common in the trinitarian context, especially in the texts based on Cappadocian terminology. In the first of the Pseudo-Athanasian dialogues *De trinitate*, the orthodox refutes the anhomoean's objection, that a unique θεότης would imply a unique hypostasis, by drawing upon the Cappadocian distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις using the example of manhood. When the anhomoean asks back: “Ἡ ἀνθρωπότης οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν;”, he gets the answer: “Ναὶ,

<sup>32</sup> *Metaphysics* VI,2 1026 b21 cf. XII,1 1069 a21f.

<sup>33</sup> *Adv. Mathematicos* X (*Adv. Physicos* II), 238f, ed. R.G. Bury, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960, p. 326: τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα συμβεβηκέναι ταῖς οὐσίαις, οὐχ ἕτερα ὄντα τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀνυπόστατά ἐστιν. Cf. Eusebius, *Contra Marcellum* I,1,32 (GCS 14, p. 7): καὶ ἦν οὐχ ὡς ψιλὸς θεοῦ λόγος, ἀνυπόστατος, ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν ὑπάρχων τῷ θεῷ.

<sup>34</sup> MSG 29, 749B: Πάλιν ἀγέννητον ἀνούσιον νοοῦμεν τὸ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄν. Εἴπε τις ἀνούσιον, ὑπόστασιν ἀνεῖλε καὶ οὐσίας ὑπαρξιν. Ἀνούσιον, καὶ ἀνυπόστατον, τὴν μὴ ὑπάρχουσαν μήτε οὐσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἀνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐδήλωσε. The relevance of this passage for the development of our term was already noticed by P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz. Studien zu seinen Schriften, Quellen und Anschauungen*, Paderborn: F. Schöningh 1908, p. 154, although he was mistaken in reading ἐνυπόστατον instead of ἀνυπόστατον. The attribution of *Contra Eunomium* IV-V to Didymus of Alexandria is still a matter of dispute (cf. CPG 2837a; suppl. p. 101).

<sup>35</sup> CCG I, pp. 50,52-54; 51,61-67 (*Apologia*); 63,82-102 (*Capitula*). For pagan parallels cf. Asclepius, In Met.; CAG VI/2, 431,7f / Simplicius, In Cat.; CAG VIII, 90,8-10 and bel. n. 47.

ἐν ἀτόμοις θεωρουμένην”.<sup>36</sup> As will be clarified in our philosophical excursus below, phrases like ὑφίστασθαι ἐν, τὸ εἶναι or τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν ἐν or θεωρεῖσθαι ἐν were used synonymously to signify any kind of relationship to be distinguished from the καθ’ αὐτό of an independent, self-subsisting entity: the accidents in comparison to the substance just like the species in comparison to its members. The introduction of the insubsistence-formula into Christology is thus at least perfectly compatible with (if not entailed by) that of the Cappadocian terminology, though the latter is probably not its main source. This, the Ps-Athanasian (Apollinarian) letter to emperor Jovianus, is namely quoted by the Grammarian himself:

“For simultaneous is the flesh, simultaneous God the Word’s flesh, simultaneous the logically ensouled flesh, simultaneous is God the Word’s logically ensouled flesh: ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔσχευ”.<sup>37</sup>

Here we find not only the insubsistence formula, but also the typical Neochalcedonian connection of insubsistence and the harsh rejection of a preexistence or προδιάπλασις of Christ’s human nature before the incarnation. The latter was the consistent affirmation of Cyrill and the Monophysites,<sup>38</sup> but both did not regularly link it with an insubsistence formula, as the Neochalcedonians did. Severus says that both natures ὑφίστανται ἐν τῇ ἐνώσει or συνθέσει, which means that both natures subsist in the state of unity or composition<sup>39</sup> and thus differs (at least terminologically)

<sup>36</sup> MSG 28, 1141D. Cf. also Basil (?), Ep. 38,3,6-8; ed. Y. Courtonne, vol. 1, Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1957, p. 82: Ὁ δὲ Παῦλον εἰπὼν ἔδειξεν ἐν τῷ δηλουμένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος πράγματι ὑφειστώσαν τὴν φύσιν. The Basilian authorship of this letter is extensively and in my opinion in most respects convincingly defended by V. H. Drecoll, *Zur Entwicklung der Trinitätslehre des Basilios von Cäsarea. Sein Weg vom Homöusianer zum Neonizäner*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht 1996, pp. 297-331.

<sup>37</sup> The Greek text: MSG 28, 532 A/B, quoted in CCG 1 p. 13,212-215. For the widespread use of this quotation among (Monophysites and) Neochalcedonians cf. the apparatus on Pamphilus, *Panhoplion* III,42f; CCG 19, p. 145 and Anastasius Sinaita, *Hodegos* II, 5,13f, CCG 8, p. 51. An astonishing parallel can be found in Hippolytus, *Contra Noetum* 15,7, ed. H. J. Sieben, Freiburg e.a.: Herder 2001 (FC 34), p. 300: οὐτε γὰρ ἄσαρκος καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ὁ Λόγος τέλειος ἦν Υἱός, καίτοι τέλειος, Λόγος ὢν, μονογενής· οὐθ’ ἡ σὰρξ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν δίχα τοῦ Λόγου ὑποστῆναι ἠδύνατο διὰ τὸ ἐν Λόγῳ τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν. If we are not dealing with a later Apollinarian interpolation here, this is the first reference for ὑφίστασθαι in a Christological context (cf. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus* I, pp. 236f).

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Lebon, *Christologie*, pp. 436f. 462-464.

<sup>39</sup> Apud Leontium Hierosolymitanum, *Contra Monophysitas*; MSG 86/II, 1845D. 1848A / apud Eusthatium Monachum, *Epistula ad Timotheum scholasticum*, in: *Diversorum postchalcedonensium auctorum collectanea*, ed. P. Allen, Leuven: Brepols 1989 (CCG 19), pp. 417,116 (resumed by the Chalcedonian monk because of the seemingly self-contradictory plural ‘natures’ in 418,140f; 422,244f; 452,356f); 422,255 (= MSG 86/II, 1848 A6-8: *Contra impium grammaticum* II,31; CSCO 111 p.238,7-9); cf. also the second letter against Sergius (ed. J. Lebon, Louvain: L. Durbecq 1949 [CSCO 120], p. 83,5-16; English translation in I. R. Torrance, *Christology after Chalcedon. Severus of Antioch & Sergius the Monophysite*, Norwich: Canterbury Press 1988, p. 176). However, Philoxenus used syriac expressions similar to the Neochalcedonian ones (cf. R. Chesnut, *Three monophysite Christologies. Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug and Jacob of Sarug*, London: OUP 1976, pp. 78-81, esp. p. 79).

considerably from the Neochalcedonian claim that the human nature has its particular subsistence in the hypostasis of the Logos.

Before examining the systematic implications of John's account more profoundly, let us pursue historically the converging development of our term and the insubsistence-concept connected with the verbal phrase.

## *2. Leontius of Byzantium and the distinction between ἐνυπόστατον and ὑπόστασις*

The focus of discussion about our term on Leontius of Byzantium is mainly due to Loofs' postulate of the fundamental unity of the Corpus Leontii, which was refuted by the articles of M. Richard<sup>40</sup> and B. Daley<sup>41</sup>: Unlike Leontius of Jerusalem, Leontius of Byzantium is not a Neochalcedonian, but a Chalcedonian in the strict sense, to whom the Neochalcedonian emphasis on insubsistence is somewhat suspect.<sup>42</sup> Apart from the famous opening passage of the first section of the treatise against the Nestorians and Eutycheans (CNE),<sup>43</sup> the term ἐνυπόστατος occurs only one other time in Leontius' works<sup>44</sup> and definitely does not contribute significantly to the systematic elaboration of Leontius' Christology. Although isolated in the work of Leontius himself, the famous passage enjoyed a tremendous career not only in modern research, but already in the authors after Leontius up to John of Damascus. We will leave the crucial passages of the text in Greek, because any attempt of translation would anticipate the decisions of interpretation to be discussed below:

"Hypostasis, gentlemen, and the ἐνυπόστατον are not the same thing. For 'hypostasis' signifies the individual, but 'ἐνυπόστατον' the essence; and hypostasis marks off a person by means of its characteristic properties; τὸ δὲ ἐνυπόστατον τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ συμβεβηκὸς δηλοῖ, ὃ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται. Of this kind are the qualities, the so-called substantial and accidental ones, none of which is a substance, i.e. an existing thing, but they are always perceived 'around' the substance, like colour in a body and like science in a soul.

Whoever claims then that there is no anhypostatic nature, is admittedly right; but he does not draw the correct conclusion, if he infers that everything not anhypostatic has to be a hypostasis.

<sup>40</sup> Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance, in: Opera minora, vol. 3, Turnhout : Brepols 1977, pp. 53-88.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Personalism and Dialectics? and A Richer union passim.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Epilysis; MSG 86/II, 1944C. The people criticized here without being rejected as heretics can only be Neochalcedonians like John of Cesarea or Ephrem of Amid. Richard supposed those to be the ἀκροφιλόσοφοι (MSG 86/I, 1273B) CNE is directed against (Léonce de Byzance, était-il origéniste?, in: REByz 5 (1947) (31-66), pp. 53-55). However, there's no direct evidence for any rapports between Leontius and the Grammarian (cf. Uthemann, Definitionen und Paradigmen, p. 95).

<sup>43</sup> Abbreviations for Leontius' treatises according to B. Daley, The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium, in: JThS 27 (1976), (333-369) p. 333 n. 2.

<sup>44</sup> CNE; MSG 86/I, 1300A: οὐσιώδης καὶ ἐνυπόστατος ἔνωσις cf. 1308C: κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ ὑποστατικῇ ἔνωσις. His favourite phrase seems to be οὐσιωδὴς ἔνωσις (CNE 1352D; DTN 1379A-D; Epilysis 1925C. 1941A).



Analogously, one could correctly claim that there is no unshaped body,<sup>45</sup> but would incorrectly infer that the shape is the body itself [1280A] and not rather something perceived in the body. [...]

And to put it concisely: What is consubstantial and has the same definition is said to be of one nature. Yet, the definition of hypostasis is either 'what is identical according to its nature, but numerically different', or 'what consists of different natures and possesses a common existence simultaneously and in each other'. [B] They are sharing an existence not as if they were an essential part of each other's substance – which can be perceived in substances and their substantial predicates, which are called qualities –, but on the grounds that neither of the two natures or substances is perceived by itself, but (only) accompanied by the other it is composed and grown together with (μετὰ τῆς συγκειμένης καὶ συμπεφυκυίας).” (MSG 86/I, 1277D-1280B)

At first, we notice, that our term is introduced yet again on the occasion of the „οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀνυπόστατος“-objection. Yet, unlike in John of Cesarea, the crucial point seems to be the distinction between ὑπόστασις and ἐνυπόστατον, not the possibility of using ἐνυπόστατον or ὑπόστασις in a wider (existence in general) or narrower (self-subsisting existence) sense. Now, the difficult point is how this difference has to be described according to our text, and especially what role Leontius' statements about accidents and qualities play in this description.

If one wants to employ those statements in order to explain ἐνυπόστατος, one has to show, how a quality is not necessarily an accident. Loofs and Otto argue for this by identifying – correctly – ποιότης οὐσιώδης and differentia and – incorrectly – ποιότης ἐπουσιώδης and inseparable accident.<sup>46</sup> ἐπουσιώδης always means the opposite of οὐσιώδης,<sup>47</sup> i.e. accidental, and the examples of colour and science are classical quality-accidents according to Cat. 8. D.B. Evans refers – like Otto – already the ὁ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι to ἐνυπόστατον, but wants to read the τοιαῦται-

<sup>45</sup> Leontius is quoting a common philosophical axiom: Dexippus, In Cat.; CAG IV/2, 23,20 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄχρουν ἢ ἀσχημάτιστον ἢ ἄποσον σῶμα) / Hermeias of Alexandria, In Platonis Phaedrum scholia, ed. P. Couvreur, Paris: Bouillon 1901 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1971), p. 112,1f (σῶμα ἔνυλον ἀδύνατόν σε λαβεῖν ἀχρώματον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον) / Simplicius, In De caelo; CAG VII, 599,9f (οὔτε δὲ ἀχρώματον πάντη οὔτε ἀσχημάτιστον εἶναι σῶμα δυνατόν πεπερασμένον) and In Cat.; CAG VIII, 48,5 (ἄχρουν γὰρ καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα). The reference to this axiom in the context of a discussion of the relationship between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις might have been suggested to Leontius by Basil (?), Ep. 38,7,27-33; ed. Courtonne, vol. 1, p. 91 (cf. also Basil, Ctr. Eunom. I,6 [MSG 29, 524A] / Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio 24 [MSG 44, 213A/B]).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Loofs, Leontius, pp. 62.66-68; Otto, Person, pp. 25f.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. e.g. Elias, In Cat.; CAG XVIII/1,176, 25f / Philoponus, In Phys.; CAG XVI, 38,25-39,3 / David, In Isagog.; CAG XVIII/2, 164,22-24. The ending of the fragment ἀπὸ τῶν Λεοντίου (MSG 86/II, 2004D-2009C; CPG 6819 [1]) which seems to consist mainly of an excerpt of CNE (1277C-1280B.1281C.1284B-C.1300A-1301B.1301D-1304B. 1305A.1308B.D.1309A.1380C; cf. Loofs, Leontius, p. 110) is perfectly in line with the usage of the commentators in distinguishing the three 'substantial' voces (genus, species, difference) from the two 'accidental' ones (proprium, accident). The most comprehensive survey of Leontius' philosophical knowledge is still Junglas, Leontius, pp. 66-92 although it is surpassed in several details.

clause as if it were only “establish[ing] a parallel between the relation of enhypostasized nature to hypostasis and the relation of ποιότητες, qualities, to the ousia to which they belong”.<sup>48</sup> Although there is some truth about that, as will be expounded below, a reference of τοιαῦται to ἐνυπόστατον would make Leontius immediately revoke what he had said just in the sentence before: ‘An ἐνυπόστατον is not an accident, such as the accidents...’. The alternative Daley and Grillmeier<sup>49</sup> offer is equally unattractive: If the statements about accidents/qualities do not contribute anything to the explication of ἐνυπόστατον, one has to play down Leontius’ emphatic claim of a difference between ἐνυπόστατον and ὑπόστασις to that of a wider and narrower concept of reality as we heard it from John of Cesarea. That is why Uthemann in my opinion correctly insisted upon the insufficiency of their account,<sup>50</sup> even if his proposal of a text-alteration is not convincing.<sup>51</sup>

My own paraphrase of Leontius’ argument would be the following: ὑπόστασις and ἐνυπόστατον are different, because we call concrete individuals hypostases, but we speak of essences as ἐνυπόστατον or ἀνυπόστατον, i.e. we do not say Παῦλος ἐνυπόστατος, but ἄνθρωπος ἐνυπόστατος in order to signify the individual ‘Paul’. The predicate ἐνυπόστατος makes clear that we do not predicate anything *per accidens* of the subject we are referring to, but that our predication is *per se* or substantial. Nevertheless, the predication ‘this is a man’ does not entail that we are referring to an (exclusively) human hypostasis. In naming a species, we have not yet determined all the peculiar characteristics of the hypostasis, i.e. we have not yet excluded the possibility, that we are dealing in fact with a composite hypostasis uniting several natures, like material body and immaterial soul. Hence, the distinction between ὑπόστασις ἀνθρωπίνη and ἄνθρωπος ἐνυπόστατος only makes sense, if we take into account the possibility of composite hypostases uniting several natures. In the

<sup>48</sup> Leontius of Byzantium. An origenist Christology, Washington: Dumbarton Oaks 1970, p. 141, cf. p. 135. The whole passage (pp. 134-143) rests on his untenable postulate of a distinction between „mode of union“ and „mode of nature“ he wants to prove from the Epilysis (cf. Daley, Origenism, p. 347). As to the approximation of enhypostasized nature and accident, M. Richard goes even further and claims that Leontius theory renders “l’opposition de la substance et de l’accident [...] plus apparente que réelle”, although he refers – like Loofs, Daley and Grillmeier – the ὁ ἐν ἐτέρῳ-clause to συμβέβηκος (Léonce et Pamphile, in: Opera Minora, vol. III, Turnhout: Brepols 1977, [27-52] p. 36 cf. pp. 32f).

<sup>49</sup> Daley, Personalism or Dialectics, pp. 18f; A Richer union, p. 250 n.59 / Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus II/2, pp. 204-206.

<sup>50</sup> Definitionen und Paradigmen, pp. 99f.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 101 n. 105 he proposes: τὸ δὲ ἐνυπόστατον τῷ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ συμβεβηκὸς δηλοῖ, ὅτι ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται. Even less adequate is his insistence on a destruction of the ὡς with GcP-construction in 1280 B4-7 (p. 103 n.157).

case of simple hypostases, the equation  $x \text{ ἔνυπόστατον} = \text{ὑπόστασις}$  of  $x$  still holds true for Leontius. Due to the semantic difference between the noun and the adjective, the latter is, in case of a composite hypostasis, referred to the nature in its state of composition, in which it “is not perceived by itself, but together with the other nature it is composed or grown together with” (1280 B5-7).

This is an obvious parallel to the phrase “which has its being in something else and is not perceived in itself” (1277 D5f), which is *prima facie* related to *συμβέβηκος*. But it could also be interpreted as subject-clause of the *μή*-phrase. In this case, the correct translation would be: “*ἔνυπόστατον* signifies that that which has its being in something else and is not perceived in itself is not an accident.” This is more or less Otto’s suggestion resumed by Uthemann,<sup>52</sup> with the only difference that I would refer *τοιαῦται* to *συμβεβηκός*. Our examination of the *καθ’ αὐτό - ἐν ἄλλῳ* antithesis in the excursus below will show that the classical description of the accident can also be referred to other somehow dependent entities, especially universals. Philoponus says:

οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ζῶον καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ἐν ὑπάρξει, ὁ μήτε ἄνθρωπος ἔστι μήτε Πλάτων μήτε τις τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστον τὰ κοινὰ θεωρεῖται.<sup>53</sup>

In his commentary on the *Physics*, he refers to the post-res universals as *τὰ κοινῶς λεγόμενα ἐνυπάρχειν πᾶσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι* and to the in-rebus ones as *τὰ κοινὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἐν ὑποστάσει ὄντα ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἑκάστα*.<sup>54</sup> As there is no trace of an in-rebus / post-res distinction in Leontius, he might have held formulas of this kind to be synonymous. Then *ἔνυπόστατον* generally signifies the inexistence of an essence in its individuals – Ps-Basil’s *ἐνυπάρχουσα οὐσία* –, which is by no means restricted to the human nature of Christ and which does not result in an independent hypostasis of this essence or species in the case of a composite hypostasis.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. ab. n. 38. This is also the reading of John of Damascus, *Contra Jacobitas* 11,15f, in: *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos* IV, ed. B. Kotter, Berlin: De Gruyter 1981 (PTS 22) p. 114. Cf. Lang, *Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos*, pp. 651f.

<sup>53</sup> In *Cat.*; CAG XIII/1, 58,15-17. Cf. also Elias, In *Isagog.*; CAG XVIII/1, 48,27-29 / Simplicius, In *Cat.*; CAG VIII, 80,30f (According to Aristotle, the secondary substance *ἔχει τὸ εἶναι ἐν* the primary); 82,6-9 (Alexander’s corresponding stance) / Id., In *Phys.*; CAG IX, 490,4-11 (every *κοινὸν ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἑκάστα* τὴν ὑπάρξιν *ἔχει*). That this was a quite common description of how universals subsist also among Christian authors can be seen e.g. from Basil, *De Spiritu sancto* XVII, 41,17-21; ed. B. Pruche, Paris: Cerf 1968 (SC 17), p. 394: *Ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἂν πιστεύσαιμι εἰς τοσοῦτον αὐτοὺς παραπληξίας ἐλαύνειν, ὥστε φάναι τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὄλων, ὥσπερ κοινότητά τινα, λόγῳ μόνῳ θεωρητὴν, ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ δὲ ὑποστάσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσαν, εἰς τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαιρεῖσθαι*.

<sup>54</sup> CAG XVII, 779,28-20.

Now, what about Leontius' attitude towards the insubsistence formula? The passage Loofs referred to (Epilysis 1944C) obviously represents the Neochalcedonian stance criticized by Leontius, because it wants to explain the single hypostasis of Christ by the fact that his human nature did not preexist the incarnation, but took its subsistence in the Logos.<sup>55</sup> This criticism is part of Leontius' general attitude to analyse rather the *τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως* as it is presented in the concrete biography of Christ, than to investigate divine and human nature and how those two can perform the act of incarnation.<sup>56</sup> Thus, he probably regards the insubsistence formula as a misleading explanation of the symmetric divine-human 'mode of union'. However, he makes use of an alternative one which will be used alongside or even interchangeably with the insubsistence formula in later authors: The complete manhood of the Logos, he says, is like our inner man according to the Apostle, *συνυφαστός* and completes the definition of the whole after the union.<sup>57</sup>

*2a. Philosophical excursus: The distinction καθ' αὐτό - ἐν ἄλλῳ, the problem of substantial qualities and inexistent natures*

The distinction καθ' αὐτό - ἐν ἄλλῳ which can be regarded as a commonplace in the philosophy of late antiquity can be traced back to the basic distinctions of the systems of categories developed simultaneously in the Peripatos and the Academy. The former based its teaching upon Aristotle's Categories the starting point of which is the partition of (according to an ontological reading of the Categories) entities into καθ' ὑποκειμένου λεγόμενα and ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντα (Cat. 2 1a16-b9).<sup>58</sup> The basic opposition of Platonists was καθ' αὐτό - πρὸς τι,<sup>59</sup> but as already Plato himself had distinguished in the famous ascent-passage of his Symposium (211a/b), the καθ' αὐτό of the idea from the ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ of its likenesses,<sup>60</sup> the second element of this

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Daley, Origenism, pp. 360-362.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Epilysis 1940C; Daley, A Richer Union, p. 261.

<sup>57</sup> DTN; MSG 86/I, 1380C.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. A. Graeser, Aspekte der Ontologie in der Kategorienschrift, in: Zweifelhafte im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum (Berlin, 7.-16. September 1981), ed. P. Moraux / J. Wiesner, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 1983, pp. 31-55.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. H.J. Krämer, Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 1971, pp. 94-103.

<sup>60</sup> οὐδ' αὖ φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἷον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν σῶμα μετέχει, οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδέ που ὃν ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινι, οἷον ἐν ζώῳ ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς αἰεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιοῦτον, οἷον γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων

distinction was soon replaced by ἐν ἄλλῳ or ἐν ἑτέρῳ which was perfectly compatible with Aristotle's ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.<sup>61</sup> However, the two elements of this distinction are anything but equal counterparts. Whereas the καθ' αὐτό only signifies the single paradigmatical case of being in the philosophical universe – the idea in case of the Platonists, the individual sensible substance in case of the Peripatetics – the notion of ἐν ἄλλῳ had to comprise the whole of the rest of non-paradigmatical, dependent or accidental being. Thus, some philosophers tried to clarify this ambiguous notion in connecting Cat. 2 with another passage from Aristotle, Physics IV,3 210a16-24, a list of eight possible meanings of ἐν τινί.<sup>62</sup> As this list also comprises the reciprocal relationship of genus and species and that of form to matter, the “secondary substances” of Cat. 5 were doomed to count no longer as καθ' αὐτό, but rather as ἐν ἄλλῳ dependent on their individuals. Very interesting evidence for this development is provided by Ammonius Hermias' doxography on the problem of the ontological status of universals in his commentary to Porphyry's Eisagoge. The existence of universals once admitted, he says, one has to integrate those entities into the basic ontological classifications, e.g. that of the Categories. Hence the question arises, whether they exist καθ' αὐτό or ἐν ἑτέροις,<sup>63</sup> i.e. whether Plato was right or Aristotle. The most famous answer to this question in the Neoplatonist commentators of Aristotle is the assumption of a threefold universal, a transcendent cause of the sensible individuals of a species (*ante res*), an immanent community between those individuals holding the species together (*in rebus*) and a concept in the human mind abstracting this community from the accidental properties distinguishing those individuals (*post res*).<sup>64</sup> When

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μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἑλάττω γίνεσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. (Werke. Band 3: Phaidon, Das Gastmahl, Kratylos, ed. G. Eigler, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1990, pp. 346f).

<sup>61</sup> The – as far as I see – first testimony of this is Ps-Archytas, Περὶ τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, which reflects the discussion of Aristotle's categories in the first century BC. Cf. Th. A. Szlezák, Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 1972, 34,15-17 (οὐσία ὅσα καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστηκεν – ποιότης ὅσα ἀπλῶς συνυπάρχει τινί); 36,18-20; 42,21-44,1 (τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἑτέρῳ τινὶ συνυπάρχειν οὐσίας οἰκεῖον: πᾶσα γὰρ οὐσία καθ' αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ συνυπάρχοντα καὶ συμβεβηκότα ἢ ἐν ταύτῃ, φημί, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ταύτης). On the origin of this distinction in Eudoros of Alexandria's criticism of the Categories cf. *ibid.* pp. 130f.

<sup>62</sup> For the earliest testimony cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima (CAG suppl. II/1, 13,9-14,3) and In Metaph. (CAG I, 421,20-29). That every of this finally eleven meanings is regarded as opposition to καθ' αὐτό becomes clear from Philoponus, In Cat.; CAG XIII/1, 34,6f.

<sup>63</sup> CAG IV/3, 40,15-17.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. A.C. Lloyd, Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic, in: Phronesis 1 (1956), (8-72.146-159) pp. 59-64; Id., The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford: Clarendon 1990, pp. 62-75 / K. Kremer, Der Metaphysikbegriff in den Aristoteleskommentaren der Ammonius-Schule, Münster: Aschendorff 1960, pp.153-155, esp. the references on p.153 n.85; Id., Die Anschauung der Ammonius (Hermείου)-Schule über den Wirklichkeitscharakter des Intelligiblen. Über einen Beitrag der Spätantike zur platonisch-

Ammonius simply ascribes both a distinct hypostasis which is καθ' αὐτὸ θεωρούμενον and several other hypostases it has *in* its species to every genus,<sup>65</sup> he probably refers the former to this genus as transcendent cause and the latter to this genus as immanent community. With having detached the function of transcendental constitution from this immanent community, it can well be said to exist 'in', i.e. to be entirely dependent on the existence of its individuals.

The crucial point in the discussion of the orthodox fathers with John Philoponus – next to Simplicius the most important pupil of Ammonius and editor of his lectures – is, whether those *in rebus*-universals are universals in the proper sense, i.e. numerically identical common natures equally participated by every individual of a species, or rather – as the orthodox Neoplatonist solution of Plato's sail-cloth dilemma (Parmenides 130e-133a) demanded – numerically (and to a certain extent also qualitatively) different likenesses of the unique transcendent cause in each of the individuals caused by it.<sup>66</sup> The commentators are not entirely clear about this: A passage in Simplicius' commentary on the Categories clearly expounds the doctrine according to the orthodox Neoplatonic view and finally states that the only proper universal is the abstract concept in our minds.<sup>67</sup> However, Simplicius – who was a pupil of both the Alexandrian Ammonius and the Athenian Damascius – shares with his Alexandrian colleagues a partition of the meaning of κοινόν which could justify blaming the Alexandrians for a severe deviation from the orthodox Proclan metaphysics. Something can be "common" either (1) without being divided, like a slave shared by different owners, or (2) in being divided, like a breakfast being partly consumed by different people, or (3) by successive alternation of the actual possession, like a seat in the theatre, or (4) in being temporally and locally participated to the same degree and without differentiation, like the human nature by its individuals. The crucial point is of course case (4). Ammonius explains this ἀδιαίρετως μεθεκτόν by the fact that every human being participates

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aristotelischen Metaphysik' Philosophisches Jahrbuch 69 (1961/62), (46-63) p. 62 / L. Benakis: The Problem of General Concepts in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Thought, in: Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. D.J. O'Meara, Albany: State of New York Press, 1982, (75-86) pp. 83-85 and R. Cross, Gregory of Nyssa on Universals, in: VigChr 56 (2002), (372-410) pp. 374-380.

<sup>65</sup> In Isagog.; CAG IV/3, 27,23-28,5.

<sup>66</sup> For a survey of this discussion cf. R. Cross, Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological predication in John of Damascus, in: Medieval Studies 62 (2000), (69-124) pp. 74-86.

<sup>67</sup> CAG VIII, 69,3-71,2.

‘undividedly’ in every trait of animal.<sup>68</sup> Philoponus<sup>69</sup> and Olympiodorus use formulations even more susceptible to the sail-cloth objection: according to those two, the whole species is participated by every of its members to the same degree, it is, as Olympiodorus puts it ὅλον ἑαυτὸ παρέχον ἑκάστῳ τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτοῦ.<sup>70</sup> They are both using an example which strongly resembles the daylight-one rejected in Parmenides 131b: the voice of the messenger which is received as a whole by everyone in town while being numerically one. However, the Alexandrians’ deviation or lapse manifests itself most clearly by a comparison of Elias and Simplicius: the latter makes clear that the ἀδιαιρέτος κοινότης of both a voice and a slave has nothing to do with participation, but is rather a matter of χρῆσις which can either be exerted simultaneously by several people (in case of the voice) or not (in case of the slave).<sup>71</sup> In contrast, the former makes extensive use of the dubious kind of universality in his account of predication and multiplies the examples adding the centre common to all the radii of a circle and the generic matter common to all its specific forms.<sup>72</sup> Hence, the church fathers’ stance towards this matter does have some foundation in contemporary philosophy.

Thus, the claim that natures or species do not exist καθ’ αὐτό but in their individuals is well explicable from the philosophical background. In contrast, the specific differences or substantial qualities (ποιότητες οὐσιωδεῖς) are – following Aristotle, Cat. 5 3a22-32 – always denied to be ‘in’ a subject, but rather affirmed to form an essential part (συνπληροῦν) of this subject. Of course, the specific differences are one part of the species and are thus comprised in the affirmation of the latter’s inexistence in the individuals. However, whenever they are discussed on their own, every attempt to

<sup>68</sup> In Cat.; CAG IV/4, 19,10-12. That this discussion of the term “common” was originally related to that of the ontological status of universals is shown by Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii I,10; ed. S. Brandt, Leipzig: G. Freytag 1906 (CSEL 48), pp. 162,16-163,3.

<sup>69</sup> We are talking about – in K. Verrycken’s terminology – Philoponus I here who is still more or less faithful to the doctrine of his teacher Ammonius (cf. The development of Philoponus thought and its chronology, in: Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, ed. R. Sorabji, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990, pp. 233-274), whereas the orthodox fathers had to cope with the arguments of Philoponus II. Although several aspects of Verrycken’s reconstruction – especially concerning the motives of Philoponus’ ‘conversion’ to Christianity – have been correctly criticized by C. Scholten, Antike Naturphilosophie und christliche Kosmologie in der Schrift ‘De opificio mundi’ des Johannes Philoponos, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 1996, pp. 118-143, the main point of ours in the present context, namely the distinction of an entirely Neoplatonist and a more and more Christian period (from 529 onwards) in Philoponus authorship, still seems tenable to me.

<sup>70</sup> Both In Cat.; CAG XIII/1, 18,30-19,4 and XII/1, 30,33-31,1.

<sup>71</sup> In Cat.; CAG VIII, 26,11-20.

<sup>72</sup> In Cat.; CAG XVIII/1, 154,13-155,8. For the Aristotelian analogy of genus:species = matter:form cf. H. Steinfath, Die Einheit der Definition (Z 12 und H 6), in: Aristoteles, Metaphysik. Die Substanzbücher (Z, H, Θ), ed. C. Rapp, Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1996 (KA 4), pp. 229-251.

assign some kind of intermediary position between substance and accident to differentiae or substantial qualities is harshly rejected from Porphyry onwards, because this would question the all-embracing character of the fundamental distinction between substance and accident and establish an eleventh category apart from the ten Aristotelian ones.<sup>73</sup> Although Aristotle himself called the differentiae κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότης,<sup>74</sup> the commentators only oppose the difference as οὐσιωδὴς ποιότης and the accidental quality as ἐπουσιωδὴς ποιότης in refuting objections concerning the non-substantiality of the differentia or the definition constituted by it.<sup>75</sup> Hence, it would be really astonishing and without philosophical parallel, if Leontius intended an analogy of substantial qualities and inexistent natures with respect to their alleged intermediary position between substance and accident.

### 3. Ephrem of Amid

Ephrem of Amid, patriarch of Antioch from 526 until 544, died about one year after Leontius of Byzantium, and thus cannot have written a long time after him.<sup>76</sup> He wrote an apology for Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo which must have drawn quite a lot upon that of John the Grammarian.<sup>77</sup> It is quite astonishing that our term was in his time already important enough to be embodied in the '26 chapters of dogmatic definitions

<sup>73</sup> Porphyry, In Cat.; CAG IV/1, 95,22-28.31-35 / Dexippus, In Cat. II,20-22; CAG IV/2, 47,28-51,2 / Ammonius, In Cat.; CAG IV/4, 46,17-19 / Philoponus, In Cat.; CAG XIII/1, 66,7-25 / Olympiodorus, In Cat.; CAG XII/1, 67,32-35. 70,27-71,6 / Elias, In Cat.; CAG XVIII/1, 173,35-174,14 / Simplicius, In Cat.; CAG VIII, 49,5-9. On the systematic background cf. Lloyd, *Anatomy*, pp. 85-95.161-163 / J. Ellis, *Alexander's Defense of Aristotle's Categories*, in: *Phronesis* 39 (1994) (69-89) 69f.83-88 / K. Wurm, *Substanz und Qualität. Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation der plotinischen Traktate VI 1, 2 und 3*, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 1973, pp. 250-262.

<sup>74</sup> *Metaphysics* V,14 1020 b 1 cf. *ibid.* 1020 b 14f (πρώτη ποιότης τῆς οὐσίας); XI,12 1068 b 18f; *Physics* V,2 226 a 27f (τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ) and *Cat* 5 3 b 20 (about the genus and the species, which is often identified with the differentia [e.g. *Metaphysics* VII,12 1038 b 19-21]: περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀφορίζει). For the discussion in the *Topics* see Wurm, *Substanz*, p.122 with n.102. The passage he quotes from *Topics* VII,3 153 a 17f does not classify the differentia as substance, but makes clear that the question τί ἐστὶν has to be answered by genus and differentia. H. G. Zekl correctly translates in the *Meiner*-edition (*Topik. Sophistische Widerlegungsschlüsse*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1997, p. 367): „wenn aber bei dieser Frage nach dem Wesen die Gattung und die artbildenden Unterschiede ausgesagt werden“. According to *Topics* IV,6 128 a 20-29, the differentia was assigned to the category of substance by some philosophers, but has to be regarded as a quality.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. the references *ab. n.* 47.

<sup>76</sup> For his life cf. Helmer, *Neuchalcedonismus*, pp. 185-187; P.T.R. Gray, *The Defense of Chalcedon in the East (451-553)*, Leiden: Brill 1979 (SHCT 20), pp. 141f; T. Hainthaler in A. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*, Vol. II/3: *Die Kirche von Jerusalem und Antiochen nach 451 bis 600*, ed. T. Hainthaler, Freiburg a.e.: Herder 2002, pp. 357-359.

<sup>77</sup> John of Damascus quotes it as περὶ τοῦ γραμματικοῦ Ἰωάννου καὶ τῆς συνόδου (Sacra parallela; MSG 96, 481C). For further evidence of Ephrem's dependence on the Grammarian cf. Helmer, *Neuchalcedonismus*, pp. 162f n.334; 189f. According to *ibid.*, p. 189, we have treated CPG 6902 and 6904 as identical above.



according to etymology' Ephrem wrote against Acacius the philosopher and presbyter of Apameia (CPG 6906). In the small fragment which is preserved we find the definitions and/or etymologies of ὄρος, οὐσία, μορφή, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον, ἰδίωμα, ἐνέργεια, ὁμοούσιος and finally – with 7¼ lines in Helmer's edition the most extensive one – ἐνυπόστατος:

“ Ἐνυπόστατον is what is established in a hypostasis, like size, whiteness or fatherhood, or again what is a proper being and is known without fantasy in existence. Of course, we do not call God the Logos' flesh a hypostasis, for it did not subsist by itself as any simple hypostasis does. Nor do we call it ἀνυπόστατον, which signifies the non-existent, wherefore we define it as ἐνυπόστατον or ἐνύπαρκτον or also ἐνούσιον nature”.<sup>78</sup>

As Gray has already noticed, the passage only makes sense if we refer the first meaning of ἐνυπόστατος to the human nature of Christ and the second one to the simple hypostasis.<sup>79</sup> To conceive of this flesh as φύσις ἐνυπόστατος, ἐνύπαρκτος or ἐνούσιος<sup>80</sup> is for Ephrem apparently the way to avoid the extremes of hypostasis and ἀνυπόστατον. But this ontological middle-position between nothingness and self-subsistence is occupied by the accident – quantities like size, qualities like whiteness or relations like fatherhood. According to this interpretation, Ephrem would abandon Leontius' concern for a distinction between accident and insubstantiating nature, although both of them accept a similarity concerning the ontological status of the two. However, could this also explain the synonyms Ephrem gives for ἐνυπόστατος? According to their basic meaning, all three of them do in fact mean nothing but 'real'. Thus, one could try to read the first sentence of the passage as a distinction between a wider and narrower sense of 'real', just as we found in the Grammarian. Yet, in my opinion, this would be a grave distortion of the meaning, as Ephrem clearly resumes the Aristotelian distinction between inexistent accident and self-subsistent substance. The verb

<sup>78</sup> Helmer, *Neuchalcedonismus*, p. 272,6-11: 'Ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστιν τὸ ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει καθιδρυμένον οἷον μακρότης ἢ λευκότης ἢ πατρότης ἢ πάλιν τὸ κυρίως ὄν καὶ ἀφανταστῶς ἐν ὑπάρξει γνωριζόμενον. Τὴν μέντοι τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σάρκα οὐχ ὑπόστασιν λέγομεν, οὐ γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπέστη ὡς πᾶσα ψιλὴ ὑπόστασις. Οὐτε πάλιν αὐτὴν φάμεν ἀνυπόστατον ὅπερ σημαίνει τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον, διόπερ αὐτὴν φύσιν ὀρίζομεν ἐνυπόστατον ἡγοῦν ἐνύπαρκτόν τε καὶ ἐνούσιον. In taking the last three adjectives as neutra, the translation of Gray, *Defense*, p. 149, seems to miss that composite adjectives do not have a female ending. Cf. also T. Hainthaler's translation in Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus II/3*, p. 369. However, Hainthaler's assumption of a dependence on Leontius of Byzantium's *Epilysis* (ibid. and n. 70) – only based on the examples for accidents which are not even the same – is without any foundation.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., p. 149f.

<sup>80</sup> In the framework of Cappadocian terminology, φύσις ἐνούσιος is of course a tautology. But Ephrem does not introduce ἐνούσιον directly as a predicate of φύσις, but rather as a synonym for ἐνυπόστατος and ἐνύπαρκτος. Those three terms occur together also in Ps-Basil, *Contra Eunomium V*; MSG 29, 713C.

καθιδρύεσθαι signifies the ontological dependence on some kind of ἔδρα – a quite common metaphor in the context of the inherence-problem.<sup>81</sup> Thus, Ephrem possibly wants to accommodate also the meaning of the two synonyms to his first meaning of ἐνυπόστατος. This should well be possible in the case of ἐνύπαρκτος, the verbal-adjective of ἐνυπάρχω.<sup>82</sup> ἐνούσιος presents more difficulties. Lampe postulates a meaning “of attributes, qualities, *inherent in the nature, proper to the essence*”, but adduces only two testimonies from a considerably later period: Anastasius Sinaites and John of Damascus.<sup>83</sup> Nonetheless, one cannot rule out the possibility of a co-transformation of two established synonyms like ἐνούσιον and ἐνυπόστατον, even if we do not have other explicit testimonies for this from the sixth century. Yet, this does not make of Ephrem a revolutionary terminological innovator, as the reason for the new meaning postulated by the patriarch becomes clear from the context: He wants to provide an etymological definition at any price and thus hits upon preposterous derivations, e.g. μορφή from μέρος φέρειν.<sup>84</sup> Small wonder that an analogous derivation of ἐνυπόστατον from ἐν ὑποστάσει (καθιδρύμενον) leads him to make it refer to the accident.

To summarize, our text, though not clearly and explicitly promoting a Loofsian meaning of ἐνυπόστατος, supports two tendencies pointing towards such a meaning: the approximation of ἐνυπόστατον and accident and the focus on Christ’s human nature being ἐνυπόστατος in a special sense (not like a ψιλὴ ὑπόστασις).

Neither in the reports of Photius (codd. 228f) nor in the other remaining fragments do we find any direct evidence for the insubstance formula in Ephrem. The objection ‘no nature without hypostasis’ is refuted not by pointing to the insubstance of Christ’s human nature in the Logos, but by denying the axiom: Neither the ‘natures’ of water, wrath, war nor those of body and soul include (συνεισάγειν) a πρόσωπον of their

<sup>81</sup> Cf. e.g. Plotinus, Ennead VI 3,4 1.3f (ed. Bréhier, vol. VI/1, p. 128) / Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem, ed. V. Cousin, Paris: Durand, 1864 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961), pp. 730,7f or 861,16-18.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. e.g. Cyril, Thesaurus de sancta consubstantiali trinitate; MSG 75, 109C (εὐκῶς τῷ Πατρὶ, οὐκ ἐνυπάρκτου βουλήσεως εἰκόνα φορεῖ, ὑπάρχων πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων Υἱός). Cf. also the ἐνύπαρκτος θεότης in Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Monophysitas; MSG 86/II, 1801B.

<sup>83</sup> Patristic Greek Lexicon, s.v. (p. 478b/479a) 4. Anastasius gives as one possible meaning of ἐνούσιον “τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ γνωριζόμενον ἰδίωμα, οἷον ἐνούσιόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ τὸ φθαρτόν” (Hodegos II, 3,127f; CCG 8, p. 39). John of Damascus explains: “ἐνούσιον μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ θεωρούμενον, τούτῃ ἐστι τὸ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἄθροισμα, ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν” (Ctr. Jacobitas 11,5-7; PTS 22, p. 114). However, this testimony – part of John’s explication of the famous Leontius-passage – could also be interpreted as counter-instance to the meaning postulated by Lampe (ἐνούσιον = ὑπόστασις!).

<sup>84</sup> Helmer, Neuchalcedonismus, p. 271,9f.

own.<sup>85</sup> As Pamphilus' argument for the existence of φύσεις, but not οὐσίαι ἄνυπόστατοι shows,<sup>86</sup> this is a resumption of the derived, more specific use of ἄνυπόστατος mentioned above. However, as Ephrem also drew upon the Apollinarian *Epistula ad Jovianum* as an important authority,<sup>87</sup> he may have succeeded in postulating not only the μία φύσις- but also the insubsistence formula.

#### 4. Pamphilus the Theologian

Entering the second half of the sixth century, it becomes very difficult to establish a relative chronology of our texts. For the *De sectis*, we have a fixed terminus ante quem: the ending of Eulogius of Alexandria's patriarchate in 607/8.<sup>88</sup> For Pamphilus and Leontius of Jerusalem, their silence about the monergetist/monotheletic problem is our only datum to establish one. The official outbreak of this controversy is usually located in Sophronius of Jerusalem's protest against the Alexandrian union with the Monophysites (633) in 634. However, we find an intensive concern with the problem of Christ's wills and energies already in late-sixth century authors, like Anastasius I. of Antioch († 599).<sup>89</sup> Thus, we will not be able to determine the termini ante quem more accurately than 'first half of the seventh century'. As our termini post quem are around 580 for both Leontius of Jerusalem<sup>90</sup> and *De sectis*, but around 570 for Pamphilus,<sup>91</sup> we will take him as a starting point, being aware that we can by no means be certain about his temporal priority.

<sup>85</sup> Photius, *Bibliotheca cod.* 229 256 b24-33, ed. R. Henry, vol. 4, Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1965, p. 130.

<sup>86</sup> *Panhoplion* II, 132-156; CCG 19, p. 140f. Pamphilus' examples are love, hate, time, lie and words.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 259b24-27; ed. Henry, p. 156.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus* II/2, pp. 516f referring to MSG 86/I, 1232C; cf. also his rejection of M. van Esbroeck's earlier dating (543-551) in p. 523 n. 91a. Accordingly, the beginning of Eulogius' patriarchate in 581 is the terminus post.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. K.H. Uthemann, *Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung des Monotheletismus*. Ein Beitrag zum eigentlichen Anliegen des Neuchalkedonismus, in: *Studia Patristica* 29, Leuven: Peeters 1997, (373-413) pp. 394-403; Helmer, *Neuchalcedonismus*, pp. 223f; T. Hainthaler in Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus* II/3, pp. 398-400. Of course, there are also earlier treatments of the problem, like that of Ephrem of Amid (Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 370f) or Severus of Antioch (Cf. Chesnut, *Three monophysite Christologies*, pp. 25-34).

<sup>90</sup> D. Krausmüller, *Leonius of Jerusalem. A theologian of the seventh century*, in: *JThS* 52 (2001), (637-657) pp. 639-649 has convincingly refuted Richard's arguments for 543 as terminus ante and reassessed Loofs' arguments for 568 (the Lombards entering Italy cf. *Contra monophysitas*; MSG 86/II, 1896D) or 578 (death of Jacob Baradaeus, origin of the Jacobite movement cf. *ibid.* 1900C) as termini post. However, his own "new arguments" (pp. 649-656) referring the Nestorian's example in CN III,8 1633A to the birth of the emperor Heraclius' son in 612 and Leontius' lament about the conquest of Jerusalem in VII,10 1768hC to a contemporary one, namely that of the Persians in 614, seem to press the wording of the text far too much in both cases.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. J. H. Declerck in his introduction to CCG 19, p. 24 ('about ten years after the outbreak of the tritheite controversy in 557').

Whereas we cannot be sure whether Pamphilus knew any of John's or Ephrem's writings,<sup>92</sup> his abundant use of those of Leontius of Byzantium, who is even endowed with the title "father" (qu. VI,119f; VIII,126), is well attested.<sup>93</sup> If Declerck's latest hypothesis on Pamphilus' identity with the co-author of the letter to Agapetus I. from 536 holds, he might even have known Leontius personally.<sup>94</sup> As especially the second question of his *Panhoplion*<sup>95</sup> shows, Pamphilus knew Porphyry's *Eisagoge*, Aristotle's *Categories* and *Physics* and also had a somewhat superficial acquaintance with the commentary tradition on those works.<sup>96</sup> Of course, this also holds true for Leontius of Byzantium, but Pamphilus is probably the first Chalcedonian to draw (provoked by Philoponus' attacks?) upon Aristotle (mainly *Cat.* 5) so explicitly for his account of substance and nature. It is very interesting that his preoccupation with Leontius' text deceived him in his interpretation of the commentators' technical terminology in the same way it deceived the modern scholar St. Otto: In combing the passages from CNE (1277D) and the *Epilysis* (1945B), he relates the distinction between ποιότητες οὐσιωδεῖς and ἐπουσιωδεῖς to that of inseparable and separable accidents by identifying the second member of the first distinction with the first of the second one.<sup>97</sup> This is not only a contradiction against the terminology of the commentators, but also highly implausible in itself, as it would entail the inseparability of every accidental quality. Nevertheless, it is a beautiful demonstration for Pamphilus' preoccupation with Leontius' text which is especially displayed in his use of ἐνυπόστατος. Neither is there any trace of trinitarian use of the term, nor do the Christological formulas ἔνωσις

<sup>92</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 81f.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-68.81-83. Pamphilus knew CNE, the *Epilysis* and the *Epaporemata* and made use of them mainly in qu. VI-IX. The dependence on Leontius of Jerusalem supposed by C. Moeller (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 83f) is now, taking into account Krausmüller's new dating, not only improbable, but impossible.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus* II/3, p. 158.

<sup>95</sup> We will retain Cardinal Mai's title for the sake of the beautiful biblical metaphor.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Declerck's apparatus on II, 45-104.168-205. He even had an idea about the threefold universal (cf. I,38-41) and Proclus' distinction between three kinds of wholes (V, 115f cf. Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, prop. 67-69, ed. E.R. Dodds, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 64f). But Grillmeier's assumption of an acquaintance with Philoponus' commentary on the *Physics* (*Jesus der Christus* II/3, pp. 145f) is – taking into account the homogeneity of the Neoplatonic commentary tradition – highly improbable, as Pamphilus most probably knew about Philoponus' heresies. He may equally have used another commentary or attended a lecture on the *Physics* at some point.

<sup>97</sup> *Panhoplion* II, 26-45; CCG 19, p. 135. M. Richard not only overemphasizes Pamphilus' philosophical incompetence (Léonce et Pamphile, pp. 34.39), but also wants to construct a fundamental difference between Pamphilus' traditional, Cappadocian/Porphyrian concept of hypostasis and Leontius' very own καθ' αὐτό ὑφίστασθαι (*Ibid.* pp. 30f.34-39). However, he makes far too much of Pamphilus' addition of καθ' αὐτό to Leontius' description of the οὐσία as πρᾶγμα ὑφεστώς (qu. II, 43f) – analogous to ἐνυπόστατος, ὑφεστώς can mean both 'real' and 'self-subsisting' –, just like he does not recognize Pamphilus' reception of our derived use of ἀνυπόστατον in qu. VII, 32-34, but claims those lines to be a failed attempt of harmonizing traditional and Leontian terminology.

ἐνυπόστατος, ἐνυποστάτως ἐνυσθαι still occur.<sup>98</sup> However, there are two passages in which he clearly remains faithful to the traditional equation  $x$  ἐνυπόστατον = ὑπόστασις of  $x$ . The first is qu. XI,157f, where he describes the hypostasis as ἐνυπόστατόν τι καὶ οὐσιῶδες πρᾶγμα. The second is the one we already referred to in our discussion of Ephrem, his distinction between οὐσία only signifying ἐνυπόστατα, i.e. ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει ἰδίᾳ θεωρούμενα (II, 134-136) and physis also signifying ἀνυπόστατα. Maybe this passage is directed against a refutation of the ‘no nature without hypostasis’ objection similar to that of Ephrem which could render the synonymous meaning of οὐσία and φύσις in Christology questionable.

In contrast, his own refutation of the objection in question (qu. VII) is entirely based on Leontius’ distinction between hypostasis and ἐνυπόστατόν. The introductory passage reads almost like a glossed version of CNE 1277D-1280B.<sup>99</sup> However, Pamphilus is much more reluctant than Leontius to compare Christ’s οὐσία ἐνυπόστατοι with an accident in any respect whatsoever: The phrase μετὰ τῆς συγκειμένης καὶ συμπεφυκνίας φύσεως which described the ‘insubstisting’ natures of the composite hypostasis in Leontius (1280B) is related to the accident by Pamphilus (VII,12-15); he uses parallel and explanatory phrases like πρᾶγμα ὑφεστώς (VII,10f) or ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑπάρξει θεωρούμενον (22f) for our term; and, finally, he explicitly parallels the relationships substance-accidents and ἐνυπόστατον-ἀνυπόστατον (32-34). Thus, Pamphilus does not acknowledge any kind of analogous ontological status of accidents and insubstisting natures, but wants to distinguish ἐνυπόστατον and hypostasis as the substantial and the separating or self-subsisting aspect of the concrete individual:

“ἐνυπόστατον indicates the fact that the entity in question is not an accident, but is perceived in itself and in its own existence; hypostasis means that, which is separate and by itself, and reveals the congregation of the characterizing idioms, as it is seen in the idioms in the first place in order to mark off the individual or person from the common essence, although it is not unsubstantial”.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>98</sup> The former of course still remained common in the sixth century (cf. e.g. Ammonius Alexandrinus, Frg. 2 in John, in: Johannes-Kommentare aus der griechischen Kirche, ed. J. Reuss, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1966 (TU 89), pp. 196f / Olympiodor Diakon von Alexandria. Kommentar zu Hiob, ed. U. Hagedorn and D. Hagedorn, Berlin: De Gruyter 1984 (PTS 24), p. 219 / Zacharias Rhetor, De opificio mundi contra philosophos; MSG 85,1116C / Gregorius Agrigentinus, Super Ecclesiasten; MSG 98,837B), the latter seems to have been much less common.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Richard, Léonce et Pamphile, pp. 35f; Lang, Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos, pp. 643f.

<sup>100</sup> Panhoplion VII, 21-27; CCG 19, p. 174. As ἐν ἑαυτῷ and καθ' ἑαυτό are actually used almost synonymously as opposites of ἐν ἑτέρῳ in the philosophy of late antiquity (cf. e.g. Proclus, Elements

In other words: The term ἐνυπόστατον signifies that we are dealing with something substantial, which exists in itself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ), not in something else, and which belongs to a species common to several individuals. In contrast, ὑπόστασις signifies a separate individual, which exists by itself (καθ' αὐτό) and is marked off from the other member species by a unique set of accidental characteristics. In the incarnation, Christ's human nature obviously retains only the first aspect, whereas the second aspect is taken over by the Logos. Adapting a quotation from Ps-Justin's (Theodoretus') *Expositio fidei*, Pamphilus says:

"Inhabiting the virgin mother, the Logos creates for himself – in an imperishable and an unperceivable way – a temple from her, a complete human being, without seed. This means: He took a certain οὐσία ἐνυπόστατος, a part of her nature, and caused it to exist as substance in his own hypostasis; [...] If he, then, did not assume a hypostasis, but a human οὐσία ἐνυπόστατος – for, as it was already said before, the Lord's human element did not exist 'self-subsistently' (ἰδιουποστατῶς) and by itself before the union –, Our Lord Jesus Christ must neither be said to come to be from two hypostases before the union nor is it allowed to separate those after the union and conceive of two hypostases".<sup>101</sup>

However, Pamphilus is not able to reconcile this distinction between two aspects, which would entail an individuation of Christ's human nature by the Logos, with the Cappadocian concept of individuation by separating accidents. This is why he has to reject the question as to whether Christ's human and divine natures were universal or particular, by pointing to the inexplicability of the miracle.<sup>102</sup>

All in all, Pamphilus is even further from employing our term in the Loofsian way than was his master Leontius. He rules out any kind of approximation to the accident and also seems to focus on the human nature to a lesser degree in using the term: We have three occurrences with special reference to the human nature (VII,78.83; X,117), one to both natures (VII,40). The remaining nine ones are neutral in that respect.

With regard to the insubstance formula, we encounter a similar hesitation as we did in Leontius, although Pamphilus – as we saw – did approve of the Apollinarian-

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prop. 41 and 81 (ed. Dodds, pp. 42.44.76) / Ammonius, In Isagog.; CAG IV/3, 29,20f), one can understand that Richard claims this passage to be "près de l'incohérence" (Léonce et Pamphile, p. 37).

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. 76-88; p. 176. For the Theodoretus-quotation cf. Corpus apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi, ed. J.C.T. Otto, vol. 4, Jena: Mauke 1880 (repr. Wiesbaden: Sändig 1969), pp. 34f: Μέση δὲ παρθένῳ, ἐκ Δαυιτικοῦ καταγομένη γένους διὰ τὰς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπαγγελίας, πρὸς τὴν τῆς οἰκονομίας χρεῖαν χρησάμενος, καὶ ταύτης τὴν νηδὺν εἰσδύς οἶονεῖ τις θεῖος σπóρος, πλάττει ναὸν ἑαυτῷ, τὸν τέλειον ἄνθρωπον, μέρος τι λαβὼν τῆς ἐκείνης φύσεως καὶ εἰς τὴν τοῦ ναοῦ διάπλασιν οὐσιώσας. Ἐνδὺς δὲ τοῦτον κατ' ἄκραν ἔνωσιν, θεὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ ἄνθρωπος προελθὼν, οὕτω τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς οἰκονομίαν ἐπλήρωσεν.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Panhoplion X,94-124; CCG 19, pp. 199f.

Neochalcedonian rejection of a προδιάπλασις.<sup>103</sup> Although the *Epistula ad Jovianum* is briefly quoted in this context (III,42f), the more important source for Pamphilus seems to be the passage from Theodoretus' *Expositio* referred to above: He prefers Theodoretus' οὐσιοῦν εἰς τοῦ ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν or ὑφίστασθαι ἐν. The only passage coming close to something like an insubsistence formula also resumes the quotation from the *Expositio*:

"In the last days, the Son descended ineffably and invisibly into the virginal womb like a divine seed and formed for himself a temple in his own hypostasis assuming a complete man".<sup>104</sup>

Pamphilus was not aware of the career the concept of the Logos as divine seed would have in Maximus and especially in John of Damascus in interpreting the insubsistence formula. However, one of his merits may have been to promote the passage from Theodoretus into a position equally prominent to that of the Letter to Jovianus, as it seems itself just as compatible to the 'Alexandrian intuition' as the Apollinarian text. But this only applies to the tradition after Pamphilus. As to our author himself, he normally prefers the symmetric chalcedonian formula of two natures in one hypostasis to both the insubsistence-one of Apollinaris' and the 'insubstantiation'-one of Theodoretus. In this case, a further approximation of the insubsistence formula to the term ἐνυπόστατος is of course impossible.

##### 5. De sectis and the Christological disadvantages of the common usage

The relatively short treatise *De sectis* does not offer any convincing evidence to prove any kind of dependence on or acquaintance with John the Grammarian, Leontius of Byzantium<sup>105</sup> or Ephrem of Amid. The author is comparable to Pamphilus with respect to his display of philosophical learning<sup>106</sup> and his (even more) strictly Chalcedonian stance.<sup>107</sup> We will thus look in vain for any occurrence of the insubsistence formula. The "ungewöhnliche Sinn für geschichtliche Entwicklungen" our author is credited

<sup>103</sup> On Pamphilus' ambiguous stance towards Neochalcedonism cf. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus* II/3, pp. 151-157.

<sup>104</sup> ἐπ' ἐσχάτων τῶν ἡμέρων ἐν τῇ παρθενικῇ νηδύϊ εἰσδυς ἀφράστως καὶ ἀοράτως ὁιοεῖ θεῖος σπόρος, ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει ἀφθάρτως πλάττει ναὸν ἐαυτῷ, τέλειον ἄνθρωπον λαβών. (Panhoplion III,31-32 [CCG 19, p. 145]; Theodoretus-quotations italicized).

<sup>105</sup> Its Loofian incorporation into the *Corpus Leontii* was sufficiently refuted by M. Richard, *Le traité "De sectis" et Léonce de Byzance*, in: *Opera minora* Vol. 2, Turnhout: Brepols 1977, (695-723) pp. 697-709.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. MSG 86/I, 1193A. 1233B (Cat. 5). 1241D-1244B (Cat. 6; Physics IV,11 219b1f). 1244B/C (Metaphysics V,6).1244C (Physics I,7 190b24).

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus* II/2, pp. 520-523.

with<sup>108</sup> is not only displayed in the *praxeis* with mainly historical concern (II-VI), but also in the seventh, philosophical one we are interested in.<sup>109</sup> Starting from our well-known monophysite ‘no nature without hypostasis’-objection, the author gives an adequate summary of the traditional usages<sup>110</sup> of the terms ὑπόστασις, ἐνυπόστατον and ἀνυπόστατον, of course – as a strict Chalcedonian – without taking into account Neochalcedonian impulses like Ephrem’s concerning the ἐνυπόστατον. The equation  $x \text{ ἐνυπόστατον} = \text{hypostasis of } x$  is thus his absolutely unquestionable point of departure. When he, in his first ἐνστάσις (cf. Anal. prior. II,26), easily admits that Christ’s two natures can well be called ἀνυπόστατοι, but not ἐνυπόστατοι,<sup>111</sup> he clearly resumes the derived use of ἀνυπόστατος we encountered in Ps-Basil. Small wonder that the Monophysite reply confronts him with the charge of annihilating the Saviour’s natures and demands another ‘reconsideration’ (ἀντιπερίστασις) of his argument. This reconsideration starts with exactly that distinction between a wider and narrower sense of ὑπόστασις / ἐνυπόστατον which we have found in John the Grammarian<sup>112</sup> and which in the formulation of *De sectis* parallels even more exactly Ammonius’ distinction between a wider and narrower sense of οὐσία: Either it signifies τὸ ἀπλῶς ὄν and comprises also the accidents, *although* (καὶν) they have their existence in something else, or it signifies τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ὄν, like individual substances.<sup>113</sup> However, he attaches the analogous distinction between a general and a more specific sense of ἀνυπόστατον which had not been thought of yet by John the Grammarian: Either it signifies τὸ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄν, like centaurs or other creatures of our fantasy, or τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχον τὴν ὑπόστασιν and does not exist καθ’ αὐτό, like the accidents.<sup>114</sup> Hence, the derived sense of ἀνυπόστατος seems to coincide with Ephrem’s first, Christological sense of ἐνυπόστατος, and the accidents also form the overlapping section between ἐνυπόστατος and ἀνυπόστατος in *De sectis*. Applied to Christology, this means that Christ’s two natures can be called ἐνυπόστατοι only in the wider sense, ἀνυπόστατοι only in

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. p. 516.

<sup>109</sup> Richard, *De sectis*, pp. 716-718 offers a critically revised version of MSG 86/I,1240C-1241A.1241C (actio VII,2-3).

<sup>110</sup> As to the trinitarian use, ἐνυπόστατος is replaced by αὐθυπόστατος (MSG 86/I, 1216A).

<sup>111</sup> MSG 86/I, 1240B.

<sup>112</sup> Richard, *De sectis*, pp. 717f (MSG 86/I, 1241C) shows even the same justification of the double use by Cyril-passages using οὐσία and ὑπόστασις synonymously (the third anathematism in CCG 1, p.55,191f, the 11. chapter of the Scholia and the fourth anathematism in our text).

<sup>113</sup> Richard, *De sectis*, p. 716 (MSG 86/I, 1240C/D).

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., pp. 716f (1240D/1241A).



the more specific one (οὐ καθὼ μή εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν μὴ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὄντων εἰσίν).<sup>115</sup>

The logic of this argument would demand that not only the negative aspect (μὴ καθ' ἑαυτό) of the second sense of ἀνυπόστατος holds true for Christ's two natures, but also the positive one (ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχον τὸ εἶναι). However, this is never explicitly said by our author, and the fact that he both totally avoids the insubsistence formula and shows – always remaining faithful to the Chalcedonian symmetry – no sign of focus on Christ's human nature whatsoever in our discussion, casts considerable doubt on his possible approval of such an application. Hence, the main result of our examination of this text will be a confirmation of what we have said about John the Grammarian's introduction of the term and its sources. However, the Grammarian's solution in comparison to that of Leontius of Byzantium suffers one major disadvantage: It has to admit two hypostases in Christ, both understood in the wider sense. Anastasius of Antioch tried to solve this problem in referring ἐνυπόστατος only to the wider, hypostasis only to the narrower sense,<sup>116</sup> a solution which will be echoed in the attempt of seventh and eighth-century compilers to harmonize the material concerning our term received from the tradition. However, as this wide concept will never suffice to determine the ontological status of Christ's natures as specifically as the Leontian concept does, John the Grammarian and the *De sectis* are doomed to be finally subordinated to or even suppressed by Leontius of Byzantium.

## 6. Leontius of Jerusalem

Having re-dated Leontius, the author of the *Contra Monophysitas* (CM) – in its present form probably just two appendices left from a larger treatise against the Monophysites<sup>117</sup> – and the voluminous *Contra Nestorianos* (CN), Richard's prosopographical suppositions concerning our monk – partially refuted already by D. B. Evans – are definitely surpassed.<sup>118</sup> Thus, all we can know about his relationships to our previous authors has to be inferred from his works. In the florilegium of CM he quotes from Severus' *Contra impium grammaticum* and introduces the quotation as by “the

<sup>115</sup> MSG 86/I, 1241A-C.

<sup>116</sup> Des Patriarchen Anastasius I. von Antiochien Jerusalem Streitgespräch mit einem Tritheiten, ed. K.-H. Uthemann, in: *Traditio* 37 (1981), (73-108) pp. 103f (ll. 768-800).

<sup>117</sup> Cf. M. Richard, Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance, in: *Opera minora*, vol. 3, Turnhout: Brepols 1977, (53-88) pp. 38f; Helmer, *Neuchalcedonismus*, p. 203; Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus* II/2, p. 287. As the reference in CN II,14 1565C most probably points to CM, the latter is the earlier work.

<sup>118</sup> Léonce de Jérusalem, pp. 81-88 cf. Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium*, pp. 156-183.

same Severus, from his book against the Grammarian John, bishop of Cesarea”, the first testimony for the confusion of the Grammarian with John Khozibites, bishop of Cesarea at the time of Severus, which makes at least an intimate knowledge of the Grammarian’s or Severus’ work improbable.<sup>119</sup> An acquaintance with Leontius of Byzantium was supposed on the grounds of a text quoted in CN II,13 which will be discussed in detail below.<sup>120</sup> Leontius was sometimes credited with outstanding knowledge of philosophy and natural sciences,<sup>121</sup> sometimes accused of infertile scholasticism and quasi-scientific sophistry.<sup>122</sup> Of special interest for our purposes is the acquaintance with the philosophical discussion of ἐν τινι he displays in several passages of CN.<sup>123</sup> After all, Leontius seems to be the most inventive of our authors concerning both hypostasis- and insubsistence-language.<sup>124</sup>

Nevertheless, his use of ἐνυπόστατος does not at first sight show any kind of peculiarities whatsoever. That our well-known equation also holds for him is already shown by the very first occurrence of the term in CN, where it figures merely as the adjective that corresponds to the basic meaning of ὑπόστασις and means ‘settled at the bottom’ (in liquids).<sup>125</sup> The same holds true for IV,36, where φύσις ἐνυπόστατος – in a *commutatio* – parallels φυσικὴ ὑπόστασις (1704D) and for VII,1, where it is claimed that we perceive the complete divinity in all three hypostases of the trinity, ἐνουσίως κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἐνυποστάτως κατὰ τὸ ἰδικόν (1760B). The rest of the occurrences is more or less explicitly connected with a refutation of the ‘no nature without hypostasis’-objection which once again leaves no room for the first two

<sup>119</sup> MSG 86/II, 1848D cf. M. Richard in CCG I, p. V.

<sup>120</sup> The similarities mentioned by Loofs in order to establish his “Grundschrifthypothese” are not even close enough to establish any kind of acquaintance between the two authors (cf. Richard’s discussion in Léonce de Jérusalem, pp. 69-73). Otto’s revisitation of those similarities (Person und Subsistenz, pp. 89-133) does not prove more than the non-incompability of those two authors’ anthropology. However, he convincingly refutes Richard’s (Léonce de Jérusalem, pp. 60-62) and C. Moeller’s (Textes ‘Monophysites’ de Léonce de Jérusalem, in: EThL 27 (1951) (467-482) pp. 472f) suggestion that Leontius – though not consistently – dismisses the Cappadocian definition of hypostasis (Person und Subsistenz, pp. 100-103.118f.133).

<sup>121</sup> Richard, Léonce de Jérusalem, pp. 52-58; Helmer, Neuchalcedonismus, p. 204.

<sup>122</sup> C. Moeller, Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme en Orient de 451 à la fin du VI siècle, in: Grillmeier / Bacht, Chalkedon I, (637-720) p. 687 (CN “illisible”); Gray, Defense, p. 123.

<sup>123</sup> He knows about the difference of ἐν τινι ὡς συμβεβηκός and ὡς μέρος (CN I,6; MSG 86/I, 1421 A-C; II,49 1601B), the πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι of this expression (I,8 1433 A), the wide range of meaning of the prefix ἐν (II,4 1537D/1540 A), and claims that the phrase generally signifies a ἐνωσις (II,9 1553D).

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus II/2, pp. 297-302.

<sup>125</sup> II,1 1528D.

kinds of usage we encountered in the Grammarian.<sup>126</sup> With only one exception – V,28, a resumption of earlier arguments – they are concentrated in book II which is directed against the Nestorian doctrine of two hypostases in Christ. The Nestorian's point of departure is that hypostasis means something ἐνούσιον only if it refers to an individual substance. If this sense of hypostasis is to be applied to the Chalcedonian definition, there is no room for a twofold consubstantiality of Christ, as the latter presupposes two ἐνούσια.<sup>127</sup> The vast majority of the Nestorian objections in CN II are nothing but variations of this first one. In II,5, the Nestorian argues against the possibility of an ἀνυπόστατον – the human nature of Christ which does not have a hypostasis on its own – to be consubstantial with an ἐνυπόστατον, i.e. our human natures every one of which does have one (1540 A/B). Leontius – still perfectly in line with his understanding of ἐνυπόστατον as hypostatic – reminds him that his objection confuses the level of (universal) natures and that of (particular) hypostases: Only the former can be consubstantial with each other, whereas the latter are only consubstantial qua ἐνούσια. As the ἐν ἐνυπόστατον πρόσωπον of our Lord is ἐνούσιον in a twofold manner, it can well be ἐνυποστάτοις δύο προσώποις ὁμοούσιον (1544 A/B). The fact that Christ's human nature is not ἰδιοὑπόστατον,<sup>128</sup> i.e. does not have a hypostasis of its own (cf. 1540C), does by no means entail that it does not have a hypostasis at all. In II,35, Leontius underscores this conclusion using the example of the ἐνυποστάτων ζώων καὶ βοτανῶν φύσεις transferred into a new hypostasis by consumption and digestion (1593C).

Having noticed no trace of connection between our term and the insubsistence formula nor of a distinction between ἐνυπόστατον and hypostasis so far, we finally encounter this distinction II,13, and surprisingly within a quotation from the Nestorian. This is not only the most important chapter in Leontius with regard to our term, but also one of the most difficult ones to interpret. Following David Evans, Patrick Gray has suggested that

<sup>126</sup> Leontius prefers ὑποστατικός both in the trinitarian context (cf. CN I,19 1481B12; II,24 1585D; VII,5 1768aC) and with respect to Christ's hypostatic union (cf. I,46 1504D; I,50 1512B-1513 A; II,12 1557D; II,30 1589B; III,2 1609 A; III,5 1616 A. 1617 A; V,1 1724B; VII,7 1768eC).

<sup>127</sup> CN II,1 1526C-1528D. The Nestorian quotes Ps 88,48 LXX, not 104,4. ἡ ὑπόστασις must of course be part of the quotation!

<sup>128</sup> For this term cf. II,10 1556A; V,29 1749C. It appears to be a Neochalcedonian neologism; cf. e.g. John the Grammarian, Capitula ctr. Monophysitas; CCG 1, p. 64,110 / Justinian, Contra Monophysitas 153,20. 158,11, in: Drei dogmatische Schriften Justinians, ed. M. Amelotti a.a., Milan: Giuffrè 1973, pp. 50.52 and Edictum rectae fidei, in: Ibid., p. 150,11 / Eusthatius, Epistula de duabus naturis; CCG 19, pp. 421,222f. 431,547f. It closely parallels ἰδιοσύστατος (cf. Lampe, Patristic Greek Lexicon, col. 665b) and is often varia lectio to the latter in the manuscripts.

the opponent in this chapter is not the Nestorian, but Leontius of Byzantium.<sup>129</sup> The implausibility of this sudden change of opponent was already seen by Uthemann whose first analysis of the text is the most appropriate one so far.<sup>130</sup> L. Abramowski suggests a distribution of the text which became a commonly shared opinion among researchers: She assumes two Nestorian passages marked by the *φασίν* in 1560 A7 and B8 and an orthodox interruption marked by the *φάμεν* in B1.<sup>131</sup>

However, neither the postulate of an interruption<sup>132</sup> nor the ascription of those passages to the Nestorian is tenable. In fact, the whole passage 1560 A7-B15 is a quotation in a quotation, i.e. a Chalcedonian text criticized by the Nestorian whose statements can be found in A4-7 and C1-D13. As already Uthemann noticed,<sup>133</sup> this is proven by 1561C9-12 where Leontius refers to the Nestorian's statement in 1560D11-13 as "what was said by you at the end". In 1561A1-3 Leontius explicitly admits that the Nestorian is really targeting proper Chalcedonian arguments (*ἡμέτερα προβλήματα*), but blames his refutation with being too superficial to convince anybody except himself. Hence, the argument of the chapter has to be analysed as follows:

The Nestorian's Chalcedonian opponent – provoked by his audience to demonstrate the existence of a *φύσις ἀνυπόστατος* – postulates a difference between *ὑπόστασις* and *ἐνυπόστατον* analogous to that of *οὐσία* and *ἐνούσιον* one has to admit with regard to the trinity (1560A). This entails the possibility of conceiving two *φύσεις ἐνυπόστατοι* in one *ὑπόστασις*. Just like a body can be *ἐγχρωμάτιστον*, but does not have to be a *χρῶμα* for that reason, a nature can be *ἐνυπόστατος*, but does not have to be a *ὑπόστασις*. Thus, the postulate of two natures in one *ὑπόστασις* does not entail that one or even both of them are *ἀνυπόστατος* (1560B). The Nestorian starts his counter-attack with ridiculing the Chalcedonian because of the self-contradiction the latter gets involved in by his example. He maintains that a *φύσις ἐνυπόστατος* by all

<sup>129</sup> Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium*, pp. 139-143 / Gray, *Defense*, pp. 128f.

<sup>130</sup> Das anthropologische Modell der hypostatischen Union. Ein Beitrag zu den philosophischen Voraussetzungen und zur innerchalkedonischen Transformation eines Paradigmas, in: *Kleronomia* 14 (1982) (215-312) pp. 261-263. However, after reading Abramowski's essay he unfortunately changed his mind (Cf. *Defintionen und Paradigmen*, p. 111 n. 5).

<sup>131</sup> Ein nestorianischer Traktat bei Leontius von Jerusalem, in: R. Lavenant (ed.), *III. Symposium Syriacum* (1980). *Les contacts du monde syriaque avec les autres cultures*, Rome : Pontificio instituto orientale 1983, (43-55) pp. 43f n.5 cf. p. 52.

<sup>132</sup> Abramowski should have noticed that not only A14-B7, but also B13f clearly argue for the possibility of two natures in one *ὑπόστασις*. Also the *φάμεν* of B1 does not necessarily introduce a new speaker, as the Nestorian also quotes his opponent's *φάμεν* in A8. The repetition of *φασίν* in B8 probably just indicates that the Nestorian skips a few passages.

<sup>133</sup> *Anthropologisches Modell*, p. 263 n.38.

means presupposes the presence of a hypostasis, just like a coloured body presupposes that of a colour (1560C). As physically different things are necessarily also hypostatically different, but not the other way round, the example of the Trinity is worthless and nothing but a sophistic play on words. The Chalcedonian should have shown something naturally but not hypostatically different in order to substantiate his case (1560D).

According to Leontius, this refutation of the Chalcedonian position completely misses the point. The mere presence of colour or of an hypostasis does not entail the identification of body and colour or nature and hypostasis respectively. The Nestorian should have shown that the presence of several different φύσεις ἐνυπόστατοι necessarily presupposes the presence of the corresponding number of different hypostases (1561A). Just as different bodies can be coloured by one and the same colour 'white', different natures can subsist in one and the same common hypostasis and thus be all together ἐνυπόστατος. For being something<sup>134</sup> is not necessarily identical with being something independently (ἰδίᾳ) (1561B), just as a city is not without a ruler, simply because it does not have a ruler of its own. Hence, the nature's being ἐνυπόστατοι does not necessarily entail their being ἑτεροῦπόστατοι,<sup>135</sup> but they have their being ἐνυπόστατοι in one common hypostasis. Two ἐνυπόστατα do thus by no means introduce a duality of hypostases into the one hypostasis of our Lord, but only two sets of hypostatic idioms (i.e. divine and human idioms characterizing the unique hypostasis) (1561C),<sup>136</sup> i.e. a synthesis not of hypostases, but of natures.

Leontius' defence of this 'quotation in the quotation' could give rise to the suspicion that it is actually taken from an earlier treatise of his own. As we did not find enough evidence in our sixth-century-texts to classify the distinction ἐνυπόστατον/hypostasis as a "topos der christologischen Debatte"<sup>137</sup>, and as it occurs here together with the analogies ἐνοῦσιον/οὐσία and body/shape or colour,<sup>138</sup> a dependence of this treatise

<sup>134</sup> τι εἶναι here probably in the sense of ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι.

<sup>135</sup> In Leontius of Jerusalem, this term is formed in analogy to ἑτεροοῦσιον and means "different in hypostasis" (cf. II,5 1540D.1544 A), not "having a different hypostasis" as in the commentators who derive it from αὐτοῦπόστατος (cf. David, In Isagog.; CAG XVIII/2, 168,21-24 / Elias, In Cat.; CAG XVIII/1, 162,1f).

<sup>136</sup> For Leontius' conception of the „more composite idiom“ (CN I,20 1485D) cf. Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus II/2, pp. 305-311; Uthemann, Definitionen und Paradigmen, pp. 113f.

<sup>137</sup> Abramowski, Nestorianischer Traktat, p. 44 n.5.

<sup>138</sup> The replacement of σχῆμα by χρώμα could be inspired by Leontius' mention of colour as example for the accident in 1277D10. The philosophical parallels (cf. ab. n. 45) regularly mention also colour, but do not parallel ἀσχημάτιστον with ἀχρωμάτιστον (Dexippus/ Simplicius, In Cat. ἄχρουν;

on Leontius' namesake from Byzantium would be at least highly probable. However, there are two good reasons for the assumption that Leontius is defending not a text of his own, but that of a fellow Chalcedonian:

(1) We do not find any trace of this distinction elsewhere in Leontius' writings and he does not resume it anywhere in his defence against the no 'nature without hypostasis' objection which reoccurs several times in CN, especially in the second book,<sup>139</sup> and also in CM. The parallel of the 51<sup>st</sup> *aporia* of CM (1797B/C) and CN II,13 (1561 A/B) shows that for him a much more crucial point in refuting the objection than the difference of hypostasis and ἐνυπόστατον is that real, individual natures do not have to be ἰσάριθμοι with the hypostases they are perceived in.<sup>140</sup> Also, the difference between οὐκ ἀνυπόστατον and ἰδιουπόστατον plays a more important role.<sup>141</sup>

(2) As we have noted above, there is no other indication of Leontius' acquaintance with his namesake from Byzantium which would be very probable, if the text quoted by Nestorian really stemmed from Leontius himself.

Thus, we probably do best in supposing an intermediate Chalcedonian source which refuted the 'no nature without hypostasis' objection on the basis of Leontius of Byzantium's CNE.

If we look for Leontius' use of the insubsistence formula, the frequent occurrences of both ὑφίστασθαι ἐν<sup>142</sup> and synonymous phrases like (ἐν)υπάρχειν, (ἐν)εἶναι, (ἐν)θεωρεῖσθαι ἐν<sup>143</sup> prove that we are dealing with one of Leontius' central Christological formulas. However, two of the passages speaking of insubsistence in connection with the term ἐνυπόστατος (both from CN II,13), clearly hold both natures to subsist in the hypostasis of the Logos:

"For we say that the two natures exist in one and the same hypostasis, not as if one of them could be ἀνυπόστατος in the latter, but because both can exist in one common hypostasis, and thus each of them is ἐνυπόστατος according to one and the same hypostasis." (1561B)

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Hermeias/ Simplicius, In De cael.: ἀχρώματον). Thus, the Chalcedonian author is most probably imitating Leontius' formulation, just like (Ps-)Maximus was doing several decades (?) later on (Cf. Opusculum 23a; MSG 91, 261C/264D).

<sup>139</sup> Cf. esp. CN II,14 (1565A-1568D). 18f (1576D-1580C). 23 (1534D/1535A).

<sup>140</sup> Cf. already John the Grammarian, Cap. 11 ctr. monoph. (CCG 1, p. 64,122-124): "Ὅσαι ἂν ὡς φύσεις ἐνυποστάτως διηρημένοι, ἐν ἰσάριθμοις προσώποις θεωροῦνται. Ὅσαι δ' ἂν ὡς φύσεις ἐνυποστάτως ἡνωμένοι, ἐν ἐνὶ προσώπῳ θεωροῦνται.

<sup>141</sup> Cf. passages referred to ab. n. 107.

<sup>142</sup> CN I,39 1500C; I,47 1505D; II,7 1552D/1553 A; II,9 1553C; II,13 1561B; II,17 1568 A; II,22 1584D; II,47 1600C. Leontius knows the technical sense of this formula signifying the ontological status of the accident (cf. II,8 1553B) and considers the accident according to the philosophical tradition as improper being (IV,9 1668C/D). Thus, his Christological application to Christ's human nature is probably due to a well established tradition from the Apollinarian literature onwards.

<sup>143</sup> CN I,30 1496C/D; I,52 1524B; II,5 1540C; II,6 1548C; II,13 1561C; VII,2 1761B.

“Obviously both natures must not belong to different hypostases, but their being ἐνυπόστατον must be perceived in (νοεῖσθαι ἐν) one and the same hypostasis.” (1561C)

A third, similar passage can be found in V,28, where Leontius argues that two individual natures do not entail two hypostases, because an individual human nature, i.e. an individual body and an individual soul, “ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις [...] ψιλοῖς ἀνθρώποις [...] ἐνυπόστατος ὁρᾶται” without splitting the unique man in a soul- and a body-hypostasis. The Christological application following immediately afterwards uses a corresponding verbal expression: “ὁ Λόγος [...] αὐτῇ τῇ ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει [...] τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν ἐνυπέστησεν” (1748D). Leontius transforms the insubsistence formula into a composite verb ἐνυφίστημι which he uses both in the active (“cause to exist in...”) <sup>144</sup> and in the medial (“subsist in...”) voice. <sup>145</sup> The term ἐνυπόστατος always signifies nothing but the reality the two natures have and which in a second step – explicitly only in the third passage – is specified by the traditional insubsistence formula. Leontius’ adjective for ‘insubsisting’ is not ἐνυπόστατος, but συν(εν)υπόστατος. According to his reinterpretation of the traditional fire-iron-paradigm, <sup>146</sup> the iron can also correspond to the preexisting divine hypostasis receiving the fire, i.e. the insubsisting human nature: ἐν τῇ τοῦ σιδήρου ὑποστάσει φύσις πυρὸς ἀνυπόστατος καθ’ αὐτὴν οὕσα συνετέθη τῇ φύσει τοῦ σιδήρου συνυπόστατος αὐτῇ γενομένη. <sup>147</sup> This “συν” could be classified as one last stronghold of classical Chalcedonian symmetry in Leontius of Jerusalem. He can not only make the flesh insubsist in the Logos, but also both natures coexist in the one hypostasis. Thus, both the Logos and the flesh can be subject of συν(εν)υπόστατος, <sup>148</sup> συνουσίωσις, <sup>149</sup> συνυφίστασθαι, <sup>150</sup> or συνυπόστασις. <sup>151</sup>

To summarize, although we found some immediate connections of our term and the insubsistence formula, this seems to have barely affected its meaning. Leontius’ use of

<sup>144</sup> Cf. apart from the previous passage I,6 1425D.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. II,23 1585 A; VII,6 1768dC.

<sup>146</sup> Cf. Uthemann, Definitionen und Paradigmen, pp. 117-122.

<sup>147</sup> CN I,49 1512B. Pace Uthemann, Definitionen und Paradigmen, pp. 118f n. 224 the text must not be altered. The ἀνυπόστατος is a clear resumption of the derived use of the word we have examined above.

<sup>148</sup> CN V,30 1749D (Logos and flesh); V,31 1752 A (Logos).

<sup>149</sup> IV,17 1685B (L+f).

<sup>150</sup> II,14 1568 A (L); V,31 1752B (L); VII,2 1761B (f). This verb was already used by Leonitus of Byzantium (cf. ab. n. 50)!

<sup>151</sup> V,23 1745B (f).

it shows no focus on Christ's human nature whatsoever, but is rather in line with the rest of Chalcedonian symmetry to be seen in his use of both coexistence and inexistence terminology.

### 7. *Maximus the Confessor*

Maximus, definitely the most important Christological thinker we are dealing with in our examination, is commonly credited with both knowing "a good deal of classical philosophy"<sup>152</sup> and possessing "eine souveräne Kenntnis der ganzen Christologiegeschichte, insbesondere der des 6. Jahrhunderts".<sup>153</sup> However, whether and to what extent Maximus knew any of the authors we discussed above is in most of the cases unclear. The only established fact is his acquaintance with Leontius of Byzantium's CNE and Epilysis on which he drew very extensively,<sup>154</sup> as will be shown again in our analyses below. The florilegia of the Lateran synod of 649 to which Maximus made considerable contributions<sup>155</sup> confuse John the Grammarian with John Khozibites, a fact which casts the same doubt on the authors' knowledge of John's or Severus' work as it did in the case of Leontius' CM.<sup>156</sup> The case of Leontius of Jerusalem is the most difficult one: Many of the authors dealing with Maximus' concept of the composite hypostasis just take Maximus' familiarity with his texts for granted, in most of the cases relying on commonplaces of Neochalcedonian Christology to be found in both authors, but of course insufficient to prove direct literary dependence.<sup>157</sup>

<sup>152</sup> A. Louth, *Maximus the Confessor*, London / New York: Routledge 1996, p. 19. This is particularly illustrated by P. Sherwood's analyses of the *Ambigua* (The earlier *Ambigua* of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his refutation of Origenism, Rome: Herder 1955, e.g. pp. 96-102 with regard to the concept of motion). The earlier discussions of Maximus' philosophical sources, e.g. W. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 1965 who argues on pp. 40-43 against v. Balthasar's (and partly Sherwood's) claim of a largely Aristotelian background in favour of a Neoplatonist-Dionysian one, overlook the fact that Maximus mainly represents exactly the Platonic-Aristotelian blending to be found in the commentators.

Those of Maximus works only available in MSG 90/91 (Combefis/Oehler) will be referred to using the following abbreviations: Acta (90,109-172), CT (90,1084-1173), Cap. XV (90,1177-1185); Op. (91,9-285), Disp. (91,288-353), Ep. (91,364-649), Myst. (91,657-717), Amb. (91,1032-1417).

<sup>153</sup> G. Bausenhardt, 'In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde'. Studien zum Beitrag Maximus' des Bekenner zur altkirchlichen Christologie, Tübingen: Grünewald 1990, p. 110.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. F. Heinzer, *Gottes Sohn als Mensch. Die Struktur des Menschseins Christi bei Maximus Confessor*, Freiburg: Universitätsverlag 1980, pp. 90-116.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. R. Riedinger, *Die Lateransynode (649) und Maximus*, in: *Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur*. Fribourg, 2-5 Septembre 1980, ed. F. Heinzer / C. Schönborn, Fribourg: Éditions universitaires 1982, (111-121) pp. 118f.

<sup>156</sup> ACO ser. II vol. 1, p. 325, 34f ("sanctae memoriae Johannes episcopus Caesareae Palaestinae"). Cf. ab. n. 119.

<sup>157</sup> Cf. A. Riou, *Le monde et l'église selon Maxime le confesseur*, Paris: Beauchesne 1973, p. 41: "l'influence de Léonce de Byzance sur saint Maxime a sans doute été compensée par celle de Léonce de Jerusalem, théologien nettement néo-chalcédonien, que saint Sophron de Jérusalem connaissait bien,



However, the example of Peter's and Paul's soul and body and their relationship to each other and to the composite hypostasis of both in Ep. 15 (552C-555A) is strongly reminiscent of the discussions in CN II,11f and 15, just as Leontius of Jerusalem is the only extant parallel for the use of ἑτεροῦπόστατος as derived from ὁμοούσιος, not from αὐθυπόστατος.<sup>158</sup> Yet, a final judgement about the relationship of those two theologians will have to expect a more detailed critical comparison of their works.

Reading the voluminous corpus of Maximus' extant works, one does not encounter the term ἐνυπόστατος very often. Nevertheless, there are several of the traditional trinitarian usage of the term in the works before 634, the *Ambigua*, the *Quaestiones et Dubia* and the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*.<sup>159</sup> Also in a trinitarian context – commenting on the same passage from Gregory of Nazianzen as Amb. 23 (1260D), where the term is used in the traditional way –, but less in conformity with the tradition is Amb. 1 (1036B/C), where the holy Trinity is called ἐνυπόστατος ὀντότης ὁμοούσιου Τριάδος and ἐνούσιος ὑπαρξίς τρισυποστάτου μονάδος. Those

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ainsi que par celle de l'auteur du *De Sectis*" (C. v. Schönborn, *Sophrone de Jérusalem. Vie monastique et confession dogmatique*, Paris: Beauchesne 1972, p. 173 finds an influence of Leontius on Sophronius "peu probable"), or P. Piret, *Le Christ et la trinité selon Maxime le Confesseur*, Paris: Beauchesne 1983, pp. 169f who claims the definition of hypostasis in Ep. 15 (557D: οὐσία μετὰ ἰδιωμάτων) – a commonplace of Cappadocian terminology – to be borrowed from CN I,20 (1485B: φύσεις μετὰ ἰδιωμάτων). Sherwood, *Ambigua*, pp. 60f suggests a possible influence of Leontius on Maximus' anthropology. L. Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator. The theological anthropology of Maximus the Confessor*, Lund: Gleerup 1965, pp. 41-50 just gives a list of Neochalcedonian topics and concepts resumed by Maximus and discusses his stance towards the authority of Cyril of Alexandria, but does not commit himself to the claim of any literary dependence.

<sup>158</sup> Op. 13 (147C); Op. 14 (152A); Ep. 15 (549A.552B/C.553B.569A/B) cf. ab. n. 115. However, in his use of ὁμυπόστατος Maximus was most probably inspired by Anastasius I. of Antioch's – one of the authors discussed more frequently during the monotheletic controversy (cf. Op. 20 [229B-233B]; Op. 26 [277A-D]) work on the energies in Christ (cf. the fragment in the *Doctrina patrum*, p. 135,2), as Leontius used this term only in the trinitarian context (CN II,1 1534B). One could further ask, whether op. 16 (205A) was inspired by the 51<sup>st</sup> *aporia* in CM (1797B/C: ἰσάριθμος, trinity), or whether the γνώρισμα κοινόν of Ep. 15 (556C) presupposes (as N. Madden, *Composite Hypostasis in Maximus the Confessor*, in: *Studia Patristica* 27 [1993], [175-197] pp. 186-188 and Heinzer, *Gottes Sohn*, p. 104 seem to suppose) the concept of idiom-composition, the basic idea of Leontius' Christology (cf. CN I,20 [1485C/D]; I,28 [1493C/D]; I,35 [1497D]; I,42 [1501D]; II,7 [1552D-53A]; II,14 [1568A/B]; II,17 [1576B/C]; II,24 [1585C/D]; II,39 [1596C]; IV,42 [1716C/D]; V,25 [1745D-48A]).

<sup>159</sup> QD 136,7-12 (*Maximi confessoris quaestiones et dubia*, ed. J.H. Declerck, Turnhout: Brepols, 1982 [CCG 10], p. 97: Son and Spirit as σοφία and ζωὴ ἐνυπόστατος) / Amb. 7 (1077C: εἰς λόγος ἐνούσιος καὶ ἐνυπόστατος); Amb. 23 (1260D: λόγος καὶ σοφία and ἀγιαστική δύναμις [spirit] as ὁμοούσια καὶ ἐνυπόστατα) / Thal. 48,39f (*Maximi confessoris quaestiones ad Thalassium*, ed. C. Laga and C. Steel, vol. 1, Turnhout: Brepols 1980 [CCG 7], p. 333: son as δύναμις ἐνυπόστατος; Thal. 63,52 (ed. Laga / Steel, vol. 2, Turnhout: Brepols 1990 [CCG 22], p. 147: son as ἐνυπόστατος σοφία καὶ λόγος); Thal. 64,162f (CCG 22, p. 197: son as ἐνυπόστατος θεοῦ δύναμις). In such contexts, Maximus can use ὑφεστώς (Thal. 39,21 [CCG 7, p. 259] / *Expos. or. dom.* 239-242.444f [*Maximi confessoris opuscula exegetica duo*, ed. P. van Deun, Turnhout: Brepols 1991 (CCG 23), pp. 41.53] / Amb. 18 [1132C]; Amb. 26 [1268A] / Cap. XV [1177B/1180A]) or αὐθυπόστατος (Amb. 5 [1049D]; Amb. 26 [1268A]; Op. 1 [16D.24C] / *Disp.* [321C]) as well.

two complementary formulas are obviously designed to describe the complex and vivid structure of the triad of hypostases in the unity of essence in a way excluding any separation of the unique divine essence or substance from the three divine hypostases: That is why the hypostatical aspect represented by ὑπαρξίς<sup>160</sup> is qualified as ‘substantial’, the monad as ‘three-hypostatic’, the triad as ‘consubstantial’ and the substantial aspect represented by ὀντότης as ἐνυπόστατος. Thus, our term will be most correctly translated in this passage as ‘hypostatically structured’.<sup>161</sup> This enables Maximus to apply the distinction between ὑπόστασις and ἐνυπόστατος also to trinitarian theology and to establish a univocal technical use of it in trinitarian and Christological contexts, of course without having for that purpose to abandon the traditional trinitarian use completely.

Two passages in *Myst.* and one in *Thal.* seem to resume what we have called ‘doxological’-use in our introductory sense, i.e. the approximation of our term to ἀλήθεια-derivatives. This is particularly clear in *Myst.* 24 (704D), where Maximus talks about our faith to participate in what we have to believe in this life κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐνυποστάτως αὐτῷ τῷ πράγματι in the after-life. Accordingly, the ἐνυπόστατος πίστις in *Thal.* 25,31 is the true belief, i.e. that belief which has the real object, the true, real God, and not the fictional one of the heretics’ ἀνυπόστατος πίστις (*Acta* 132B). Thus, the difficult passage *Myst.* 20 talks about the “true and real adoption according to the gift and grace of the holy spirit”, not about the “persönlichen und als solchen wirklichen Heiligen Geist[.]”, as Balthasar decides to translate.<sup>162</sup>

It is difficult to see how there is room for ἐνυπόστατος in Maximus’ elaborated terminological system that provides perhaps the first coherent synopsis of trinitarian and Christological teaching: The three trinitarian hypostases are ὁμοούσιοι, but ἑτερουπόστατοι, the two natures of Christ are ἑτεροούσιοι, but

<sup>160</sup> This connotation of ὑπαρξίς is confirmed rather than contradicted by *Amb.* 67 (1400D-1401A), although F. Heinzer, *Gottes Sohn*, p. 95 n. 88 is right in emphasizing that ὑπαρξίς can also refer to the οὐσία-aspect in Maximus. A similar formula can be found in *Myst.* 23 (700D): μόνας οὐσίας τρισυπόστατον καὶ τριάς ὑποστάσεων ὁμοούσιον. Anastasius Sinaita, *Hodegos* XI,15-18 (CCG 8, p. 199) claims explicitly that ὑπαρξίς can be used both instead of οὐσία and instead of ὑπόστασις (for the justification of this claim cf. Uthemann’s extensive apparatus on those lines).

<sup>161</sup> Cf. H. U. v. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie. Zum Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenners*, Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag 1961, p. 229: „durchhypostasiert“.

<sup>162</sup> *Kosmische Liturgie*, p. 392. The sentence reads: Ἡ δὲ παναγία τε καὶ σεπτὴ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μακαρίου Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς ἐπικλησις τῆς δοθησομένης ἐνυποστάτου τε καὶ ἐνυπάρκτου κατὰ δωρεάν καὶ χάριν τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος υἱοθεσίας ἐστὶ σύμβολον (696C).

ὁμοὑπόστατοι.<sup>163</sup> The trinity is characterized by a φυσικὴ ταυτότης (or κοινότης) and a ὑποστατικὴ (or προσωπικὴ) ἑτερότης (or διαφορά), the person of Christ by a ὑποστατικὴ ταυτότης and a φυσικὴ ἑτερότης.<sup>164</sup> There are four passages in Maximus' works examining explicitly the meaning of our term, two of them in a Christological context (Op. 16 [205A/B]; Ep. 15 [557D-560C]), and the other two embodied in collections of definitions clearly betraying their design for Christological purposes (Op. 14 [149B/C.152D]; Op. 23[a] [261A-264D]). However, the authenticity of Op. 23 has in my opinion to be strongly doubted. If it really is a work of Maximus', it must be a very early one, rather an excerpt of Leontius' of Byzantium than a proper work. The long annotation in MSG 91,261D wants to save only the first paragraph (261A) for Maximus by applying its definitions to physical science rather than to theology and supposes a student of Maximus' rather than the master himself to be responsible for the rest. Indeed, all the parts of the text not literally copied from Leontius of Byzantium<sup>165</sup> display strong difficulties with regard to their content:

(1) The following explanation of ἐνυπόστατος is given in 261A8-11:

“ἐνυπόστατον signifies the very fact that something is in a hypostasis and does not subsist in itself or by itself, i.e. that which does not come together in one entity from incomplete parts, but which is perceived in the union of a complete and an incomplete part in the way of a confusion”.

This might actually be, as the footnote supposes, an anthropological account of the union of soul and body which Maximus in fact – motivated by his antimonophysite polemics – did not conceive of according to the Nemesian-Leontian-tradition of ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις.<sup>166</sup> Against Pyrrhus' use of the anthropological paradigm to confirm his monenergism he can claim that the substantial composition of body and

<sup>163</sup> Cf. Op. 13 (148C); Ep. 15 (549A.552C.553B.569A/B); Myst. 7 (685A/B).

<sup>164</sup> Cf. Op. 13 as a whole (interpreted by Piret, *Le Christ*, pp. 105-155). The ὑποστατικὴ or προσωπικὴ ταυτότης of Christ is one of Maximus' favourite expressions: Amb. 3 (1040C); Op. 4 (61C); Ep. 13 (516C.521B); Ep. 15 (556B.561B.572C); Ep. 2 ad Thomam (*Le deuxième lettre à Thomas de S. Maxime le confesseur*, ed. P. Canart, in: *Byzantion* 34 [1964], [428-445] p. 435, 104.106). Thal. 28,66f speaks of ὑποστατικὴ διαφορά of the trinitarian persons.

<sup>165</sup> 261A1f = 1277D1f; 261A3f = 1277C13/D1; 261A12-B6 = 1277D3-9 (altered!); 261B10-12 = 1277D9-11; 261C4f = 1277D12f; 261C6-9 = 1277D11-13.1280A1; 261C10-264A2 = 1277D13-1280A1; 264A3-5 = 1277D 10-13; 264A6-9.12f = 1280A1-5; 264A14-B4 = 1280A5-8.

<sup>166</sup> For the antimonophysite context cf. J.-M. Garrigues, *La personne composée du Christ d'après saint Maxime le Confesseur*, in: *Revue thomiste* 74 (1974), (181-204) pp. 189-196; Madden, *Composite hypostasis*, pp. 175-182. For the difference from Leontius of Byzantium cf. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie*, pp. 237-239; Thunberg, *Microcosm*, pp. 100-112.

soul “destroys their existence itself and pushes them completely into non-existence”.<sup>167</sup> However, as their natural interdependence tying them together to constitute the species ‘man’ does not make them indistinguishable in essence (οὐσιωδῆς λόγος; Ep. 12 [488B/C]), Maximus would have hardly accepted the title of a σύγχυσις for their union, as this would entail a complete destruction of the properties of both elements.<sup>168</sup>

(2) In 261A13-B7, Leontius’ text is adulterated in a way that allows for an identification of ἐνυπόστατον and accident – diametrically opposed to Maximus’ later understanding of the passage.<sup>169</sup> Obviously, the author of Op. 23 is very fond of the colour/shape-example<sup>170</sup> and pushes its application so far as altering Leontius’ text in order to equalize the ontological status of the ἐνυπόστατον and those qualities.

(3) The excerpt does not include 1280A12-B7 – the key passage for Maximus’ mature interpretation, as our analyses of the remaining Maximus-texts will prove.

After all, we are dealing either with a very early and immature attempt of Maximus to understand Leontius, or the work is in fact – similar to the *Loci communes* – nothing but a later compilation falsely attributed to Maximus. In both cases the work should not be referred to in interpreting Maximus’ mature Christology.

The collection of definitions in Op. 14 the authenticity of which has also been doubted<sup>171</sup> does not show similar shortcomings. In contrast, 149B/C and 152D-153A display the structure of the twofold ἐνυπόστατον gained from Leontius’ distinction between two kinds of hypostases (1280A12-B7) and occurring – probably most clearly outlined – also in Ep. 15 (557D-560A): ἐνυπόστατος is either the species in its individuals or the natures of a composite hypostasis. What Maximus does in those two passages is to distinguish a twofold act of hypostatical realization: Either a species realizes itself naturally in its individuals, or it realizes itself together with another

<sup>167</sup> Disp. (336C): Τὸ δὲ κατ’ οὐσίαν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἐν αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν λυμαίνεται, εἰς ἀνυπαρξίαν αὐτὸ παντελῆ ὥθοῦν. For a fuller exposition see Amb. 7 (1100A-1101C).

<sup>168</sup> For a short account of the Christian reception of the Stoic theory of mixture cf. G.C. Stead, *Philosophy in Christian Antiquity*, Cambridge: CUP 1994, pp. 208-210; for a more extensive one cf. R. Sorabji, *Matter, Space and Motion. Theories in Antiquity and their sequel*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1988, pp. 79-119.

<sup>169</sup> Cf. Op. 16 (205A/B): ἐνυπόστατον, ἵνα μὴ ὡς συμβέβηκος ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ λαμβάνηται. In Op. 14 and Ep. 15, the accident is not mentioned in the relevant context, but the example of the species (149C; 560A) makes clear that Maximus does not intend an identification of ἐνυπόστατον and accident.

<sup>170</sup> Cf. 261B11-13 (he knows about the philosophical axiom!); 261C10-264A2; 264A11-13. Maximus reflects this example only in Op. 16 (204A-D), immediately before assuring that ἐνυπόστατον is by no means an accident (cf. ab. n. 150). For his approval of the philosophical axiom behind it cf. Ep. 6 (425C).

<sup>171</sup> Cf. Uthemann, *Anthropologisches Paradigma*, pp. 301f, n. 90.

species in a composite hypostasis which is not the result of physical species-procreation. This distinction reflects Maximus' central antimonophysite insight concerning the difference between a natural composite hypostasis like man and a non-natural one the only example of which is Our Lord Jesus Christ himself.<sup>172</sup>

In Leontius of Byzantium, the latter case was described as "what consists of different natures and possesses a common existence simultaneously and in each other [...], on the grounds that neither of the two natures or substances is perceived by itself, but (only) accompanied by the other it is composed and grown together with (μετὰ τῆς συγκειμένης καὶ συμπεφυκυίας)." (1280A/B) Maximus describes it the following way:

"Again, ἐνυπόστατον is what is composed and coexisting (συγκείμενόν τε καὶ συνυφιστάμενον) with another substantially different entity to the constitution of a single person and is never ever perceived by itself." (149C)

"The proprium of an ἐνυπόστατον is to be perceived together with another substantially different entity in one hypostasis according to an indissoluble unity." (149D-153A)

"ἐνυπόστατον is [...] what is composed with a substantially different entity in order to create a whole. As far as it is distinct by the properties marking it off from its substantial cognates, it is united and identified with what it is hypostatically composed (συγκείμενον) with. For by the properties which mark it off from its cognates it is not distinguished τοῦ συγκειμένου καθ' ἑνωσιν καὶ συνυφεστῶτος" (557D-560A)

Obviously Maximus considers Leontius' μετὰ τῆς συγκειμένης καὶ συμπεφυκυίας to be not only the key-phrase to understand what is meant by ἐνυπόστατον in Leontius, but also to describe the composite hypostasis of Christ very appropriately. It reoccurs several times in Maximus' works, often varied by συνυφίστασθαι instead of συμφύειν,<sup>173</sup> although Maximus is quite fond of using the corresponding noun συμφυία in the Christological context.<sup>174</sup> Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between Maximus and Leontius: Whereas Leontius' platonic anthropology enables him to present the composite hypostasis of man as an outstanding example for the second, Christological case, man exclusively belongs to the first category for Maximus, the second one being exclusively reserved for the μονώτατος

<sup>172</sup> Cf. e.g. Ep. 12 (488A-492C) and the references ab. n. 166.

<sup>173</sup> Cf. e.g. Amb. 5 (1060A/B: μηδετέρας τῆς φυσικῆς ἐκάστης ἐνεργείας [...] τῆς συγκειμένης καὶ συνυφεστῶσης διακεκριμένη); Ep. 12 (501C: μετὰ τῆς συγκειμένης καὶ συμπεφυκυίας); Ep. 19 (593B/C: μήτε [...] τῆς τοῦ συγκειμένου καὶ συνυφεστῶτος [scil. δυνάμεως] κεχωρισμένην).

<sup>174</sup> Cf. e.g. Op. 2 (48B); Op. 6 (65B.68C); Op. 7 (81D.88A); Op. 8 (100C.101A.108C); Op. 9 (117B); Op. 16 (197A); Op. 20 (236A). The term is traditionally employed (by Maximus' icon Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa and Leontius of Byzantium!) both in the trinitarian (Cf. Maximus, Cap. XV [1177A]; Lampe, Patristic Greek Lexicon, s.v. [1292a] B1) and Christological context (Lampe, ibid. [1292a/b] B2).

incarnate Logos (Ep. 13 [532B/C]). Leontius' Platonism ignores the physical constitution of a human being and describes the embodiment of soul as a quasi-incarnation accomplished by a special act of divine power (Epilysis 1940B) and can thus push the parallel between man and Christ pretty far. As a consequence, the relation between man's metaphysical membership of a class and his physical composition of two substantially different elements (in Balthasar's terms: his metaphysical and physical composition) is reduced to the unexplained *brutum factum* that there are several soul-body composites forming a class while there is only one divine-human composite without class. By differentiating between natural and non-natural composite hypostases Maximus overcame this problem and put a final stop to the monophysite abuse of the anthropological paradigm.<sup>175</sup>

How, then, does the term ἐνυπόστατος fit into the terminological framework mentioned in the beginning? A comparison of the passages from Ep. 15 and Amb. 1 (1036B/C) might provide the answer. In trinitarian theology, it is as important to maintain that a hypostasis ἐνούσιος is not necessarily an οὐσία of its own, as it is in Christology to prove that a φύσις ἐνυπόστατος is not necessarily a hypostasis of its own (cf. Op. 16 [205A]). Hence, ἐνυπόστατος and ἐνούσιος describe the relationship of nature and hypostasis *a parte naturae* and *a parte subsistentiae*. The substantiality of a hypostasis can either be unique (in the case of 'natural hypostases') or twofold (in the case of Christ), whereas the hypostatical realization of a nature can either be uniform (in case of the natural procreation of species-individuals) or in form of a hypostatical coexistence with another nature (in case of Christ). How this relationship has to be specified in metaphysical categories has been profoundly discussed among Maximus-scholars since V. Lossky's objection against Balthasar's application of the essence-existence-distinction to Maximus' nature-hypostasis-concept.<sup>176</sup> Riou, Garrigues and Piret are all side with Lossky in claiming that οὐσία never means pure essence as actually distinguished from existence in Maximus.<sup>177</sup> As Balthasar envisages the actual distinction between essence and existence only as a possible consequence of Maximus' system and stresses the vivid interdependence and inseparability of both otherwise,<sup>178</sup> their criticism is at least partly unjustified. Nevertheless, when Balthasar –

<sup>175</sup> Cf. the references ab. n. 166.

<sup>176</sup> Cf. Madden, Composite hypostasis, p. 190.

<sup>177</sup> Riou, L'Église, p. 79 n.1; Garrigues, Personne composée, pp. 191 n.51. 197-200; Piret, Le Christ, pp. 30-37. 200f.

<sup>178</sup> Kosmische Liturgie, pp. 223-224.245f.

relying mainly on Junglas – interprets ἐνυπόστατος as “mittleren Existenzgrad zwischen Nichtsein (oder akzidentellem Sein) und voller hypostatischer Existenz” or “mittlerer Seinstufe zwischen Natursein und hypostatischem Sein”,<sup>179</sup> he should have clarified more emphatically that this refers at best to the tradition before Maximus, not to the Confessor himself. For Maximus, Piret is certainly right in maintaining that the ἐνυπόστατον “n’est pas un intermédiaire réel entre l’hypostase et son ousie. Elle [l’enhypostasie] n’ajoute rien au rapport strict de l’ousie et de l’hypostase, et ne fait pas nombre avec lui; elle vise au contraire à circonscrire l’être et le subsister dans ce rapport lui-même”.<sup>180</sup>

The third text from Op. 16 (205A/B) transfers our term explicitly into the context of the monotheletic discussion. Maximus reacts here to a monotheletic transformation of the ‘no nature without hypostasis’ objection claiming that a nature which is οὐκ ἀνενεργητὸς presupposes necessarily an ἐνεργῶν of this nature, i.e. an acting (human or divine) hypostasis. If Op. 23 (261C-264A) is really spurious, this is the only passage where Maximus is explicitly referring to this objection, whereas his antimonophysite treatises are concerned with other topics like the separating force of the number two or the impossibility of a remaining two natural qualities without its proper subjects, the two natures.<sup>181</sup> Here, it is the Monothelites whom he has to remind that making a hypostasis of the φύσις οὐκ ἀνυπόστατος or an οὐσία of the ὑπόστασις οὐκ ἀνούσιος would separate the trinity into three substances and would force the two natures of Christ together into one (205A). For, as the tradition of the holy fathers teaches,

“the ‘not ἀνυπόστατον’ does not make a hypostasis of the nature, but an ἐνυπόστατον, for the sake of not perceiving it in mere thought like an accident, but in actual fact like a species. Accordingly, the ‘not ἀνούσιος’ does not make an οὐσία of the hypostasis, but represents it as an ἐνούσιος, so that we do properly not conceive of it as a pure property, but together the subject of this property. Just like here the ἐνυπόστατον means the ἐνύπαρκτον, and ἐνύπαρκτον is what participates in substantial and natural ὑπαρξις, the ἐνεργόν or ἐνεργητικόν there signifies properly the ἐνδύναμον, and ἐνδύναμον is what has a substantial and natural δύναμις.” (205A/B)

Whereas the first part of this quotation perfectly confirms what we have said about Maximus’ integration of our term into his terminological system above, the second part

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., pp. 228.237. Cf. Helmer, *Neuchalkedonismus*, p. 230: „Zwischenbegriff zwischen Hypostase und Natur“ (with regard to Pamphilus).

<sup>180</sup> Le Christ, p. 172 cf. p. 185.

<sup>181</sup> The texts are gathered by Garrigues, *Personne composée*, p. 191 n.54. For the natural qualities in Severus cf. Lebon, *Christologie*, pp. 536-542.

seems to offer something new. Why does Maximus resume the substitution of ἐνύπαρκτον for ἐνυπόστατον we already encountered in Ps-Basil and Ephrem of Amid?<sup>182</sup> Obviously, he intends a substitution of δύναμις for ἐνέργεια paralleling that of ὑπαρξίς for ὑπόστασις. The reason for this suggests itself: If the ἐνέργεια of Christ's human nature is conceived of as natural δύναμις, it can no longer be confused with a human ἐνεργῶν, i.e. a second human hypostasis in Christ. Maximus wants to exclude the possibility of a separate actualisation of the human nature independent from that of the divine Logos. The sense of the ὑπόστασις-ὑπαρξίς-substitution can thus only be to exclude the possibility of a separate subsistence of the human nature independent from that of the divine Logos. Might this be a trace of the wider sense of ὑπόστασις / ἐνυπόστατον we have encountered in John the Grammarian and the *De sectis*? This wider sense was classified in Ammonius' parallel distinction to signify the ἀπλῶς ὑπαρξιν, i.e. the mere existence without respect to substantiality or non-substantiality, dependence or independence.<sup>183</sup> However, if Maximus really alludes to this tradition, he accepts it in a fundamentally corrected form: The ὑπαρξίς of Christ's human nature must not be confused with that of an accident and thus to be specified as οὐσιώδης. It is by all means the hypostatical realisation of a species which has to be ascribed to Christ's humanity. Its ontological status can never be adequately determined by a concept of existence wide enough to comprise also the accident.

As to Maximus' use of the insubsistence formula, it occurs in several non-christological contexts: It describes of course the relationship of accidents to their subject,<sup>184</sup> that of parts to their whole,<sup>185</sup> that of the soul to the body,<sup>186</sup> and also that of universal natures

<sup>182</sup> Cf. ab. n. 80 and also Maximus himself, Myst. 20 (ab. n. 162).

<sup>183</sup> Cf. ab. n. 30. Anastasius Sinaita will describe this wider sense by τὸ ὑπάρχον or ἔχων ὑπαρξιν ἤτοι οὐσίαν respectively (Hodegos II, 3,120-122; CCG 8, p. 58). Ibid., X.2,3,1-16 (p. 163) he discusses a similar supposition of ὑπαρξίς for hypostasis suggested by the Monophysites. Cf. also *Doctrina patrum*, p. 39,19-24 (on the difference of οὐσία and φύσις according to pagan philosophers): Τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ὄνομα σημαντικὸν ὑπάρχει τῆς ἀπλῶς τῶν ὄντων ὑπάρξεως τουτέστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀπλῶς εἶναι τῶν ὄντων. εἶναι γὰρ λέγονται καὶ ὁ ἄγγελος καὶ ὁ λίθος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα. τοῦτου οὖν τοῦ ἀπλῶς εἶναι, οὗ κοινῶς πάντα μετέχουσι, σημαντικόν ἐστι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ὄνομα. (resumed on p. 40,2f).

<sup>184</sup> Cf. e.g. Amb. 67 (1400C); CT II,3 (1125D); Op. 1 (25D); Ep. 12 (473D-476D.485B/C). However, ὑφιστάσθαι ἐν is also used for divine attributes which cannot count as accidents (cf. Op. 21 [249A]): Thal. 55,158 (CCG 7, p. 489); OrDom 192f (CCG 23, p. 37). Amb. 22 (1256D-1257C) even describes the universal inexistence of God, of the One in the many, in an almost Proclan manner.

<sup>185</sup> Cf. e.g. Amb. 10,32 (1169C).

<sup>186</sup> Ep. 7 (436D-437B); Amb. 42 (1337A) cf. ibid. 1324A (not καθ' αὐτό).



to their particular instances.<sup>187</sup> With regard to its use in the Christological context, Thunberg's statement that Maximus "combines his acceptance of Neo-Chalcedonian formulations and positions [...] with a more strict Chalcedonian dialectic"<sup>188</sup> holds absolutely true. Maximus claims the flesh to be "in" the Logos several times using different formulations<sup>189</sup> for this and even quotes the letter to Jovianus.<sup>190</sup> However, since a quasi-accidental relationship of the human nature to the divine super-subject of the Logos is completely alien to Maximus' Christological concept, he favoured a more immediate connection of natures and hypostasis expressed either by the copula or by a genitive: Christ is the hypostasis of his natures, he is "nothing else but his natures".<sup>191</sup> Nevertheless, his individual phrasing of the insubistence formula deserves a closer look: His favourite verb seems to be λαμβάνειν ἐν. However, what the flesh "takes" or "receives" in the logos is not only hypostasis, subsistence, but also τὸ εἶναι which is explained in Ep. 15 (553D) as τὴν φύσιν. Maximus' theory of Christ's composite hypostasis is not restricted to providing an explanation of how Jesus' humanity can subsist, if it is not an independent hypostasis, but also comprises an account of its coming to be, as for Maximus only this account can also solve the subsistence problem properly. According to Maximus, the Logos replaced the male seed,<sup>192</sup> which according

<sup>187</sup> Cf. e.g. Amb. 10,42 (1189C-1192A); Amb. 41 (1312A-D); Ep. 13 (517D).

<sup>188</sup> Microcosm, p. 50.

<sup>189</sup> Amb. 5 (1052B: οὐκ ἀθύποστατον φανεῖσαν [scil. προσληφθεῖσαν φύσιν], τουτέστι καθ' ἑαυτήν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ καθ' ἀλήθειαν αὐτὴν οὐσιωθέντι Θεῷ Λόγῳ τὸ εἶναι λαβούσαν); Op. 4 (61B: ἐν ἐκείνῳ [scil. Λόγῳ] κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν γεγονος [...] ἅμα τῷ εἶναι φυσικῶς καὶ τὸ ὑποστήναι θεικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ κληρωσάμενον); Op. 7 (76B: ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ [...] οὐσης τελείως); Op. 8 (93B: γενόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Λόγῳ καὶ τῇ σοφίᾳ καθ' ἑνωσιν ἀδιασπάστως); Ep. 12 (468A/B: οὐδ' ὥς ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ προηποστᾶσαν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὑποστήναι λαβούσαν); Ep. 15 (553D: ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν φύσιν λαβούσης καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τουτέστι τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὸ ὑφεστάναι; 560C: ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν λαβοῦσα τοῦ εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν). Cf. also Op. 24 (269C): ἡ ζωοποιὸς σὰρξ [...] ἐν αὐτῷ ἔσχε τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ πάντα τὰ ὑπερφύα τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως.

<sup>190</sup> Op. 16 (197B); cf. also the allusion in Ep. 15 (552D: ἅμα – ἅμα – ἅμα).

<sup>191</sup> Disp. (289B); cf. Heinzer, Gottes Sohn, pp. 90f; P. Piret, Christologie et théologie trinitaire chez Maxime le Confesseur d'après sa formule des natures 'desquelles, en lesquelles et lesquelles le Christ', in: Heinzer / Schönborn, Symposium, pp. 215-222 (more extensive in Le Christ, pp. 203-240). According to Bausenhardt, Sünde, p. 170 n. 3, Piret has missed ep. 19 (593A/B) and op. 3a (edited by Epifanovič). The genitive can be found in the following passages: Amb. 4 (1044D); Amb. 5 (1052C); Op. 1 (36B); Op. 8 (95B); Disp. 296D; Ep. 2 ad Thomam (Byz 34, 439,164). Ibid. 435,109-111, Maximus says that the flesh has the Logos as a hypostasis (αὐτὸν [...] ἔσχευ ὑπόστασιν).

<sup>192</sup> Cf. Amb. 2 (1037A); Amb. 5 (1049B,1052D); Op. 4 (60A,61B); Ep. 14 (537 A); Ep. 15 (553D); Ep. 19 (592C/D); Ep ad Thom (435,107-122). Maximus uses the phrases σποράς δίκην, ἀντὶ σποράς, ἐν εἶδει σποράς or σπορὰ γίνεσθαι, but – as far as I see – never Theodoretus' οἰονεῖ θεῖος σπόρος (cf. ab. n. 101). Did he develop the idea independently from this source? As the Theodoretus-passage was contained in one of the florilegia of Leontius of Byzantium's CNE (cf. Declerck's apparatus on Panhoplion III,31-33; CCG 19, p. 145), Maximus should have been at least superficially acquainted with it.

to Aristotelian biology exerts the forming power upon the female menstrual blood which plays the role of matter in this process:

“[I]n fact the male provides both the form and the source of movement while the female provides the body, i.e. the matter. Just as in the setting (πῆξις; B.G.) of milk, while the body is the milk, the curdling-juice or rennet is the container of the source that constitutes it, so is that which comes from the male when it is partitioned in the female”.<sup>193</sup>

The comparison of the formation of an embryo with the curdling of milk already occurs in Job 10:10<sup>194</sup> and again – in a fashion definitely influenced by Aristotelian philosophy – in Sap 7:1f: “In the womb of a mother I was molded into flesh, within the period of ten months curdled (παγεῖς) in blood by the seed of a man during the pleasure of marriage”. As this biblical authorization made Aristotle’s theory very widespread among Christian authors,<sup>195</sup> a very tempting suggestion would be to connect the Christological use of the verb (συμ-) πῆγνυσθαι to be found in Maximus and other authors<sup>196</sup> with the curdling-analogy and translate by ‘to be curdled’ or ‘condensed’. However, a more detailed examination of the relevant context – especially if one takes into account the parallels in John of Damascus – seems to reveal a different analogy behind the verb: συμπῆγνυσθαι is understood rather mechanically in the sense of composing parts – in this case: body-parts or organs – to a stable unity.<sup>197</sup> In this sense the verb can already be found in the Christological discussions of the late fourth century

<sup>193</sup> Aristotle, *De generatione animalium* I 729a9-14. The translation is taken from *De partibus animalium* I and *De Generatione animalium* I (with passages from II,1-3), translated with notes by D.M. Balme, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992, p. 51. For Aristotle’s further development and foundation of his theory cf. 726 b1-24.728b32-729a33.730a24-b32 (pp. 45f.51-55 in Balme’s translation). For survey of the ancient conceptions of generation and embryology cf. H. Balss, *Die Zeugungslehre und Embryologie in der Antike. Eine Übersicht*, in: *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin* 5 (1936), (1-82) pp. 10-14.35-40.42-45. For a more detailed account of Aristotle’s theory cf. E. Lesky, *Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 1950, pp. 1349-1351.1358-1365. The milk-analogy and the verb (συμ)πῆγνυσθαι is treated *ibid.*, pp. 1308f (*Corpus Hippocraticum*).1361f (Aristotle).

<sup>194</sup> Also in this passage, we can find ἔπηξας as a *varia lectio* to ἐτύρωσας. A fragment of Chrysostomus’ exegesis of the passage paraphrases explains the τυροῦν by συμπῆγνυσθαι (MSG 64, 608A).

<sup>195</sup> Cf. J.H. Waszink, *Art. Embryologie A II. Jüdisch / B. Christlich*, in: RAC IV (1959), col. 1241-1244. Accordingly, at least since Denys, *De divinis nominibus* II,9, ed. B.R. Suchla, Berlin: De Gruyter 1990 (PTS 33), p. 133,5-12 (cf. Lampe, s.v. αἷμα [50a] I F) the παρθενικὰ αἷματα are considered as the matter in the process of Christ’s generation (cf. Maximus, Op. 4 [60A]; Amb.5 [1049B]; cf. also Amb. 42 [1321B]). For the further development of this Logos-seed-theory cf. *bel. nn.* 298-305 on John of Damascus.

<sup>196</sup> Cf. Amb. 7 (1097B); Amb. 61 (1385D) and *bel. n.* 198.

<sup>197</sup> Cf. Galen’s expression πρώτη σύμπηξις for the original ‘putting-together’ or constitution of an animal (e.g. *De usu partium* 14,7; ed. G. Helmreich, vol. 2, Leipzig: Teubner 1909, p. 307,24f [Kühn IV, pp. 172f]; opposition of the universal genus of an animal and τοῦδε τοῦ ζώου τοῦ ἀτόμου σύμπηξις / *De causis morborum*; ed. C. G. Kühn, vol. 7, Leipzig: Knobloch 1824 [repr. Hildesheim: Olms 1965], p. 25 / *De marcore*, ed. Kühn, vol. 7, p. 678). Philoponus explains a too early dissolution of this σύμπηξις of an animal relating it to its basic principles, the male and female seed in his commentary on *De gen. et corr.* 336b20 (CAG XIV/2, 295,8-296,10).

in descriptions of the formation of the man Jesus in the womb of Mary.<sup>198</sup> In Maximus, there are some signs of an ecclesiological extension of this notion: The Logos not only ‘composes’ or ‘compacts’ the parts of his human nature, soul and body, but via this assumption he also ‘composes’ the human individuals forming the body of the Holy Church.<sup>199</sup> However, the aspect of central relevance for Maximus’ Christology is another one:

This new way of birth is decisive for Christ’s *τρόπος ὑπάρξεως*, i.e. for his new way of being human,<sup>200</sup> as being begotten by human seed indicates the human *τρόπος* as subject to sin and thus to death: *σπορά* entails *φθορά*.<sup>201</sup> This new *τρόπος*, not a quasi-accidental inherence of his human nature, integrates both of Christ’s natures without doing any harm to their substantial *λόγος* and thus constitutes the unity of his hypostasis. The immediate coincidence of the coming to be of the man Jesus and the incarnation of the divine Logos, i.e. the exclusion of a human seed and a *προδιάπλασις* of this man, constitutes a hypostasis which because of its direct divine origin is “complètement filialisée”<sup>202</sup>. Its human existence is elevated on a new level characterized by the novelty of divine subsistence (*ὑποστήναι θεικῶς*).<sup>203</sup>

How is this insubsistence concept related to Maximus’ use of *ἐνυπόστατος*? In explaining *ἐνυπόστατος*, he speaks of insubsistence only with respect to the case of natural hypostatical realisation,<sup>204</sup> whereas the Christological case is specified as co-

<sup>198</sup> Cf. Gregory of Nazianzen, *Carmina dogmatica* 10 (MSG 37,464D-465A) / Ps-Athanasius, *De sancta trinitate dialogi* (MSG 28,1253B) / Ps-Athanasius, *Dialogi contra Macedonianos II* (MSG 28,1336A). In Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 25; ed. M. Morani, Leipzig: Teubner 1987, p. 87,5-7 the verb is used to describe the formation of the skin layers around the embryo, the *Chorion* and the *Allantois*, as curdling around the teats in the womb (cf. Balss, *Zeugungslehre*, pp. 45f). In the sixth century, it appears in a relevant context e.g. in Anastasius I. of Antioch’s sermon on the incarnation (cf. T. Hainthaler’s survey of his *Sermon on the incarnation* in Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus II/3*, p. 387). The earliest christian reference I could find is Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus* I,6,38,3; ed. O. Stählin, Leipzig: Hinrichs 1905 (GCS 12), p. 113.

<sup>199</sup> Cf. Amb. 7 (1097B): *ἡμᾶς διὰ τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀγίας αὐτοῦ σαρκὸς ὥσπερ δι’ ἀπαρχῆς ἐαυτῷ συμπηξαμένου* / Amb. 61 (1385D): *τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἐν ἐαυτῷ πηξάμενος ἐνώσει τῇ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν* / Ep. 12 (504B): *αὐτὴν (scil. ἐκκλησίαν) συμπηξαμένου τε καὶ ἀρμοσαμένου τοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

<sup>200</sup> On the distinction between *λόγος φύσεως* and *τρόπος ὑπάρξεως* in Maximus cf. Riou, *L’Église*, pp. 73-88; Heinzer, *Gottes Sohn*, pp. 29-58.117-145.

<sup>201</sup> Cf. e.g. Amb. 31 (1276A); Amb. 41 (1313C/D); Amb. 42 (1317C.1341C); QD 113,19f (CCG 10, p. 84).

<sup>202</sup> Garrigues, *Personne composée*, p. 202.

<sup>203</sup> Maximus never explicitly identifies the trinitarian and the human *τρόπος ὑπάρξεως* of the Logos, as *γεννητός* is definitely not the same as *ἄσπορος*. However, both predicates coincide with respect to the immediate and direct divine origin. On this problem cf. Heinzer, *Gottes Sohn*, pp. 137-145.

<sup>204</sup> Op. 14 (149A: *τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀτόμοις πραγματικῶς ὑφιστάμενον*; 153A: *τὸ ἐν ἀτόμοις φυσικῶς τυγχάνειν καθ’ ὑπαρξιν*); Ep. 15 (557D-560A: *τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ὑφιστάμενον, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ θεωρούμενον, ὡς εἶδος ἐν τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις*).

subsistence. However, in Ep. 15 (560B/C) he maintains that Christ's human nature is no means an independent hypostasis, is not perceived by itself for a single moment, but is ἐνυπόστατος ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν λαβοῦσα τοῦ εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν. Even more clearly than in Leontius of Jerusalem, the reason for and mode of (ὡς) the hypostatical realization of Christ's human nature (its being ἐνυπόστατος) is described here by the insubsistence formula – of course in its Maximian transformation. The rapport between nature and hypostasis or λόγος φύσεως and τρόπος ὑπάρξεως referred to by the term ἐνυπόστατος is thus well describable as insubsistence, not only in case of the natural, but also in case of the Christological realization of the human nature, provided that any connotation of (quasi-) accidental inherence or asymmetry is ruled out. This is the reason, why Maximus, inspired mainly by Leontius of Byzantium but possibly also by his namesake from Jerusalem, prefers co-subsistence-formulas with regard to the Christological case and, in the end, detaches the insubsistence formula completely from its original asymmetric Apollinarian context. As the 'no nature without hypostasis' objection seems to be less urgent for him than it was for the authors of the early sixth century – John Maxentius dedicates an entire antimonophysitic treatise to a refutation of this objection<sup>205</sup> – he can feel free to develop a coherent trinitarian-christological terminological system attributing to the term ἐνυπόστατος the same function in both theological contexts. Hence, Maximus' use of our term shows no special connection whatsoever to the ontological status of Christ's human nature or to the insubsistence formula understood in its original Apollinarian sense, but his terminological system coherently integrates Leontius of Byzantium's distinction between ὑπόστασις and ἐνυπόστατον and widely invalidates the equation  $x \text{ ἐνυπόστατον} = \text{hypostasis of } x$ .

#### 8. Anastasius Sinaites (and the *Doctrina patrum*)

Even if D. Serruys' and F. Diekamp's suggestion of Anastasius Sinaites as one possible candidate for the authorship of the *Doctrina patrum de incarnatione verbi*<sup>206</sup> has lost much of its credit among scholars since J. Stiglmayr's attempt to refute this suggestion,<sup>207</sup> a further comparison between Anastasius and the *Doctrina* seems to be

<sup>205</sup> Responsio contra Acephalos qui 'post adunationem' stulte 'unam' profitentur 'in Christo naturam' (ACO IV/2, 12-14).

<sup>206</sup> Cf. Diekamp's introduction, pp. LXXXIII-LXXXVII and CPG 7781.

<sup>207</sup> Der Verfasser der *Doctrina Patrum de incarnatione verbi*, in: ByZ 18 (1909), (14-40) pp.17-21. His positive identification of the *Doctrina*-compiler with Anastasius Apocrisarius, a pupil of Maximus,

necessary for two reasons: Firstly, Stiglmayr's arguments against the ascription of the *Doctrina* to the Sinai-monk fail to work out the theological differences. Stiglmayr mentions only one divergence of systematic relevance: Following Maximus, the *Doctrina*-compiler assumes a twofold energy in Christ, whereas Anastasius – following Cyril's account of the *divisio vocum* – affirms a threefold one.<sup>208</sup> His other arguments rely on the fact that the antimonophysite polemics of the *Hodegos* simply lack the foundation in both heretical and orthodox sources the compiler of the *Doctrina* would have been able to provide. Secondly, contrasting the Sinai-monk with the *Doctrina* is in my opinion a very convenient way for a more exact presentation of his theological profile.

Two major systematic differences between Anastasius and the *Doctrina* seem to be relevant in this context:

(1) The antiphilosophical stance Anastasius displays in the *Hodegos* claiming the transfer of philosophical definitions to the mystery of Trinity and incarnation to be the source of all heresy<sup>209</sup> is irreconcilable with the *Doctrina*-compiler's freedom in entering into philosophical discussions and employing philosophical concepts in order to clarify theological matters.<sup>210</sup>

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demands further examination. For the acceptance of Stiglmayr's suggestion cf. the "Nachträge" in the second edition of the *Doctrina*, p. 369.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., p. 18. Cf. esp. *Hodegos* I, 2,76-124 (CCG 8, pp. 14-16) and Op. VIII (CCG 12, pp. 125-134).

<sup>209</sup> Cf. I, 3,41-79 (CCG 8, pp. 19-22); II,3,3-17 (Ibid., pp. 31f); VI,2 (pp. 99-103); VIII,1,11-42 (pp. 114-116). 5,112-127 (pp. 132f); IX,2,65-78 (pp. 141f). Accordingly, the opponents are called "philosopher" (VII,2,21; p. 109 / X,2,18; p. 163) in an obviously pejorative sense. Cf. also the 7<sup>th</sup> chapter against the Monophysites (K.-H. Uthemann, Antimonophysitische Aporien des Anastasius Sinaites, in: *ByZ* 74 [1981], [11-26], p. 24): Οἱ φιλοσόφως, μᾶλλον δὲ ἄσώφως λέγοντες...

<sup>210</sup> The ἔξωθεν φιλόσοφοι – obviously respectable authorities for this compiler – are referred to several times (pp. 44,12.18; 45,11 [alteration of Pamphilus' text]; 137,20f [inserted in Maximus' text]; 192,1f [inserted in the *De sectis*-text]; 218,20; 219,1), longer passages from Elias and Stephen of Alexandria (pp. 201,3-202 cf. Elias, In *Isagog.*; CAG XVIII/1, 83,31-84,5.85,4-7.86,2-13 / pp. 202,9-206,16 cf. Stephanus, In *De int.*; CAG XVIII/3, 23,28-20. 61,9-28 [I could not find a parallel to 203,18-204 about privation and habit]) are quoted in pretty free adaptation, the chapter on the difference of φύσις and ὑπόστασις contains two scholia conscribed by the compiler himself on the meaning of those terms κατὰ τοὺς ἔξωθεν φιλοσόφους and several passages on philosophical terminology from Heraclian and Pamphilus (chap. 6, t. XVI-XXII; pp. 39-47), the chapters 26 and 28 present philosophical discussions about the problem of universals and a description of concepts of potentiality and actuality, habit and privation. The extensive discussion of Philoponus' account of nature, hypostasis and universals (chap. 36) was added by a later redactor (cf. introd. pp. XXXVII-XXXIX). G. Richter, *Die Dialektik des Johannes von Damaskos. Eine Untersuchung des Textes nach seinen Quellen und seiner Bedeutung*, Ettal: Buch-Kunstverlag 1964, p. 155 n. 384 claims the t. XVI referred to above to be dependent on the final chapter of Anastasius' *Quaestiones et Responsiones* as they are presented in MSG 89 (824B/C). According to Richard's analysis of the manuscript-tradition of those *Quaestiones*, this is already impossible for chronological reasons (*Les véritables 'Questions et Réponses' d'Anastase le Sinaïte*, in: *Opera Minora* III, Turnhout: Brepols 1977, [43-56] pp. 41.52f).

(2) Anastasius' central argument against the Monophysites which perfectly justifies in his eyes the distinction between nature and person is a very wide conception of nature not entailing any necessity of hypostatical realization. According to Ps-Clement of Alexandria,<sup>211</sup> Anastasius defines nature as ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλήθεια, a 'real thing' the reality of which does not necessarily imply a hypostasis or person of its own.<sup>212</sup> In contrast, the Doctrina-chapters on nature and hypostasis (especially 6 and 22) neither show a single trace of this argumentation nor do they include the citation from Ps-Clement.

At all events, Stiglmayr's affirmation of the defective foundation of Anastasius' polemics<sup>213</sup> is perfectly verified in comparing what Anastasius and the Doctrina-compiler have to say about the term ἐνυπόστατος. Examining the latter's work, one could get the impression that the entire present study is futile, as almost all the material we have analysed above was already gathered by this late sixth or early seventh century compiler: Without his quotations from Eulogius of Alexandria, not a single Greek fragment of John the Grammarian's apology would be left, of course including the paragraph on the twofold meaning of hypostasis or ἐνυπόστατον.<sup>214</sup> He also handed down to us the name of the author of the 'Panhoplion' quoting three passages from it including Pamphilus' statement about the possibility of φύσεις (not οὐσίαι) ἀνυπόστατοι, but omitting his exposition of ἐνυπόστατος.<sup>215</sup> Although the famous passage from Leontius of Byzantium's CNE is also not included – the original Doctrina

<sup>211</sup> Apud (Ps-)Maximum, Op. 23 (264B). For further parallels cf. Uthemann's apparatus on Hodegos I,2,22-25 (CCG 8, pp. 11f).

<sup>212</sup> Ps-Clement's (cf. Hodegos I,3,73-79; pp. 21f) definition is to be found verbatim in VIII,2,9f (p. 117). 69f (p. 120). 5,22 (p. 129) and 68f (p. 131). Variants of it are τὸ ἀληθὲς πρᾶγμα (I,2,22f.25; pp. 11f / VIII,5,73f; p. 131), ἀληθὴς πρᾶγματος ὑπαρξίς (II,3,4; p.31), τὸ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ὄν (II,3,7; p. 31 / 3,41f; p. 33), τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀλήθεια (II,3,9f; pp. 31f), , ἀλήθεια (VIII,5,26f.33; p. 129 / 49; p. 130 / 76-91; p.131), τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ πεφυκὸς καὶ ὑπάρχον ἐν ἀληθείᾳ (VIII,5,120-122; p. 133). φύσει is explained as (ἐν) ἀληθείᾳ or κατὰ ἀλήθειαν in II,3,19-22 (p. 32). 43-45 (p. 33); VIII,2,29-63 (pp. 118-120); VIII,5,24f (p. 129). 82-85 (p. 131) and XIV,2,9 (p. 259), φυσικόν as τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀληθὲς γνωριζόμενον (II,7,3; p. 60), ἀλήθινον (VIII,5,38f.43f, p. 130) or τὰ ἀληθῆ τῶν πραγμάτων (ibid. 41). The phrase φύσις ἡγοῦν (ἡτοι) ἀλήθεια occurs twice in Anastasius' text (X,2,4,21f.27; p. 170 / XIII,6,118; p. 236) and once in a quotation from Ammonius of Alexandria (XIV,1,11; p. 256) which cannot be verified otherwise. Could it be a forgery of Anastasius' just like the letters of Andrew of Samosata and Maro of Edessa (XXII,4f)? For the fundamental relevance of this definition for Anastasius cf. also K.-H. Uthemann, Sprache und Sein bei Anastasios Sinaites. Eine Semantik im Dienst der Kontroverstheologie, in: Studia Patristica XVIII/1 (1989), (221-231), pp. 226f n. 6.

<sup>213</sup> Stiglmayr explicitly mentions the missing references to Leontius of Byzantium (Verfasser, p. 21).

<sup>214</sup> Doctrina, pp. 69,17-71,15; 193,17-198,20; 205,20-206,28; 214,28-216,4; 220,15-221,15. The passage referred to is to be found on p. 198,9-20.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid., pp. 44,25-45,9 = Panopl. II,64-79 (CCG 19, pp. 136f); Doctrina, pp. 45,11-46,6 = II,120-154 (CCG 19, pp. 139-141, considerably altered!); Doctrina, pp. 46,9-47,14 = XI,1-41 (CCG 19, pp. 201f).

(chap. 1-31) comprises Leontius' thirty chapters against Severus<sup>216</sup> and one passage from his *Epilysis*<sup>217</sup> – the compiler was fully aware of the distinction between ἐνυπόστατον and hypostasis. His preparation of our *De sectis*-passage<sup>218</sup> – the five citations from the Scholia Leontii which gave rise to the Loofsian 'Grundschrift-hypothese' are according to Junglas and Richard nothing but more or less freely adapted excerpts from *De sectis*<sup>219</sup> – obviously shows his attempt to reconcile the two traditions with regard to our term which we have encountered so far: the distinction between a wider and narrower use of hypostasis or ἐνυπόστατον (John the Grammarian, *De sectis*) and the distinction between hypostasis and ἐνυπόστατον (Leontius of Byzantium, Maximus) which he might have become acquainted with either from Leontius himself without citing the relevant passage or from Maximus, Ep. 15, a text he presents in a considerably altered, but not adulterated, version.<sup>220</sup> As Richard has shown,<sup>221</sup> our compiler in increasing the *De sectis*-text by several glosses tries to restrict the use of ἐνυπόστατος by attributing 'more proper' terms to every one of its meanings as distinguished by *De sectis*: According to its first meaning, it is said to comprise substances – which are more properly called αὐθύπαρκτα or αὐθυπόστατα – and accidents which are more properly (κυριώτερον) called ἑτεροῦπόστατα.<sup>222</sup> According to its second meaning, it primarily refers to individual substances which are not properly ἐνυπόστατα, ἀλλ' ὑποστάσεις μᾶλλον εἰσὶ τε καὶ γνωρίζονται<sup>223</sup> – an implicit, but nevertheless clear interpolation of the distinction between hypostasis and ἐνυπόστατον into the *De sectis*-text. Maybe also as a concession to the Leontius-tradition, our compiler consequently omits the passages, where the natures are called ἀνυπόστατοι. However, he also tries to do justice to the other tradition in connecting the statement about the twofold ecclesiastical usage of

<sup>216</sup> Doctrina, pp. 155,11-164,3.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid., pp. 198,24-199,12 = MSG 86/2, 1932A/B.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., pp. 191,21-193,12.

<sup>219</sup> Junglas, Leontius, pp. 6-9; Richard, *De sectis*, pp. 712-721 (cf. CPG 6819 (2)-(5)). Doctrina, pp. 213,6-214,24 and 217,17-218,5(13) cite without major alterations *De sectis* VII (1248D-1249D.1244B/C). Doctrina, pp. 111,14-114,25; 177,22-179,11 and 191,21-193,12 offer considerably transformed versions of *De sectis* X (1260B-1261D); VI (1233C-D.1236D-1237A.1237B/C) and VII (1240C-1241A.C).

<sup>220</sup> Doctrina, pp. 137,1-138,15.

<sup>221</sup> *De sectis*, pp. 715-721.

<sup>222</sup> αὐθυπόστατον – ἑτεροῦπόστατον: the philosophical, not the theological opposition (cf. ab. n. 135)! Another interesting feature of the Doctrina-revision is also the clear indication of the derivative character of the second use of ἀνυπόστατον (cf. p. 192,14-16).

<sup>223</sup> Doctrina, pp. 191,21-192,9.

ὑπόστασις directly with a slightly altered quotation from John the Grammarian.<sup>224</sup> He might even show some awareness of the philosophical parallels for this distinction in employing the phrase ἀπλῶς ὑπαρξίς for the wider use.<sup>225</sup> At all events, he is acquainted with the connection of our term and the ‘no nature without hypostasis’ objection, as he not only uses it as an introductory phrase to the text from Maximus, Ep. 15,<sup>226</sup> but also quotes it in the heading of chapter 27, where the relevant citations from De sectis and John the Grammarian (Eulogius) are gathered.<sup>227</sup>

In contrast, in the case of Anastasius, none of the numerous parallels Uthemann adduces seems – in my opinion – sufficient to establish a direct literary connection to Leontius of Byzantium, Pamphilus, Leontius of Jerusalem (who was of course not mentioned by the Doctrina either) or the De sectis.<sup>228</sup> Due to his historical research about the Monophysite movement, Anastasius was of course informed about the controversy between Severus and John the Grammarian, but was apparently not in the possession of any primary source.<sup>229</sup> However, the most striking evidence that Anastasius could hardly have been aware of the traditions concerning our term are the numerous strategies he offers to refute the ‘no nature without hypostasis’ objection without referring to our term in those contexts one single time. Already the final chapter of the collection of definitions in the *Hodegos* (II,8) deals with this πολυθρύλητον πρόβλημα πάντων τῶν Μονοφυσιτῶν and offers the following strategy to solve

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., pp. 192,18-193,7 cf. CCG I, pp. 55,191-56,211 (cf. ab. n. 27).

<sup>225</sup> Doctrina, p. 192,18f cf. p. 39,19-23; 40,2f.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid., p.137,2. The Maximus-quotation is made up as follows: 137,4-7 = Ep. 15 (557D15-560A4). 137,9f cf. 557D4-7. 137,12f = 557D8f. 137,14f cf. 560A8f. 137,19-22 = 557D12-15. 137,22-138,6 = 560B7-C6. 138,6-15 = 556C9-D6.

<sup>227</sup> Doctrina, p. 191,16-18. An interesting fact about the composition of this chapter is the insertion of a short phrase from Cyril of Alexandria between the two long quotations from De sectis and John/Eulogius: Τὸ γὰρ τοι μὴ ὑφεστὸς ἐν ἴσῳ τῷ μηδενί, μάλλον δὲ παντελῶς οὐδέν. (De incarnatione unigeniti, ed. G.M. de Durand, Paris: Cerf 1964 [SC 97], p. 214) Is this passage intended to underscore the necessity of attributing – if not a hypostasis – at least some kind of subsistence to Christ’s human nature?

<sup>228</sup> Cf. the indices fontium in CCG 8 and Sermones duo in constitutionem hominis necnon opuscula adversus Monotheletas, ed. K.-H. Uthemann, Turnhout: Brepols 1985 (CCG 12). One passage in his anthologies he cites from Amphilochius in fact belongs to Ephrem of Amid (Hodegos X,1,153-157; CCG 8, pp. 155f). A dependence on the anthology of CM is also possible (cf. Uthemann’s index fontium, CCG 8, pp. 429f). Although Maximus is not mentioned in his short history of the monotheletic controversy (Op. III,1,18-112; CCG 12, pp. 56-61), Anastasius must have known the most important theologian of his time. His emphasize on the ἀσπορία of Christ is most probably due to the influence of Maximus’ writings. Cf. Op. I,1,89-91 (CCG 12, p. 11); II, 3,19f.23 (p. 43); V,16 (p. 99). 42 (p. 100); Op. VII,1,16-19 (p. 125, ref. Div. nom. II,9); IX,1,85f (p. 139) / Hodegos II,7,45f (p. 62); IV,59 (p. 84); XIII,4,23 (p. 222, ref. Div. nom. II,9).30.48 (p. 223). 7,110f (p. 240); XXII,2,56 (p. 295), but especially II,5,40-52 (CCG 8, pp. 52f) and XIII,5,1-25 (pp. 225f, the paragraphs about the κοινωνομία; cf. Maximus, Amb. 41, Amb. 7 [1096A], Ep. 19 [592C/D]).

<sup>229</sup> Cf. Hodegos VI,1,21f.30f (CCG 8, pp. 94f).116-121 (Ibid., p. 99). In the last passage, he claims to have received his information in Babylon from Athanasius the secretary. If he had been in possession of a copy of John’s apology, he would have most probably mentioned it there.



it: If the Monophysites admit a twofold begetting in Christ, they will also have to claim one offspring to be ἀνυπόστατος or admit a duality of offspring. In VI, 2,15-17 the objection together with the identification of nature and person is rejected as one of the many errors originating in the heretics' reading of Aristotle's *Categories*. Anastasius' biblical proof for the non-identity of nature and person (VIII,2) culminates in accusing his opponents of ignoring clear biblical testimony in claiming that there is no φύσις ἀπρόσωπος (VIII,2,79-86). IX,2 is analogously structured and accuses our heretics of shunning all the orthodox fathers and agreeing with the ancient heretics in proclaiming this stupid objection (48-60). The alleged Severian postulate of terminological non-identity of trinitarian and Christological language restricting the objection to the Christological context is sarcastically welcomed and without further refutation employed as introduction to the report about the four disputes with the Monophysites in Alexandria (X). According to Anastasius' report about the first one of those disputes, he tricked his opponents beforehand "in a certain hypocrisy of pious knavery" (X.1,1,26f) and made them agree to the presupposition of substituting 'person' for 'nature' in every authoritative Christological text on the basis of our objection (X.1,34-36.42-44). Thus, he has little trouble in subjecting the objection and the whole monophysite position to a *reductio ad absurdum* by presenting those passages from the fathers speaking explicitly of two natures (X.1,2).<sup>230</sup> In the beginning of the second dispute, the Monophysites are said to have reinforced our objection pointing to the texts of Cyril of Alexandria calling the natures hypostases (X.2,1,12-17). Of course, Anastasius was once again much too cunning for his opponents and tricked them a second time on the basis of those Cyril-passages speaking of two ὑποστάσεις in Christ which – taken for granted the synonymous use of hypostasis, nature and person – could only be understood in a Nestorian way (X.2,3).<sup>231</sup> Anastasius can thus just continue quoting Cyril and manifesting the absurd consequence of the monophysite objection (X.2,3,38-40). The rest of the dispute is mainly concerned with a confrontation of the Monophysite and the Anastasian concept of nature. The objection is only resumed one other time (X.2,5,5-13), when Anastasius briefly alludes to the lack of coherence between the trinitarian and Christological terminology caused by the Monophysites' identification of nature and

<sup>230</sup> The objection is resumed in X.1,2,13f (p. 146). 27f (p. 147). 81f (p. 151). 103f (p. 152). 109f (p. 153) and 196 (p. 158).

<sup>231</sup> Accordingly, also the second chapter against the Monophysites (Uthemann, *Antimonophysitische Aporien*, p. 23) refutes the objection by the supposition of hypostasis and person for nature in the monophysite ἐκ δύο φύσεων-formula.

person.<sup>232</sup> The short fourth dispute (X.4) exclusively deals with our objection again, but only restates the point about Cyril speaking of hypostases in Christ made in X.2,3. In XXI,1, the second dispute is resumed as to the possibility of calling Christ's body φύσις, but our objection only plays the role of the Monophysite's reason for his denial of this possibility (XXI,1,32-35.39f).

This survey has shown that the refutation of our objection on the basis of a distinction between nature and person forms the central topic of Anastasius' *Hodegos*. However, his argumentation rests almost exclusively on the authoritative usage of the fathers and does not present anything like the refined discussions of the Leontii or Maximus – and not a single allusion to a distinction between hypostasis and ἐνυπόστατος or a differing use of this term. Accordingly, his use of ἐνυπόστατος hardly presents any feature of systematic interest. There is one instance of the traditional trinitarian use,<sup>233</sup> one Christological passage stressing the reality of Christ's flesh<sup>234</sup> and three other instances where our term is used in the sense of 'true, real' as opposed to merely verbal or imaginary.<sup>235</sup> That our term is nevertheless included in the collection of definitions forming the second book of the *Hodegos* can only be motivated by a traditional canon of terms Anastasius follows in composing this collection. The passage reads:

"We do not call the flesh of Christ person, but substance, in order to signify that he assumed and saved our entire nature. For if we call it hypostasis, we are caught in claiming that Christ assumed and saved one single man. However, the flesh also cannot be called hypostasis insofar as it is inseparable from the God-Logos. We call it ἐνυπόστατον, but not hypostasis; for the ἐνυπόστατον is what exists (τὸ ὑπάρχον), just like the ἀνυπόστατον is what does not have any existence or substance: e.g. a thing seen in sleep (ἐνύπνιον) is without substance and

<sup>232</sup> This is a standard motive in the Neochalcedonian polemics against the Monophysites from its beginnings. Although some texts of Severus' (Cf. the fragment preserved in Leontius of Byzantium, Epilysis; MSG 86/II,1921B and the letter to John Hegoumenos preserved by the Doctrina, p. 309f) actually claim the necessity of a new Christological terminology and thus apparently justify the reproach, Severus' most extensive account of dogmatic terminology (Contra impium grammaticum II,1-5; CSCO 111,55-84 / 112,43-66) offers nothing like that. Accordingly, A. de Halleux claims with regard to Philoxenus' letter to the monks of Senoun that the latter "applique avec une parfaite conséquence la même terminologie 'technique' aux deux mystères de la Trinité et de l' Incarnation" (Lettre aux moines de Senoun, ed. A. de Halleux, Louvain : Secrétariat du CSCO 1963 [CSCO 232], p. XVII). The criticism of a terminological "Vogel-Strauß-Politik" (Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus II/2, p. 29) still raised against the Monophysites by patristic scholars most probably needs to be carefully differentiated.

<sup>233</sup> *Hodegos* XXII,2,95-97 (CCG 8, p. 296): ὁ μὲν λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνυπόστατος θεός ἐστιν, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ θεός ἐστι καὶ ὑπόστασις θεοῦ.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid. XIII,7,150-152 (p. 242): Ἐκὼν δέ σοι πάρειμι σιγήσων (scil. in my list of arguments for a real human energy in Christ) τὴν τῶν θρόμβων τοῦ αἵματος καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς εἰς τὴν γῆν ἐξ Ἰησοῦ καταρρυσίν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐνυποστάτου σαρκὸς θεοῦ ἀφαίρεσιν

<sup>235</sup> Ibid. XII,3,6-8 (p. 205): οὐκέτι ῥηματικῶς καὶ γραφικῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς παρεταξάμεθα, ἀλλὰ πραγματικῶς διὰ παραδείγματος καὶ σχήματος ἐνυποστάτου / Op. I,5,4-6 (CCG 12, pp. 24f): τὴν Τριάδα ἐπίγνωθι δι' ἐνυποστάτων πραγμάτων· ὑπὲρ γὰρ πᾶσαν ἄλλην νομικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν μαρτυρίαν βεβαιότερα αὕτη / Op. X,5,98f (Ibid., p. 157): οὐ διὰ ῥημάτων, ἀλλὰ διὰ καρδιακῶν καὶ ἐνυποστάτων πραγμάτων καὶ ἐνεργημάτων.

subsistence (ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον), (only) imaginary. And in order to say it in a definition: Without subsistence, existence and substance (ἐνυπόστατον καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον καὶ ἐνούσιον) is what is – despite being verbally pronounced very often – not perceived in substance or subsistence, just like Hades, death or illness.” (II,3,112-126)

This passage presents a proper amalgam of the two traditions concerning our term we have recognized so far: The distinction between hypostasis and ἐνυπόστατον is of course displayed in claiming Christ’s human nature – in a way similar to Maximus, Ep. 15 (557D)<sup>236</sup> – as ἐνυπόστατον, but not hypostasis, and in consequently attaching it to the substance, not to the hypostasis. However, the wide concept of substance or nature comprising every kind of reality and only excluding *entia rationis* and privations is reminiscent of the wider use of ἐνυπόστατος in the other tradition. Obviously this is perfectly in line with Anastasius’ concept of nature as ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλήθεια. However, it also deprives our term of all the technical specification it had received in Maximus and can thus only be described as a retrogression in its development. Yet, this is not all Anastasius has to say about our term. He also distinguishes a twofold meaning of it analogous to that of ἐνούσιος:

“Again, we call ἐνούσιον either the being itself or the property perceived in a substance, just like ‘reasonable’ and ‘perishable’ are ἐνούσιον for human beings. Accordingly, also ἐνυπόστατον is said in a twofold way, either (referring to) the truly existing or to the property in the hypostasis, just like ‘unbegotten’ in the Father, ‘begotten’ in the Son, ‘proceeded’ in the Holy Spirit, as it was said above.” (II,3,126-133)

Of course, this distinction must not be confused with the one we know from John the Grammarian onwards. Anastasius rather suggests a possible synonymous use of ἐνούσιος and οὐσιωδής, ἐνυπόστατος and ὑποστατικός respectively. The reference in the last lines of the citation points to II,3,73, where Anastasius informs us about the ὑποστατικαὶ ιδιότητες of the trinitarian persons, a traditional expression occurring quite often in Anastasius.<sup>237</sup> While the alleged synonymity or ἐνούσιος and οὐσιωδής is displayed by Anastasius himself in his Op. I,4,11f.29f, where he claims the soul to have its logos οὐσιωδῶς ἐν ἑαυτῇ or ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἐνούσιον, I could not find any reference for ἐνυπόσταται ιδιότητες or ιδιώματα. Only the hypostatic

<sup>236</sup> Admittedly, there are two minor similarities between the Hodegos and the preparation of this text in the Doctrina patrum: Where Maximus writes ἐνυπόστατον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑπόστασιν, Anastasius and the Doctrina (p. 137,12f) have ἐνυπόστατον, οὐ μὴν ὑπόστασιν, and whereas Maximus does not employ χωρίζω to describe the hypostasis in this passage, the Anastasius speaks of κεχωρισμένον πρόσωπον and the Doctrina of κεχωρισμένη ὑπαρξίς (p. 137,14).

<sup>237</sup> Cf. Hodegos II, 4,38f (CCG 8, p. 41); XVI,26 (p. 269); XVI,48 (p. 270, in a quotation); XVII,15.33.36 (p. 272); XVI,44 (p. 270) / Op. I,3,38 (CCG 12, p. 19).

union can be called both ἔνωσις ἐνυπόστατος and ὑποστατική or be described as ἐνυποστάτως or ὑποστατικῶς ἐνοῦσθαι.<sup>238</sup> Anastasius is thus most probably paralleling ἐνυπόστατος and ἐνούσιος against the actual usage of the first term.

Due to his general antiphilosophical attitude, Anastasius is of course not concerned very much with the mode of subsistence of Christ's human nature. Hence, the insubsistence formula does not play any important role in Anastasius' Christological conception, it is not even used very often. There are only two traditional passages quoting the letter to Jovianus combined with the denial of a προδιάπλασις and the affirmation of the insubsistence of human nature in the Logos.<sup>239</sup> Nevertheless, Maximus' concept of Christ's τρόπος ὑπάρξεως is reflected in two interesting passages employing insubsistence-language. Both passages describe the ὑπαρξις of Christ's human nature as subsistence in or together with the Logos<sup>240</sup> being now ἔνθεος, σύνθεος, ὁμόθεος – one of them explicitly in combination with the affirmation of its ἀσπορία.<sup>241</sup> In *Hodegos* XXI,4, Anastasius provides a fairly clear account of what he means by those three terms: As in his apparition to Daniel's three friends in the fiery furnace (Dan 3:24-26) Christ's human shape was ἔμπυρος καὶ σύμπυρος καὶ ὁλοπύρος καὶ ὀλόφλογος, Christ's manhood was in every one of his earthly deeds ὅλη δι' ὅλου ὀλόθεος καὶ ἔνθεος καὶ σύνθεος.<sup>242</sup> Neither was Christ's divine energy that of a γυμνὸς θεός, nor was his human energy that of a ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος.<sup>243</sup> Both his concrete human acts and idioms are "God's" and his concrete divine acts and idioms are "Man's".<sup>244</sup> Thus, Anastasius conceives of Christ's τρόπος ὑπάρξεως strictly according to the classical rule for the *communicatio idiomatum* which was succinctly formulated probably for the first time a few decades after Athanasius by John of

<sup>238</sup> For the latter phrase cf. *Hodegos* XVI,44 (CCG 8, p. 270); XX,45f.53 (pp. 281f).

<sup>239</sup> *Hodegos* II,5,11-14 (CCG 8, p. 50f) / Chapter 14 against the Monophysites (Uthemann, *Antimonophysitische Aporien*, p. 24).

<sup>240</sup> *Hodegos* XIII,4,48-50 (CCG 8, p. 223): ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου καὶ σὺν τῷ θεῷ λόγῳ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον / *Op.* III,5,19-21 (CCG 12, p. 75): ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' ὑπόστασιν συσσωμῶς ἐν τῇ παναχράντῳ καὶ θεοδόχῳ μητρῷ ὑποστάσα (scil. Christ's soul). Cf. *Ibid.* 27f (p. 76): ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ θεῷ εἰσοικισθεῖσα καὶ σύνθεος ὑπάρξασα (scil. the human substance).

<sup>241</sup> *Hodegos* XIII,4,48-51 (CCG 8, p. 223) / *Op.* III,5,18-20 (CCG 12, p. 75).

<sup>242</sup> *Hodegos* XXI,4,10-15 (CCG 8, pp. 290f). Especially Anastasius' description of Christ's death and the *descensus ad inferos* of his soul deny the 'godlessness' of those acts using our terms: *Hodegos* XII,3,65 (CCG 8, p. 207). 5,54f (p. 233); XIII,6,84f (p. 234). 7,124f (p. 241). 9,31 (249) / *Op.* III,5,61f (CCG 12, p. 77); VIII, 3,4,12-14 (p. 131); IX,2,14-27 (p. 140).

<sup>243</sup> Cf. esp. *Op.* IX,3,6-18 (CCG 12, p. 141).

<sup>244</sup> *Op.* V,111-121 (CCG 12, p. 102) cf. *Op.* VIII,4,21f (pp. 132f).

Damascus: *communicatio idiomatum fit in concretione, non in abstractione*.<sup>245</sup> Hence, in attributing a divine splendour to every of Christ's human aspects and a human cover to every one of his divine aspects, Anastasius has preserved the Chalcedonian symmetry reintroduced by Maximus, although he is not able to express this in technical ontological terminology. Although his work does not contribute anything to the development of the terminology we are interested in, his work – especially his sermons and opuscula – is nevertheless valuable because of presenting a vivid picture of the dyotheletic-chalcedonian Christ.

### 9. John of Damascus

John of Damascus' work is still regarded as "something of a digest of the whole Eastern tradition, summarizing (and sometimes appropriating verbatim) a vast theological and philosophical heritage".<sup>246</sup> However, the analyses of Studer and especially Richter have shown with regard to the philosophical heritage that John was nothing but a compiler in the strictest sense. His philosophical treatises depend on philosophical introductions and excerpts from the Alexandrian commentators composed by and for theologians who did not have any profound acquaintance with philosophical matters.<sup>247</sup> In principle, Studer and Richter extend this judgement to John's relationship to the theological tradition, even if they admit a slightly higher degree of appropriation of the collected material here.<sup>248</sup> Admittedly, the widespread use of anthologies and compilations casts doubt on every literal quotation with regard to its origin in a direct use of the source or an acquaintance conveyed by an anthology. As those anthologies and compilations were

<sup>245</sup> Cf. *Expositio fidei* 48; ed. B. Kotter, Berlin: De Gruyter 1973 (PTS 12), pp. 116-118. The usual assumption of Ps-Cyril, *De trinitate* 27 (MSG 77,1172A-D) as being the source for this chapter is refuted by V.S. Conticello, Pseudo-Cyril's 'De SS. Trinitate': A Compilation of Joseph the Philosopher, in: OCP 61 (1995), 117-129, who shows the treatise to be a part of Joseph's († ca. 1330) Encyclopedia compiled from John's *Expositio* and Nicephorus' *Blemmydes Sermo ad monachos suos*. However, the classical rule cited above is already presupposed by Maximus' (cf. Heinzer, *Gottes Sohn*, pp. 141-145) and Leontius of Byzantium's (cf. Daley, *Richer union*, pp. 259f.262) use of the concept of *communicatio idiomatum*.

<sup>246</sup> Cross, *Perichoresis*, p. 69. In quoting John of Damascus we use the abbreviations listed *ibid.* n. 1.

<sup>247</sup> Cf. B. Studer, *Die theologische Arbeitsweise des Johannes von Damaskus*, Ettal: Buch-Kunstverlag 1956, pp. 102-125 and Richter, *Dialektik*, esp. pp. 235-242.268-280.

<sup>248</sup> Cf. Studer, *Theologische Arbeitsweise*, p. 123: „Johannes bring gegenüber den kirchlichen Schriftstellern des sechsten und siebten Jahrhunderts, denen er durchwegs verpflichtet ist, kaum etwas Neues. Im Gegenteil, er steht ihnen bereits ordentlich nach, wie auch ein nur oberflächlicher Vergleich mit deren Werken zeigt.“ Richter (*Dialektik*, pp. 28-36) shows accurately that the Nemesius and Maximus-quotations in John's account of man and creation in *Expos.* are not drawn from the original sources, but from some intermediate compilation. However, his extension of this observation to the whole work of John (*Ibid.*, p. 238. 241) seems in my opinion precipitate. Studer, *Theologische Arbeitsweise*, pp. 91f and K. Rozemond, *La Christologie de St. Jean Damascène*, Ettal: Buch-Kunstverlag 1959, pp. 34-39 take John's direct acquaintance with Maximus for granted.

continuously copying one another and thus overlapping to a large extent, Richter can even raise doubts against John's use of the *Doctrina patrum*, which was commonly accepted since Diekamp.<sup>249</sup> In this case, the only reasonable method is to decide about every single relevant passage on its own, whether it displays a more profound understanding of the tradition resumed in it, or just adds an undigested piece of traditional knowledge to the vast collection embodied in John's Πηγὴ γνώσεως.

With respect to the traditional trinitarian use of ἐνυπόστατος, we encounter a comprehensive resumption of the entire complex of motives connected with the term during the fourth-century-debate. In Expos. 6, John opposes the human λόγος προφορικός and the divine Λόγος ἐνυπόστατος just as Eusebius of Caesarea's homoeousian companions did and infers – following John Chrysostom and Cyril of Alexandria – the hypostatical reality of God's Logos from his consubstantiality with the Father,<sup>250</sup> an argument which recurs two chapters later in Expos. 8.<sup>251</sup> This chapter also resumes another motive from Cyril's trinitarian treatises: The Son is not a dead or independent instrument of the creating Father, but his ἐνυπόστατος (σοφία καὶ) δύναμις.<sup>252</sup> Moreover, it extends – perhaps also inspired by Cyril – the inference of hypostatical reality from consubstantiality also to the Spirit.<sup>253</sup>

Small wonder we find John employing the phrases ἐνυπόστατος λόγος,<sup>254</sup> ἐνυπόστατος σοφία<sup>255</sup> or δύναμις<sup>256</sup> in various combinations<sup>257</sup> mainly for the

<sup>249</sup> Dialektik, pp. 238-242 cf. Doctrina, pp. LXVI-LXXIV and the indices of parallels in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, ed. B. Kotter, vol. 2, Berlin: De Gruyter 1973 (PTS 12), pp. 252f and vol. 4, Berlin: De Gruyter 1981 (PTS 22), pp. 446f.

<sup>250</sup> Expos. 6,4-11 (PTS 12, p. 15). This passage resembles pretty much one of Cyril's corresponding accounts in the Thesaurus (MSG 75, 324A). On the impossibility of Ps-Cyril as a source of John cf. ab. n. 245.

<sup>251</sup> Expos. 8,108-112 (PTS 12, p. 23).

<sup>252</sup> Ibid. 8,38-43.156-162 (Ibid., p. 20.25).

<sup>253</sup> Ibid. 8,181-187 (p. 26) cf. Cyril, Thesaurus (MSG 75, 580A.596B).

<sup>254</sup> Dial. fus. 1,68; ed. B. Kotter, Berlin: De Gruyter 1969 (PTS 7), p. 55 / Expos. 13,95 (PTS 12, p. 41) / Ctr. Man. 9,12f (PTS 22, p. 309) / Hom. in transf. 13,5; ed. B. Kotter, Berlin: De Gruyter 1988, (PTS 29), p. 450 / Hom. in ficum 1,1 (PTS 29, p. 102) / Hom. in sab. 4,2 (PTS 29, p. 123) / Enc. in Chrys. 3,2 (PTS 29, p. 360) / Hom. in Dorm. III 2,43f (PTS 29, p. 551).

<sup>255</sup> Dial. fus. 1,20 (PTS 7, p. 53) / Volunt. 3,16 (PTS 22, p. 176).

<sup>256</sup> Expos. 54,5 (PTS 12, p. 129); 87,70 (Ibid., p. 201) / Ctr. Jac. 85,3 (PTS 22, p. 141) / Epist. de trishag. 3,31 (PTS 22, p. 309) / Hom. in. sab. 4,10 (PTS 29, p. 123) / Enc. in Chrys. 2,8 (PTS 29, p. 360). This is again strongly reminiscent of Cyril's usage (cf. ab. ch. 1, n. 72).

<sup>257</sup> The Son can be called – alluding to 1Cor 1:24 – „personified wisdom and power“ (Expos. 46,20 [PTS 12, p. 109]; 84,33 [PTS 12, p. 187]; 91,28 [PTS 12, p. 213] / Ctr. Nest. 43,43 [PTS 22, p. 287] / Hom. in Nativ. 2,15f [PTS 29, p. 326]), the Son and the Spirit can be called “hypostatical” (Ctr. Nest. 43,19 [PTS 22, p. 286] / Epist. de trishag. 28,41 [PTS 22, p. 332]) or “personified powers” (Epist. de trishag. 7,21 [PTS 22, p. 315]; 25,26 [Ibid., p. 328]; 28,30 [Ibid., p. 331]). Only one passage in the *Sacra parallela* also includes the Father (MSG 95, 1076B).

Son, but also for the spirit,<sup>258</sup> lots of times also in other works. We also find three instances of what we labelled ‘doxological use’: Christ is called once ἐνυπόστατος ζωή,<sup>259</sup> twice ἐνυπόστατος ἀλήθεια.<sup>260</sup> The validity of the equation  $x$  ἐνυπόστατος = ὑπόστασις of  $x$  is beautifully displayed by John’s paralleling of ἐνυπόστατος and ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει ὑφίστασθαι or ὑπάρχειν.<sup>261</sup> The only passage in John resuming Maximus’ technical trinitarian use is Ctr. Jac. 12,4-13, where the ἐνυπόστατος οὐσία and the ὑποστάσεις ἐνούσιοι of the Trinity are said to correspond to the οὐσίαι ἐνυπόστατοι and the ὑπόστασις ἐνούσιος of the Incarnation. The entire rest of John’s trinitarian account calls – according to the older tradition – the (second and third) hypostases ἐνυπόστατος, not the divine substance.

K. Rozemond claimed “la notion d’enhypostasie” to be the systematic basis of John’s Christology, the necessary presupposition to understand every single one of his Christological statements.<sup>262</sup> We will have to examine whether this holds true only for the insubistence-concept, or also for the term ἐνυπόστατος, or for none of them. The passages in John’s work reflecting explicitly upon our term can be divided into two groups: The first is represented by two passages from the *Dialectics*, Dial. fus. 30 (= Dial. brev. 10) and 45, which deal with the term rather formally without always making its theological context explicit. The second group almost perfectly coincides with the Christological debates of the ‘no nature without hypostasis’ objection: Expos. 53, Ctr. Jacob. 11f and Ctr. Aceph. 5f.<sup>263</sup>

Dial. fus. 30 offers a concise summary of the twofold use of hypostasis, ἐνυπόστατος, and ἀνυπόστατος, just as it was postulated by John the Grammarian and the *De sectis*. This distinction – based upon the validity of the equation referred to above – is repeated a bit more extensively in Dial. fus. 43 (= Dial. brev. 26) about the hypostasis. However, the ending of chap. 45 providing the Christological application of our term

<sup>258</sup> Expos. 13,88 (PTS 12, p. 41) / Hom. in. sab. 4,13 (PTS 29, p. 123).

<sup>259</sup> Expos. 59,155 (PTS 12, p. 150).

<sup>260</sup> De imag. 1 3,22; ed. B. Kotter, Berlin: De Gruyter 1975 (PTS 17), p. 68 / Ctr. Nest. 17,14 (PTS 22, p. 269).

<sup>261</sup> Expos. 8,184 (PTS 12, p. 26) / Epist. de trishag. 28,30 (PTS 22, p. 331).

<sup>262</sup> *Christologie*, p. 22. The “triple but” of the concept she summarizes her analyses in on p. 26 only makes sense in referring this “notion” to the term ἐνυπόστατος (“un seul mot”). As our analysis below will show, the term despite being very closely connected to the insubistence formula, the true key-concept of John’s Christology, not identical with or completely inseparable from it, Rozemond’s statement is with all its implications clearly an overstatement.

<sup>263</sup> The only passage where the objection is properly discussed without reference to our term is De fide ctr. Nest. 6-10 (PTS 22, pp. 239f). Allusions to it can be found in Haer. 83a,136-154 (PTS 22, p. 54) and Ctr. Jacob. 80 (PTS 22, pp. 137f).

clearly follows Leontius of Byzantium's distinction between hypostasis and ἐνυπόστατον.<sup>264</sup> Following the *Doctrina patrum*, this chapter obviously tries to reconcile those two traditions and deserves a closer look.

45,1-7 presents the attempt – well known from the *Doctrina* – to harmonize Leontius of Byzantium and *De sectis* by assigning a 'more proper' term to every one of the meanings distinguished by this text: The accident is rather ἑτεροῦπόστατον than ἐνυπόστατον, the independent individual is rather hypostasis. John – or his source – seems to omit the *Doctrina*'s attribution of ἀθύποστατος to the substance in order to have also one meaning left which is proper in contrast to the other derived ones.

45,7-16 expounds Maximus' two kinds of ἐνυπόστατον which does not show any similarities to the *Doctrina*-version. The *Doctrina* 'pedagogically' rearranges Maximus' text in presenting first the formal distinction between the two kinds and in immediate connection with the second one its Christological application, whereas John inserts an illustrative application to the anthropological paradigm<sup>265</sup> which was probably inspired (in John or already in his source) by the archetype of Maximus' distinction, the famous passage from Leontius of Byzantium (1280B). His harmonizing strategy follows the *Doctrina*, but is carried through more consequently: the κυρίως from the *Doctrina*'s *De-sectis*-version is resumed to introduce Maximus' explication of the term to fill the gap of a proper meaning for ἐνυπόστατος properly and definitely, as the final clause of the paragraph stresses again that only what subsists by itself is κυρίως a hypostasis (15f).<sup>266</sup>

In this case, why does 45,17-22 detach what originally was nothing but the Christological application of Maximus' second kind in order to form a separate Christological meaning of our term? An answer to this question could be provided by the probably closest parallel to *Dial. fus.* 45, the final paragraph from the "other chapter" – according to Richter a text completely independent from John's *Dialectics*

<sup>264</sup> *Dial. fus.* 45,19f (PTS 7, p. 110); οὐχ ὑπόστασις ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐνυπόστατον.

<sup>265</sup> Cf. Maximus, Ep. 15 (557D/560A); *Doctrina*, p. 137,3-16.

<sup>266</sup> An alternative harmonizing strategy is offered by the *Codex Oxoniensis Bodl. Auct. T.1.6* 12,9-16 (PTS 7, p. 165), an anonymous compilation of excerpts which is according to Richter (*Dialektik*, pp. 23-39) temporally prior to the *Doctrina*. The *Codex* faithfully reproduces Maximus' two kinds of ἐνυπόστατον according to the wording of Ep. 15 (and the *Doctrina*) (12,9-11). Then, it attaches the distinction between the wider and narrower use in assigning ἐνυπόστατος to the wider and ὑπόστασις to the narrower one. Thus, it subordinates the 'twofold use tradition' to the 'distinction tradition'.



despite the numerous literal agreements.<sup>267</sup> Its relevant passage (105-130) starts with the distinction between a wider and narrower use of hypostasis resumed in Dial. fus. 30 (105-107). Afterwards, it inserts the traditional Cappadocian account of hypostasis, individual, “one” and “other” (107-118). Proceeding to ἐνυπόστατος, the twofold use is only mentioned in a very brief introductory sentence (119) and thrust into the background in introducing the two kinds of ἐνυπόστατον by κυρίως. Maximus’ statement about them is faithfully reproduced (119-122), but the second one is illustrated anthropologically at first (122-126). However, the Christological application is introduced as a consequence from the anthropological one (ὅθεν) and does not constitute a meaning of its own (122-129). It concludes with the well known distinction of the twofold use of ἀνυπόστατος (129f) which is also treated in the short Dial. fus. 46. Thus, the chapter just suppresses the ‘twofold use tradition’ in dedicating to it nothing but a brief introductory clause.

As the κυρίως makes more sense in Dial. fus. 45, the passage from “other chapter” could be regarded as an excerpt from John. However, John’s disconnection of the anthropological and Christological application forming a traditional and organic unity in the “other chapter” forbids such an assumption. It was probably John’s explication of his harmonizing strategy which destroyed the connection and made a new introduction for the Christological application necessary. The text from the other chapter reads:

“Neither is the soul called hypostasis nor the body, because neither of them did ever subsist before or apart from the other, but what is completed from both of them is their hypostasis. Therefore also the flesh of the Lord is not called hypostasis, but ἐνυπόστατον, because it never subsisted by itself, but in the hypostasis of the Logos, and received and possesses it as its hypostasis”.<sup>268</sup>

The parallel in John says:

“Neither is the soul on its own called hypostasis nor is the body, but (they are called) ἐνυπόστατα. What is completed from both is their hypostasis. For hypostasis is and is called properly what subsists by itself and independently.

Again, one calls ἐνυπόστατος the nature which is assumed by a different hypostasis and received its existence in it. Therefore also the flesh of the Lord – which did not subsist by itself, not even for a single moment – is not a hypostasis, but ἐνυπόστατον. For it received its

<sup>267</sup> Dialektik, pp. 219-221. Just like in the case of the Doctrina patrum and the Codex Oxoniensis, Richter argues again that – due to the vast number of compilations and anthologies existing in John’s time and the high degree of overlap in their textual substance – the dissimilarity of order makes John’s direct literary dependence implausible despite the numerous numerous literal agreements of both texts.

<sup>268</sup> Οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεται ὑπόστασις οὔτε τὸ σῶμα ἀλλ’ ἐνυπόστατα, ὅτι οὐδέποτε ὑπέστη τὸ ἐν πρὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου οὐδὲ ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἐτέρου, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελούμενον ὑπόστασις ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν. Ὅθεν καὶ ἡ τοῦ κυρίου σὰρξ οὐχ ὑπόστασις λέγεται ἀλλ’ ἐνυπόστατον, ἐπειδὴ οὐδέποτε καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑπέστη ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τοῦ λόγου ὑποστάσει, καὶ αὐτὴν ἔσχεν καὶ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν. (Other chapter 123-129; PTS 7, p. 146).

subsistence in the hypostasis of the God Logos, because it was assumed by it and received and possesses it as its hypostasis".<sup>269</sup>

Apparently, John was not convinced of the validity of the inference suggested by a text like the "other chapter". This text denies a hypostasis of their own to the human soul and body, because they do not subsist temporally or locally separate from each other and infers from that that Christ's human nature can neither have such a hypostasis of its own, because it never subsisted temporally or locally separate from the Logos. The fact that John suppresses the point of temporal and local inseparability in the case of soul and body and just postulates their being ἐνυπόστατα but not hypostases (probably because of the obvious unity of the human individual) could be due to the fact that for him an application to Christology would have equally demanded the temporal and local coincidence of both natures.<sup>270</sup> That is probably why he restricted the parallel of man and Christ to the distinction between ἐνυπόστατον and hypostasis and presents the rejection of a προδιάπλασις at its traditional place afterwards, substantiating the insubsistence of Christ's human nature in the Logos. Another reason may have been his asymmetric Christological tendency<sup>271</sup> which again prefers the insubsistence to the cosubsistence-formula. Thus, the last paragraph of Dial. fus. 45 amounts to an account of ἐνυπόστατος perfectly fulfilling the conditions for a Loofsonian understanding of the term: It is applied in an exclusive manner to Christ's human nature and immediately connected with the insubsistence formula. Let us see whether this can be verified from the other, 'Christological' group of passages dealing with our term.

Actually, five of the six instances where our term is used in a Christological context connects it more or less immediately with the insubsistence formula<sup>272</sup> and four of them

<sup>269</sup> οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ μόνῃ λέγεται ὑπόστασις οὔτε τὸ σῶμα ἀλλ' ἐνυπόστατα, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελούμενον ὑπόστασις ἀμφοτέρων. Ὑπόστασις γὰρ κυρίως τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἰδιοσυστάτως ὑφιστάμενόν ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται.

Λέγεται πάλιν ἐνυπόστατον ἡ ὑφ' ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως προσληφθεῖσα φύσις καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐσχηκυῖα τὴν ὑπαρξιν. "Ὅθεν καὶ ἡ σὰρξ τοῦ κυρίου μὴ ὑποστᾶσα καθ' ἑαυτὴν μηδὲ πρὸς καιροῦ Ποτὴν οὐχ ὑπόστασις ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ὑπέστη προσληφθεῖσα ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ταύτην καὶ ἔσχε καὶ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν. (PTS 7, p. 110).

<sup>270</sup> In Dial. fus. 67,25-30 (PTS 7, p. 139) there is an attempt of harmonizing both stances: One can either perceive both natures together in the unique hypostasis (symmetric coexistence) or the human nature to receive its subsistence in the hypostasis of the Logos (asymmetric inexistence). Cross would probably refer the former to the union *in facto esse* and the latter to the union *in fieri* (his whole Perichoresis-article rests on this distinction to be found nowhere in John's works explicitly; cf. esp. pp. 71-73.120). Nevertheless, Cross also acknowledges John's ambiguous stance towards the anthropological paradigm (Ibid., p. 105).

<sup>271</sup> Cf. Rozemond, *Christologie*, chap. II ("Christologie asymétrique").

<sup>272</sup> One could discuss, whether also Volunt. 9,8-10 (PTS 22, p. 191) has to be included into this list, because this text clearly substitutes the term ἐνυπόστατος by the insubsistence formula: φύσιν

predicate the term only of the human nature. This astonishing fact in my opinion justifies a bit more extensive quotations:

“For the flesh of the God Logos did not subsist independently nor did it become another hypostasis apart from that of the God Logos, but it was rather – because of subsisting in the latter – ἐνυπόστατος and not an independent hypostasis of its own”.<sup>273</sup>

“Being an ἐνούσιος hypostasis the Logos assumed an ἐνυπόστατος nature as first-fruit of our mass [Rom 11:16]. We say ἐνυπόστατος, neither that it existed independently nor that it had an hypostasis of its own, but that it existed in the hypostasis of the Logos. For simultaneous is the flesh, simultaneous the flesh of the God Logos...”.<sup>274</sup>

“Being one hypostasis of the hypostases of the godhead Christ had in himself the whole, undiminished nature of the godhead and assumed from the holy virgin an ἐνυπόστατον flesh, not a hypostasis, but rather something subsisting in him, the first-fruit of our mass”.<sup>275</sup>

Two other passages connect the attribution of our term to both natures with the insubsistence of Christ’s human nature in the Logos:

“And in case of the ineffable and incomprehensible dispensation of the Lord we call the hypostasis ἐνούσιον, because it belongs to the substances it is composed of, and each of his substances ἐνυπόστατον; for they have his unique hypostasis in common – his godhead eternally, according as it also has the hypostasis of the Father and the Spirit, but his ensouled and reasonable flesh (one can also say: his manhood) as having received subsistence in it and having inherited it as hypostasis just recently”.<sup>276</sup>

“Hence, both Christ’s godhead and his manhood are ἐνυπόστατος; for both have his unique composite hypostasis in common – the godhead before all eons and eternally, the ensouled and intelligent flesh as assumed by the former in the last times, having received existence in it and having it has his hypostasis”.<sup>277</sup>

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προσλαβών, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν, φύσιν οὐκ ἀνυπόστατον, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ὑποστᾶσαν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐσχηκυῖαν ὑπόστασιν.

<sup>273</sup> Οὐ γὰρ ιδιοσυστάτως ὑπέστη ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σὰρξ οὐδὲ ἑτέρα ὑπόστασις γέγονε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποστᾶσα ἐνυπόστατος μᾶλλον καὶ οὐ καθ' αὐτὴν ιδιοσύστατος ὑπόστασις γέγονε. (Expos. 53,14-17; PTS 12, p. 128).

<sup>274</sup> Ὑπόστασις γὰρ ὑπάρχων ἐνούσιος φύσιν ἀνέλαβεν ἐνυπόστατον ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ ἡμετέρου φυράματος. Ἐνυπόστατον δὲ φαμεν, οὐχ ὡς ιδιοσυστάτως ὑπάρξασαν οὐδ' ὡς ἰδίαν ἐσχηκυῖαν ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ λόγου ὑποστάσει ὑπάρξασαν. “Ἀμα γὰρ σὰρξ, ἅμα θεοῦ λόγου σὰρξ... (Ctr. Jacob. 79,10-12; PTS 22, p. 179). The passage from the letter to Jovianus is also quoted in Expos. 46,31-33 (PTS 12, p. 110) = Hom. in Nativ. 2,27f (PTS 29, p. 326).

<sup>275</sup> ὁ Χριστὸς ὑπόστασις ὦν μία τῶν τῆς θεότητος ὑποστάσεων πᾶσάν τε τὴν τῆς θεότητος φύσιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχων ἀνελλιπῇ, προσελάβετο ἐκ τῆς ἀγίας παρθένου σάρκα ἐνυπόστατον, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ μᾶλλον ὑποστᾶσαν, ἀπαρχὴν τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως. (Ctr. Nest. 2,14-18; PTS 22, p. 265). The fourth passage referring our term exclusively to Christ’s human nature and the only one without connection to the insubsistence formula is Ctr. Jacob. 53,8-11 (PTS 22, p. 128).

<sup>276</sup> Καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρρήτου καὶ πάντα νοῦν ὑπερκειμένης τοῦ κυρίου οἰκονομίας ἐνούσιον μὲν φαμεν τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὡς ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις τελοῦσαν, ἐξ ὧν καὶ συντέθεται, ἐνυπόστατον δὲ ἐκάστην τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτοῦ· ἔχουσι γὰρ κοινὴν τὴν μίαν αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασιν ἡ μὲν θεότης αὐτοῦ αἰδίως, καθὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, ἡ δὲ ἔμψυχος καὶ λογικὴ αὐτοῦ σὰρξ, ταῦτόν δ' εἰπεῖν ἡ ἀνθρωπότης αὐτοῦ, προσφάτως ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποστᾶσα καὶ αὐτὴν κληρωσαμένη ὑπόστασιν. (Ctr. Jac. 12,6-13; PTS 22, p. 115).

<sup>277</sup> Καὶ ἡ θεότης τοίνυν καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐνυπόστατος ἐστίν· ἔχει γὰρ ἐκατέρα κοινὴν τὴν μίαν σύνθετον αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασιν, ἡ μὲν θεότης προαιωνίως καὶ αἰδίως, ἡ δὲ ἔμψυχος σὰρξ καὶ νοερὰ ἐπ' ἐσχάτων τῶν χρόνων ὑπ' αὐτῆς προσληφθεῖσα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπάρξασα καὶ αὐτὴν ἐσχηκυῖα ὑπόστασιν. (Ctr. Akeph 6,11-15 ; PTS 22, p. 414).

Obviously, the fact that Christ's human nature is not a hypostasis, but ἐνυπόστατον, is for John also explained by its lack of preexistence, i.e. its reception of existence in the hypostasis of the Logos.<sup>278</sup> However, before we deal with this problem in detail in examining John's use of the insubsistence formula, we have to answer the question, whether or to what extent the attempt to reconcile the two traditions concerning our term from the Dialectics affects John's Christological application of it.

Expos. 53 introduces our term only *en passant* (53,16) and thus cannot be expected to provide any evidence relevant for our problem. In contrast, Ctr. Akeph. 6 provides a harmonizing-effort independent from that in the Dialectics. Arguing for the distinction between hypostasis and ἐνυπόστατον, John points to the twofold use of both terms and explains this in the case of hypostasis in exactly the way we know from John the Grammarian and *De sectis* (6,3-8). But in the case of ἐνυπόστατος, he just substitutes Maximus' two kinds for the traditional twofold use (6,8-11). Even if the replacement of εἶδος by οὐσία (6,8) wants to create some affinity of Maximus' first kind to the traditional wider use, this cannot conceal the fact that the 'twofold use tradition' is deprived of every argumentative value in this chapter and simply suppressed by the 'distinction tradition'.

Although the presence of the 'twofold use tradition' in Ctr. Jac. 11f can only be revealed by a critical analysis of its sources – paragraph 11 mainly consists of what could be called a detailed exegesis of the famous CNE-passage –, this passage provides a somewhat concealed attempt to harmonize the two traditions.

11,4-12 gives an exposition of Leontius' introductory analogy 'hypostasis : ἐνυπόστατον = οὐσία : ἐνούσιον' and connects this analogy with the identification of ἐνούσιον with hypostasis and οὐσία with ἐνυπόστατον respectively. As τὸ ἔν τινι and τὸ ἐν ᾧ are distinct, says John, also the οὐσία and τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ θεωρούμενον (i.e. the ἐνούσιον or the hypostasis) and the hypostasis and τὸ ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει καθορώμενον (i.e. the ἐνυπόστατον or the οὐσία) have to be distinct. The latter identification is not pronounced very clearly in the text, but immediately becomes clear in comparing the passage with one of its (remote) sources. Ctr. Jac. 11,7-9 says:

<sup>278</sup> This is why I interpreted the *Aorist*-forms of ὑπάρχειν and ὑφίστασθαι in my translations as *aurista ingressiva*.

“ Ἐνυπόστατον is – not hypostasis – what is perceived in a hypostasis. Οὐσία δέ, i.e. whatever exists, either by itself or together with something else or in something else”.<sup>279</sup>

As U. M. Lang noticed,<sup>280</sup> this clumsy phrase is dependent on the antitritheist Dialogue of Patriarch Anastasius I., where we can read:

“There is no nature without existence, because this would not be a nature; for everything that exists, either by itself or together with something else or as having its existence in something else, is Ἐνυπόστατον”.<sup>281</sup>

In the light of this source, the obscure Οὐσία δέ is probably most adequately translated by “namely the substance”. But why did John insert an explanation of Οὐσία / Ἐνυπόστατον which is perfectly in line with the ‘twofold use tradition’ into his exegesis of the basic text of the ‘distinction tradition’? To judge from the following sentence, the two prepositional phrases offered to him the possibility of a further differentiation, analogous to that between Maximus’ second kind and the separate Christological meaning in Dial. fus. 45: A substance either exists by itself ὡς πυρὸς οὐσία (probably the pure element fire before being mixed with the other three) or together with another substance, like soul and body, or in another substance, like the fire in the torch (an example he takes from a passage later in CNE, 1304B/C) or the flesh of the Lord in his divine hypostasis. It seems obvious from the context that our term is to be applied only to the last two cases. The first case (οὐσία as synonymous with hypostasis) could only be integrated by a substitution of οὐσία for Ἐνυπόστατον as subject for Anastasius’ explication without undermining the whole argument for the distinction between hypostasis and Ἐνυπόστατον. Thus, the ‘twofold use tradition’ is suppressed in a way equally brutal to Ctr. Akeph. 6.<sup>282</sup> As this brutality provided another evidence for John’s differentiation of anthropological coexistence and Christological inexistence, we will not complain too much about it.

11,12-16 continues with Leontius’ text (1277D1-6) only amplified by a short illustration of τὸν τινὰ δηλοῖ (11,13f). Yet, John is not content with the ambiguous reference of the ὁ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι (John: τὴν ὑπαρξιν)-clause and interrupts his quotation to clarify this. He replaces Leontius’ remark about accidental qualities with a

<sup>279</sup> Ἐνυπόστατον δὲ οὐχ ἡ ὑπόστασις, τὸ ἐν ὑποστάσει δὲ καθορώμενον. Οὐσία δέ, τουτέστιν ὁπωσοῦν ὑπάρχει, εἴτε καθ’ ἑαυτὴν εἴτε σὺν ἑτέρῳ εἴτε ἐν ἑτέρῳ. (PTS 22, p. 114).

<sup>280</sup> Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos, p. 652.

<sup>281</sup> Φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνυπόστατος, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φύσις: πᾶν γὰρ ὑπάρχον, εἴτε καθ’ ἑαυτὸ εἴτε σὺν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχον τὴν ὑπαρξιν, ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστιν. (Uthemann, Streitgespräch, p. 103; II. 780f).

<sup>282</sup> This is also confirmed by Ctr. Jacob. 8 (PTS 22, p. 113) where the twofold use of hypostasis just appears as a learned gloss without any relevance for the argumentation.

more extensive account of the difference between τὸ ἐν τινι and τὸ ἐν ᾧ (16-23), which only makes sense in referring the mentioned clause to ἐνυπόστατον, not to συμβεβηκός. This account presents exactly the confusion between the prefix and the preposition ἐν Loofs' critics have blamed his Leontius-interpretation for. It parallels the relations of ἄρετή and ἐναρετόν, κακία and its main subject (the devil), substance and accident, soul and ἔμψυχον σῶμα. The most interesting one is perhaps the last example, because it provides a direct answer to our introductory question, to which one of the two relevant types of ἐν- adjectives our term belongs: The 'ensouled' body is not itself soul, just as neither the 'embodied' soul is itself body nor the 'enhypostasized' nature is itself hypostasis. Hence, John of Damascus comes very close to a Loofsian reading of ἐνυπόστατος. However, the component still missing is an entirely consequent exclusive attribution of the term to the human nature. In fact, the following paragraph displays Maximus' perfectly symmetric and consistent use of the term to signify the relationship of nature and hypostasis *a parte naturae* both in the trinitarian and in the Christological context (12,4-13).

Although we have already mentioned the close connection between our term and the insubistence formula in John, we still have to examine his use of this formula more intensively in order to reveal all the systematic implications of this connection. John uses 'subsist in' numerous times and almost exclusively<sup>283</sup> to signify the relationships of accident and substance<sup>284</sup> or – in the majority of instances – flesh and Logos-hypostasis. Only five times the formula signifies the relationship of substance and hypostasis in general.<sup>285</sup> In case of the Christological application, three grammatical variants have to be distinguished: The verb ὑφίστημι either occurs in the active voice,<sup>286</sup> i.e. the Logos is said to have 'caused to subsist' in him the human nature, or in the transitive

<sup>283</sup> Two antimanichean passages deny the 'inexistence' of the latter's alleged two principles in each other (Expos. 93,4; PTS 12, p. 220) and maintain the 'inexistence' of τὸ εἶναι in τὸ ὄν in order to make sure that those two do not constitute a manichean duality (Ctr. Man. 16,23f; PTS 22, p. 361).

<sup>284</sup> Dial. fus. 9,40 (PTS 7, p. 73); 17,4f (Ibid., p. 86); 30,10f (p. 93); 40,7f (p. 106); 42,17f (pp. 107f) / Ctr. Akeph. 8,7 (PTS 22, p. 415). More frequently, he uses τὴν ὑπαρξιν or τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν ἐν: Dial. fus. 4,10.66f (PTS 7, p. 58f); 10,103f.119f (p. 77); 17,4 (p. 86); 40,4-6 (p. 106); 46,4 (p. 110); 48,5.13f (p. 112) / Ctr. Man. 31,4f (PTS 22, p. 369) / Ctr. Jak. 8,3 (PTS 22, p. 113).

<sup>285</sup> Dial. fus. 31,16-19 (PTS 7; p. 94); 43,22f (Ibid., p. 109); 45,7f (p. 110) / Expos. 50,12f (PTS 12, p. 120); 55,4f (Ibid., p. 131).

<sup>286</sup> Expos. 56,13.33f (PTS 12, pp. 134f) / Ctr. Nest. 2,4f (PTS 22, p. 264) / Hom. in Dorm. I 3,26f (PTS 29, p. 486).

middle,<sup>287</sup> i.e. the Logos ‘causes to subsist for himself’ the human nature, or – the traditional variant – in the intransitive middle,<sup>288</sup> i.e. the human nature is simply said to subsist in the Logos. Rozemond’s claim of the fundamental significance of “la notion d’enhypostasie” can thus well be said to hold true with regard to John’s frequent and emphatic use of the insubsistence formula. If we look for alternative formulas, the first candidate is of course Maximus’ coexistence-formula. The two instances from the *Expositio* alluding to Maximus’ phrase *μετὰ τῆς συγκειμένης καὶ συνυφεστηκυίας* are dealing with the consequences of the union for the natures, namely the *communicatio idiomatum* and the triad of ‘deification’ – ‘incarnation’ – ‘communion’ reflecting Cyril of Alexandria’s threefold *divisio vocum*.<sup>289</sup> If two similar instances in John’s other works are to be found in contexts treating the same topics,<sup>290</sup> we seem to be well justified in regarding the formula as describing the consequences of the union rather than the union itself, thus being definitely less central than the insubsistence formula. However, a proper alternative expression to the latter is John’s identification of the Logos as the hypostasis of the flesh, an asymmetric echo of Maximus’ ‘more immediate’ connection between *both* natures and their hypostasis.<sup>291</sup> As John attaches this identification very frequently to the insubsistence formula, he probably regards it to be some kind of precision or completion of the latter, perhaps necessary for him to avoid the misunderstanding as merely accidental insubsistence: ‘The flesh subsists in the Logos and has the latter as his hypostasis’.<sup>292</sup>

<sup>287</sup> Expos. 51,9f (PTS 12, p. 123); 86,99 (Ibid., p. 195) / De fide ctr. Nest. 23,3f (PTS 22, p. 244) / Ctr. Nest. 43,27 (PTS 22, p. 286) / Ctr. Akeph. 9,21f (PTS 22, p. 416) / Hom. in Nativ. 2,24-26 (PTS 29, p. 326) = Expos. 46,28-20 (PTS 12, p. 110).

<sup>288</sup> Dial. fus. 45,20f (PTS 7, p. 110); 67,27.29 (Ibid., p. 139) / Expos. 53,15f (PTS 12, p. 128) / De fide ctr. Nest. 23,5.14 (PTS 22, p. 244) / Ctr. Nest. 1,34 (PTS 22, p. 264); 2,17f (Ibid., p. 265) / Ctr. Jac. 12,12f (PTS 22, p. 115) / Hom. in sab. 29,36f (PTS 29, p. 139) / Hom. in Dorm. I 8,38f (PTS 29, p. 493). Synonymously to *ὑφίστημι* in the intransitive middle John can use the verbs *ὑπάρχειν ἐν* (Expos. 61,29f [PTS 12, p. 156]; 66,13f [p. 165] / De fide ctr. Nest. 23,5 [PTS 22, p. 244] / Ctr. Akeph. 6,15 [PTS 22, p. 414] / Ctr. Jacob. 11,12 [PTS 22, p. 114]; 79,13f [Ibid., p. 136]), *ὑπόστασιν* or *ὑπαρξιν ἔχειν ἐν* (Dial. fus. 45,18 [PTS 7, p. 110] / Expos. 56,70 (PTS 12, p. 136) = Ctr. Jac. 83,22f (PTS 22, p. 141) / Expos. 71,21f [p. 170]), the Leontian *ἐνυφίστασθαι* (Hom. in Dorm. II 14,11; PTS 29, p. 531) or the Maximian *τὸ εἶναι λαγχάνειν* (Maximus said *λαμβάνειν*) *ἐν* (Expos. 46,37; PTS 12, p. 110 / Hom. in Nativ. 2,32f; PTS 29, p. 327).

<sup>289</sup> Expos. 48,32f (PTS 12, p. 117) / 91,51-53 (Ibid., p. 214). The relevant Cyril-passages are collected by Uthemann, Vorbereitung, pp. 379f n. 31.

<sup>290</sup> Ctr. Jac. 81,34-36 (PTS 22, p. 139: *communicatio idiomatum*) / Volunt. 42,30-33 (PTS 22, p. 228: three modes of the union, i.e. divine, human, theandric [cf. ab. n. 208]). The last instance, Ctr. Jac. 79,21-23 (PTS 22, p. 137), uses the formula to stress the remaining duality of natures.

<sup>291</sup> Cf. ab. n. 191.

<sup>292</sup> Dial. fus. 45,20f (PTS 7, p. 110): *ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ὑπέστη προσληφθεῖσα ὑπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ ταύτην καὶ ἔσχε καὶ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν*; 67,29 (Ibid., p. 139): *ἐν τῇ προὑπαρχούσῃ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ὑποστάσει ὑπέστη προσληφθεῖσα ὑπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ ταύτην καὶ ἔσχε καὶ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν*

Finally, we have to examine how this insubstance formula fits into John's concept of hypostasis and hypostatic union. As we have immediately noticed in quoting a few John-passages on insubstance, his concept of hypostasis very clearly displays an aspect the Cappadocian concept comprised from its beginning, but most of the time implicitly: the constitution of an hypostasis by its beginning or origin, more clearly revealed by the synonymous phrase *τρόπος ὑπάρξεως* which M. Richard most aptly interpreted as "constitution de l'individu comme tel, constitution qu'il tient de son origine et qui n'est quelque sorte que son origine continuée".<sup>293</sup> John explicitly agrees with this interpretation when he says: "The hypostasis is the composition (σύμπηξις) to one and the same thing in the beginning of every existence".<sup>294</sup> Thus, we immediately understand the connection between the denial of a *προδιάπλασις* of the human nature and its subsistence in the hypostasis of the Logos: "And again, it is impossible that what once subsisted by itself should receive another beginning of hypostasis; for hypostasis is (coming into) existence by itself".<sup>295</sup> The connection to Maximus' resumption of the *logos-tropos*-distinction is made explicit in John's treatise on the two wills, when he explains how the creator composes individuals from substances and accidents:

"The former elements are substantial and natural, but their individually modelled and chosen movement (constitutes) the hypostatical difference. To participate in the former constitutes the

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/ Expos. 55,12-15 (PTS 12, p. 131): οὐ καθ' αὐτὴν ὑποστᾶσαν καὶ ἄτομον χρηματίσασαν πρότερον καὶ οὕτως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προσληφθεῖσαν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει ὑπάρξασαν. Αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ἐγένετο τῇ σαρκὶ ὑπόστασις; 56,33f (Ibid., p. 135): ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ ἐψυχωμένην σάρκα ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ ὑποστήσας, αὐτὸς γεγωνὼς αὐτῇ ὑπόστασις / Ctr. Nest. 2,4f (PTS 22, p. 264): ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει ὑποστήσας καὶ χρηματίσας αὐτῇ ὑπόστασις / Ctr. Akeph. 6,15f (PTS 22, p. 414): ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπάρξασα καὶ αὐτὴν ἐσχηκυῖα ὑπόστασις; 9,21-23 (Ibid., p. 416): ): ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπεστήσατο σάρκα ἔμψυχον λογικὴν, αὐτὴ χρηματίσασα τῇ ἐμψύχῳ καὶ λογικῇ σαρκὶ ὑπόστασις / Ctr. Jac. 12,12f (PTS 22, p. 115): ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποστᾶσα καὶ αὐτὴν κληρωσαμένη ὑπόστασις / Hom. in sab. 29,36-38 (PTS 29, p. 139): ἐν τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάσει ὑφισταμένης τῆς τε ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ μετὰ θάνατον καὶ ταύτην κεκτημένων ὑπόστασις / Hom. in Nativ. 2,24-27 (PTS 29, p. 326) = Expos. 46,28-31 (PTS 12, p. 110): ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει ἐκ τῶν ἀγνῶν τῆς παρθένου αἱμάτων σάρκα ἐψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ ὑπεστήσατο ἀπαρχὴν προσλαβόμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου φυράματος, αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος γενόμενος τῇ σαρκὶ ὑπόστασις. For the occurrence of those 'identification'-formulas without connection to the insubstance formula cf. Kotter's apparatus on Expos. 51,15 (PTS 12, p. 123) and De fide ctr. Nest. 29,6 (PTS 22, p. 247).

<sup>293</sup> L'introduction du mot 'hypostase' dans la théologie de l'incarnation, in: MSR 2 (1945), (5-32.243-270) p. 19.

<sup>294</sup> ὑπόστασις γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκάστου ὑπάρξεως κατ' αὐτὸ σύμπηξις. (Dial. fus. 67,21f; PTS 7, p. 139). The κατ' αὐτὸ is a bit ambiguous. Richter (Die Philosophischen Kapitel des Johannes von Damaskus, Stuttgart: Hiersemann 1982, p. 154) translates: „Ein Einzelwesen ist ja die Zusammenfügung für sich am Anfang des Bestehens eines jeden“, i.e. reads (following b) καθ' αὐτό instead. In contrast, I take the phrase to signify the virtual point which all the elements of the hypostasis (the context talks about body and soul) are fixed at in its beginning (cf. Expos. 71,21-24; PTS 12, p. 170).

<sup>295</sup> Καὶ πάλιν ἀδύνατον τὰ ἅπαξ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑποστάντα ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν ὑποστάσεως σχεῖν ἢ γὰρ ὑπόστασις ἢ καθ' αὐτό ἐστιν ὑπαρξίς. (Dial. fus. 67,34-36; PTS 7, p. 140). The ambivalence of the Greek ὑπαρξίς ('existence' or 'beginning') can only be translated very oddly.



identity of nature, but the way of (coming into) existence (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως) introduces the difference of hypostases, and the marked off and independent (coming into) existence and composition (σύμπληξις) of everyone and the individually modelled and moved and different use of the natures causes the hypostases to be marked off and enables to speak of many human beings”.<sup>296</sup>

The notion of σύμπληξις – we talked about its Christological tradition when dealing with Maximus’ use of it – seems to fulfill a twofold function in this context: It links the logos-tropos-distinction with the Porphyrio-Cappadocian concept of an individual as ἄθροισμα ἰδιωμάτων, as it is the substantial and accidental properties which are “put together” in order to make up the individual,<sup>297</sup> and it resumes the Maximian ‘biology’ of incarnation we have examined above:

“In the case of every (normal) woman, the conception happens, when a sperm is thrown down from a man, and the conception is the effect of the sperm; and the sperm is the hypostasis, when the woman provides simultaneously to the conception her own blood, the intercourse happens, the blood settles down (ὑφίστασθαι) in the sperm and the sperm becomes a hypostasis for them, it becomes a common hypostasis for itself and the female blood. However, in the case of the holy virgin it was not so; for the conception was not from a male sperm, but [...] the son of God overshadowed her [...], like a divine sperm and composed (συνέπηξεν) for himself from her untainted and most pure blood a flesh enlivened by a rational and intelligent soul in becoming the hypostasis for the latter”.<sup>298</sup>

Just as in Maximus, the active and form-giving role of the sperm is transferred to the Logos – John is quite fond of Theodoretus’ formula ὅιονεὶ θεῖος σπóρος which he thinks to be Justin’s<sup>299</sup> – which makes a proper human sperm superfluous.<sup>300</sup> However, the direct and explicit identification of sperm and hypostasis is astonishing. The treatise on the two wills explains this more carefully:

<sup>296</sup> Ταῦτα πάντα οὐσιώδη εἰσὶ καὶ φυσικά, ἡ δὲ τούτων ιδιότροπος καὶ ιδιαίρετος κίνησις ὑποστατικῇ διαφορᾷ. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν τούτων τὸ ταυτὸν τῆς φύσεως παρίστησιν, ὁ δὲ τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως τὴν τῶν ὑποστάσεων εἰσάγει διαφοράν, καὶ ἡ ἀποτεμνημένη ἐκάστου ὑπαρξίς τε καὶ σύμπληξις καὶ ἡ ιδιότροπος καὶ ιδιοκίνητος καὶ διάφορος τῶν φυσικῶν χρήσις ἀποτεμνημένης τὰς ὑποστάσεις ποιεῖ καὶ πολλοὺς λέγεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. (Volunt. 7 col. 2,12-27; PTS 22, pp. 183f).

<sup>297</sup> Cf. also Ctr. Jac. 80,12-19 (PTS 22, p. 137f).

<sup>298</sup> Ἐφ’ ἐκάστης γὰρ τῶν γυναικῶν σύλληψις γίνεται σπορᾶς ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καταβαλλομένης, καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς σπορᾶς ἐστὶν ἡ σύλληψις· καὶ ἡ σπορά ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόστασις ἅμα τῇ συλλήψει χορηγούσης τῆς γυναικὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα αἵματα καὶ συναφείας γινομένης, καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς σπορᾷ ὑφισταμένων τῶν αἱμάτων, καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς σπορᾶς γινομένης αὐτοῖς ὑποστάσεως καὶ κοινῆς ὑποστάσεως ἐαυτῇ καὶ τοῖς γυναικειοῖς αἵμασι τῆς σπορᾶς γινομένης. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁγίας παρθένου οὐχ οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ σπορᾶς ἀνδρὸς ἡ σύλληψις, ἀλλὰ [...] ἐπεσκίασεν ἐπ’ αὐτὴν [...] ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ [...] καὶ συνέπηξεν ἐαυτῷ ἐκ τῶν ἁγῶν καὶ καθαρωτάτων αὐτῆς αἱμάτων σάρκα ἐψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ, αὐτὸς γεγονὼς αὐτῇ ὑπόστασις. (Ctr. Nest. 43,32-39.42-46; PTS 22, pp. 286f).

<sup>299</sup> Expos. 46,21 (PTS 12, p. 109) = Hom. in Nativ. 2,17 (PTS 29, p. 326) / Ctr. Jac. 90,3 (PTS 22, p. 144: here the explicit quotation from the Expositio fidei) / Volunt. 9,54 (PTS 22, p. 192) / De fide ctr. Nest. 23,2 (PTS 22, p. 244) / Ctr. Nest. 43,26 (PTS 22, p. 286).

<sup>300</sup> Cf. Expos. 2,21 (PTS 12, p. 9); 51,8f.35 (Ibid., pp. 123.125); 87,70f (p. 201) / Haer. 100,20 (PTS 22, p. 61) / Hom. in Dorm. I 9,9 (PTS 29, p. 494); I 12,14 (Ibid., p. 497); II 2,40 (p. 519).

“We will come to know that there is only one hypostasis of Christ the following way: The beginning of every child’s existence and his hypostasis is the sperm thrown down from the father into the uterus of the woman in the conception of which the woman provides her own blood, and thus the child is constituted. There is one single hypostasis of the sperm and the blood from the mother having settled down in it in order to form (solid) flesh. The woman conceives from the intercourse with the man the sperm thrown down from him, and the latter is the hypostasis of the child”.<sup>301</sup>

In his function as active and form-giving power in the conception, the sperm is ἀρχὴ ἡ αἰτία ὑπάρξεως of every animal transforming the undetermined mass of blood into the distinct and concrete flesh of a certain individual and can thus be regarded – according to the logos-tropos-conception – as the constitutive principle of every hypostasis, practically identical with it. The lack of a human sperm is thus the necessary presupposition for the lack of a human hypostasis.<sup>302</sup> John can thus interchangeably claim the sperm to assume a body or the Logos to cause to subsist for himself the virgin’s pure blood as his flesh without a sperm.<sup>303</sup> What does he mean then, when he talks of a ὑφίστασθαι of Mary’s menstrual blood in the logos-seed?<sup>304</sup> This was obviously so strange or even offensive for some copyists of John’s works that they altered the case of the participle in the Ctr. Nest. passage in order to deprive the blood of its (logical) subject-position.<sup>305</sup> An interpretation of this formula could be attempted in two different ways: Either John is just extending the personification of the seed which is said to assume a body also to the menstrual blood of which then our passages claim that it receives subsistence in the male seed, or ὑφίστασθαι does not have to be taken in its formalized ontological sense in those passages, but in its original ‘biological’ one. In the latter case, it would signify the settling down or curdling of the blood caused by

<sup>301</sup> “Ὅτι μία τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὑπόστασις, ἐντεῦθεν γνωσόμεθα. Ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐκάστου βρέφους ὑπάρξεως καὶ ὑπόστασις ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ πατρὸς καταβαλλομένη σπορά ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ τῆς γυναικός, ἣν συλλαμβάνουσα ἡ γυνὴ χορηγεῖ τὰ οἰκεῖα αἵματα, καὶ οὕτως συνίσταται τὸ βρέφος. Μία ὑπόστασις τῆς σπορᾶς καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ ὑφισταμένων εἰς σάρκα αἱμάτων, καὶ ἡ σύλληψις τῆς σπορᾶς ἐστὶ. Συλλαμβάνει δὲ ἡ γυνὴ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς μίξεως τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καταβαλλόμενον σπόρον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ βρέφους ὑπόστασις. (Volunt. 9,39-48; PTS 22, p. 192).

<sup>302</sup> Cf. De fide ctr. Nest. 23,6-9.12-15 (PTS 22, p. 244): οὐδὲ ἔσχε σπορὰν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὑπόστασιν εἰ μὴ τὸν θεὸν μόνον· παντὸς γὰρ βρέφους ὑπόστασις σπορά, ταύτης δὲ ὁ θεὸς λόγος. Καὶ πᾶσα σὰρξ τινὸς γίνεται, αὕτη δὲ οὐδὲ ἐνὸς εἰ μὴ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου. Διὰ τοῦτο μία ὑπόστασις. Οὕτω νοοῦμεν τὸ «ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο», [...] ὅτι οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἢ αἰτίαν ὑπάρξεως ἔσχεν ἡ σὰρξ ἐκεῖνη ἢ ἀγία εἰ μὴ αὐτὸν τὸν υἱὸν καὶ λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε ἄλλου ἐγένετο εἰ μὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπέστη καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ γέγονεν ἡ ἔνωσις τῶν φύσεων.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid. 29,9-14 (p. 247) cf. Expos. 86,66-68 (PTS 12, p. 193).

<sup>304</sup> Volunt. 9,44-46 (PTS 22, p. 192): Μία ὑπόστασις τῆς σπορᾶς καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ ὑφισταμένων εἰς σάρκα αἱμάτων / Ctr. Nest. 43,35f (PTS 22, p. 286): ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς σπορᾷ ὑφισταμένων τῶν αἱμάτων.

<sup>305</sup> The translation (“Le coit s’accomplit et donne personnalité au sang dans la semence virile”) and interpretation of C. Chevalier, *La Mariologie de St. Jean Damascène*, Rome: Pontificale Institutum orientalium studiorum 1936 (OrChrA 109), p. 110 follows this varia lectio of LPW.

the logos-seed in order to form the embryo. However, as the relevant contexts do not show any kind of implicit hint towards the milk-analogy, I would prefer the first solution, although the translations in accord with it sound very strange.

To conclude, we cannot verify Studer's harsh judgement about John's theological accomplishments with regard to the term ἐνυπόστατος and the insubistence formula. In both cases, the analyses of John's texts shed new light on the relevant traditions before John. He is definitely the author whose works fulfill both criteria for a Loofian interpretation of our term most clearly and whose Christology assigns to the insubistence formula the most prominent role. Although he failed to integrate Maximus' congenial synthesis of Christology and trinitarian theology into his teaching, he clarified and made explicit many aspects of the hypostasis-concept we could only assume as implicit in many of our earlier texts. Thus, he deserves his prominent final position in the history of the Early Church just like in this terminological survey.

## B. Summary

Finally, we shall tackle the problem we have avoided throughout the whole of our examination by leaving ἐνυπόστατος just untranslated: Which appropriate English equivalent can be found for our term in the different contexts and meanings it occurs in? Is the translation 'enhypostasized', 'enhypostatic' or even 'insubistent' possible? In answering this question we will have to come back to both our introductory alternative, whether our term parallels ἔνυλος = enmattered or rather ἔνυλος = material, and to the problem of a possible comparison or analogy between the 'insubsting' human nature of Christ and the 'insubsting' accidents, genera and species.

What we have said about the trinitarian use of our term does by no means deviate from its basic meaning 'hypostatical' ('existing as a hypostasis'), 'subsistent', 'real'. The term was used in those contexts to distinguish the entity to which it was attributed either from a merely accidental reality ('the ἐνυπόστατος λόγος is not just a thought of the father') or from a merely apparent reality ('the ἐνυπόστατος, ζῶν λόγος is not like the dead idols of the heathens'). The same holds true for what we have called the 'twofold use tradition', as it is also based on our equation  $x \text{ ἐνυπόστατον} = \text{hypostasis of } x$ . However, this tradition finally has to break with its own starting point, as it has to serve the theological task of arguing for the unity of Christ's hypostasis and against the necessity of postulating a human hypostasis in Christ. Thus, it has to restrict

ἐνυπόστατος to the wider sense of (however) ‘real’ and to oppose it to hypostasis, the term now exclusively used for the independent reality. Hence, the translation ‘real’ would in those texts probably be the best one, but ‘hypostatical’ is very problematic. Accordingly, our ‘distinction tradition’ prevailed in the end, because it does not proceed from the common usage, as did the ‘twofold-use’-one, but immediately from the relevant theological problem: the refutation of the ‘no nature without hypostasis’ objection or the denial of the necessity of a second, human hypostasis in Christ. A translation by ‘hypostatical’ is thus immediately ruled out in those texts, and also ‘real’ seems to be too unspecific for the relatively precise idea behind this tradition. We have seen from Ephrem of Amid onwards that most of our authors were – as to etymology – naïve enough to anticipate what B. Daley and others regarded as a modern misunderstanding of the Greek prefix: an ἐνυπόστατον is what is ‘in’ a hypostasis, i.e. the substance, species or nature realized in it. Therefore, we have paraphrased our term in our interpretation of Maximus as ‘hypostatically realised’, which could probably also serve as a suitable translation. But also the rendering ‘enhypostastic’ or ‘enhypostasized’ adopted by many Maximus-scholars is in my opinion acceptable, as long as it is made clear that – for Maximus – this term signifies in general the relationship of any nature and any hypostasis *a parte naturae*, not particularly that of Christ’s human nature to the hypostasis of the divine Logos. A translation as ‘enhypostatic’ in the full Loofsian sense is, as we have seen, possible at best in John of Damascus, but only if one dismisses the Maximian symmetry in the use of our term displayed from time to time as nothing but a traditional left-over. But at all events, the ‘distinction tradition’ clearly parallels our term with ἔνυλος = enmattered,<sup>306</sup> whereas the ‘twofold use tradition’ rather seems to think of ἔνυλος = material.

The rendition ‘insubsistent’ only comes into question, if one clarifies the philosophical concept behind the metaphor and distinctly rules out the misunderstanding of such an insubsistence as (quasi-) accidental. Lampe’s postulate of a meaning “subsistent in, established in the very nature, inherent”<sup>307</sup> holds for none of the reference he adduces.

<sup>306</sup> Cf. Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 2; ed. Morani, p. 18,10-15 (quoting Numenius): εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ δύναμις ὕλη τίς ἐστίν, τοῖς αὐτοῖς πάλιν χρησόμεθα λόγοις· εἰ δὲ οὐχ ὕλη ἀλλ’ ἐνυλον (ἕτερον δὲ ἐστίν τὸ ἐνυλον παρὰ τὴν ὕλην, τὸ γὰρ μετέχον ὕλης ἐνυλον λέγεται) τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ μετέχον τῆς ὕλης, πότερον ὕλη καὶ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄνυλον; εἰ μὲν οὖν ὕλη, πῶς ἐνυλον καὶ οὐχ ὕλη; εἰ δὲ οὐχ ὕλη, ἄνυλον ἄρα· εἰ δὲ ἄνυλον, οὐ σῶμα, πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ἐνυλον.

<sup>307</sup> S.v. A 5 (485b).

He obviously assumes the possibility of a construction of our term with a dative based mainly upon the following sentence from Gregory of Nyssa:

πάντοτε γὰρ ἐνεργὸν καὶ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον τῇ αἰδίῳ φύσει τὸ ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ τὸ αἰδίων ἐνθεωρεῖται θέλημα, οὔτε ἀπὸ τινος ἰδιαζούσης ἀρχῆς ἐγγινόμενον οὔτε δίχα τοῦ θελητοῦ νοηθῆναι δυνάμενον.<sup>308</sup>

However, the dative τῇ αἰδίῳ φύσει does not depend on ἐνυπόστατος here, but on ἐνθεωρεῖται. Gregory calls the good and eternal will to be perceived as always active, substantial and hypostatic in the eternal nature (not in the mortal one, where will is neither substantial nor hypostatic). 'Ενυπόστατος means 'to be in a hypostasis' and can thus, just like ἐνυλός = enmattered, not be combined with an additional dative-indication of where the entity our term is referred to is 'in'.<sup>309</sup> Yet, from a systematic point of view, it is in the context of Aristotelian ontology really difficult to see how an insubstantiating entity which can by no means be regarded as καθ' αὐτό is able to obtain an ontological status fundamentally different from that of an accident. The dominant influence of the *Categories* propagating the all-embracing distinction between substance and accident and the absolute ontological primacy of the first individual substance must finally place the secondary substances in an at least quasi-accidental position, as already Aristotle regards them to "determine the quality with reference to a substance" (Cat. 5 3b20). This consequence is particularly evident in *De sectis*, where the derived sense of ἐνυπόστατος originally signifying the accident is transferred to Christ's human and divine nature (1241B). Again, the 'distinction tradition' possesses the systematically better standing. Even if Loofs', Otto's or Stickelberger's extolling of Leontius of Byzantium as metaphysical innovator is mostly overstated, his distinction

<sup>308</sup> Contra Eunomium III,6,17; ed. Jaeger, vol. 2, p. 181.

<sup>309</sup> Accordingly, Lampe's insertion of τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ into the Cyril phrase (cf. n. 307) is incorrect, as will immediately become clear in the light of the parallels we adduced in chap. I n. 8. Lampe's other references have already been treated above in our one-by-one analysis of authors. In case of Jerome of Jerusalem, *De effectu baptismi* (MSG 40, 865B), he incorrectly refers the phrase ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ to (πραγματῶν) ἐνυποστάτων rather than to διδάσκει. A passage Lampe does not adduce, where our term is *prima facie* combined with a dative is Macarius / Symeon, Homily 16,1,11-14 (PTS 4, p. 158): οἱ λέγοντες ἐνυπόστατον τὸ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἴσασι. θεῶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ κακὸν ἐνυπόστατον κατὰ τὸ ἀπαθὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ θεϊκόν. ἡμῖν δὲ ἐστὶν ἐνεργούν ἐν πάσῃ δυνάμει καὶ αἰσθήσει, πάσας ἐπιθυμίας ὑπεράς ὑποβάλλον. However, I take the datives θεῶ and ἡμῖν to be absolute *dativi commodi* ("for God, no evil has reality") rather than to depend on ἐνυπόστατος. The only passage I found, where the rendering 'insubstantiating', 'inherent' in an accidental sense might be possible, is Ps-Gregory Nazianzen, *Fragmentum ex oratione contra astronomos*: καὶ δεσμός μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα, δεσμός δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐστὶ τὸ αἷμα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ τοῦ αἵματος ἐνυπόστατος θερμότης, ἥς ἀποψυχωμένης, ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χωρισμός ἐκ τοῦ σώματος γίνεται, ἀποπηγνυμένου τοῦ αἵματος. (MSG 36,675B) However, warmth in Aristotelian physics is not just a simple, accidental quality, but one of the four elementary ones constituting every corporeal entity. The correct translation is thus probably also: "the warmth realised or embodied in the blood".

was nevertheless also an ontological impulse especially efficient in Maximus and also the later Medieval authors. It distracts the attention of ontological analysis away from the relationship of a (substantial) entity to its (accidental) attributes and makes it focus on that of essence and existence of this entity. Even if this distinction is not yet explicitly made in Maximus, the philosophical efforts inspired by our Christological problems did in my opinion contribute at least as much to its discovery as did those provoked by the problem of creation.<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> Those are succinctly expounded by D. B. Burrell, Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish thinkers, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, ed. N. Kretzmann / E. Stump, Cambridge: CUP 1993, (60-84) pp. 62-70.

## Abbreviations

CAG	Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (cf. Bibliography).
CCG	Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca (for used vols cf. Bibl.).
CPG	Clavis Patrum Graecorum, ed. M. Geerard, 5 vols + 1 suppl, Turnhout: Brepols 1:1983 2:1974 3:1979 4:1980 5:1987 suppl:1998.
CSCO	Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum orientalium (for used vols cf. Bibl.).
GCS	Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte (for used vols cf. Bibl.).
HWP	Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. J. Ritter e.a., 11 vols, Basel: Schwabe 1971-2001.
MSG	Patrologiae cursus completus series graeca (cf. Bibl.).
PTS	Patristische Texte und Studien (for used vols cf. Bibl.).
RAC	Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum. Sachwörterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der antiken Welt, 19 vols + 1 suppl, Stuttgart: Hiersemann 1950ff.
RE	Paulys Realencyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaften, ed. G. Wissowa e.a., Stuttgart: Brucknermüller 1893ff.
SC	Sources chrétiennes (for used vols cf. Bibl.).
TRE	Theologische Realenzyklopädie, ed. G. Krause / G. Müller, 34 vols, Berlin e.a.: De Gruyter 1977ff.

For the less frequently used abbreviations see Theologische Realenzyklopädie. Abkürzungsverzeichnis, ed. S. Schwertner, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 1994.

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